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Chapter 1: Introduction 
“It was like a… refreshing, new discourse!” says Blanche Petrich, journalist in the 
Mexican newspaper La Jornada. She sits in the safe environment of an office building in 
Mexico City and talks about the indigenous armed uprising in Chiapas of January 1994. 
Blanche Petrich wears jewellery and a smart dress. She seems very middle class. And she 
is far away from the actual conflict.1 (See map 1.1) 
In a way, the quote above could have been mine. Upon arriving in Mexico in January 
2006 I guess I fitted the scheme of the naïve European revolutionary tourist.2 I was hoping 
to find traces of the revolution that took place “to make the Revolution possible”3, and I 
wanted to write my master thesis on the way the Zapatista movement had been, and still 
was, paving the way for a new Mexico, and, in consequence, for a new way of thinking 
about political change and revolution. For me, too, the indigenous cry of Basta! – Enough!4 
– represented a “refreshing, new discourse”. 
Given the political situation in Mexico in 1994, when the movement that was to be 
known as the Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional (EZLN) – The Zapatista Army for 
National Liberation – declared war on the Mexican government, Blanche Petrich’s motives 
are understandable. In 1994, the PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional – The 
Institutional Revolutionary Party) one-party rule in Mexico was still going strong after 
some 70 years in power, the wounds were still fresh after the Guerra Sucia5 – the Dirty 
War – against left wingers in the 1970s, and the indigenous peoples of Mexico were 
forgotten in the national debate, if not subject to straight forward racism.6 Petrich sums up 
a general feeling in large sectors of Mexican society about the Zapatista uprising: Finally 
somebody spoke out against government repression, dictatorship and poverty. 
But still… The distance, both geographically and culturally, between the offices of La 
Jornada in La Colonia del Valle in the capital of Mexico and the southernmost state of 
Chiapas could hardly have been greater. And Blanche Petrich, I was to find out during a 
one and a half year long stay in Mexico, exemplifies some important aspects of the 
national debate on Zapatismo – which is the common way of denominating the (neo-) 
                                                
1 In La Jornada & Canalseisdejulio 2003 
2 Viqueira 2001 
3 Subcomandante Marcos, quoted in Blixen and Fazio 1995 
4 In the document Declaracion de la Selva Lacandona, read by the Zapatista insurgents from the town hall of 
San Cristobal de Las Casas on January 1, 1994 and published in newspapers, EZLN claims to be the result of 
500 years of repression. ”But today we say enough!” is one of the more famous quotes from the document. 
(EZLN 2003) 
5 This name has been applied to the state repression against leftist activists in Mexico in the late 1960s and 
the -70s. In Montemayor 2004 
6 Gomez Izquierdo 2005 
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Zapatista movement:7 Most commentators live their lives far away from the region of 
fighting, and they speak about, and sometimes for, the indigenous peoples that rose up in 
arms in Chiapas, but rarely talk to the indigenous or ask them why?, how? and now what? 
What struck me when researching and reading the existing literature on EZLN, was that 
surprisingly little existed about the facts on the ground, about how the living and breathing 
grassroots of the Zapatista movement had experienced their participation in the uprising, 
and about why they chose to go to such an extreme measure as declaring war on the 
national government. Or, that is: Many scientists and journalists and activists had a lot to 
say on the subject, but what caught my attention was the lack of indigenous voices telling 
their stories, explaining their choices. The majority of all the words, articles and books 
produced on and about Zapatismo were written by Hispanic city intellectuals, and more 
often than not focused on abstract, political aspects of the phenomenon rather than on 
serious historical investigations about the background of EZLN.8 Blanche Petrich was not 
alone! She was part of a broad political wave that historian Juan Pedro Viqueira calls the 
chiapanólogos – politically orientated intellectuals who know little but talk much about the 
history of Chiapas and the reasons for the uprising in 1994.9 
This thesis is a modest attempt, within the limits of a master thesis and a student’s 
ability to really understand Mexican history, to answer some key questions about the 
Zapatista movement and its relationship with its base – the indigenous people of Chiapas. 
For this purpose, I give an account of the history of a small Chiapan Community called 
ejido Tabasco, located in the municipality of Las Margaritas. I follow the Tabasqueños – 
the people of ejido Tabasco –– from the creation of the community in 1939 to the end of 
the 1990s. My hope is that this enables me to study a historical process that, too some 
degree, has been left out of much of the academic work done in the aftermath of the 
Zapatista uprising. 
Before I go into the theoretical approach of this master thesis and the study of ejido 
Tabasco, I would like to discuss some of the literature on Zapatismo. This I do to show 
how I ended up studying a small Chiapan community. My initial thinking about 
researching and writing about the Zapatista movement was changed when confronted with 
                                                
7 I use zapatista instead of neo-zapatista when referring to EZLN and the politics of the movement. To quote 
one of the heavyweighters in Chiapan history, Antonio Garcia de Leon: The term ”Zapatismo” is here used 
on purpose, since it is the name the rebels give to their movement, considering it a continuation of ”original 
Zapatismo” of 1910-19. This is important because today those who are outsiders or opponents of the 
movement usually call it ”neo-zapatismo.” (Garcia de Leon 2005) 
8 This will be discussed in greater detail as this chapter rolls on, in the discussion about literature. 
9 Viqueira 1999. One note: I know very little about Blanche Petrich, about her background and knowledge 
about Zapatismo and Chiapas. I only use her as a kind of straw man in this introduction. 
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a gigantic body of literature, at times more polemic than academic in its approach. 
Planning on writing about EZLN before going to Mexico, it all seemed clear: The Zapatista 
struggle was a fair and necessary one, and had to be analyzed in the context of its 
contribution to the thinking about contentious politics. Upon arriving in Mexico, the image 
got blurred – EZLN is disputed, also among scholars, as I will show in the following. And, 
more important in this context: So many words, articles and books – of differing quality – 
are written about Zapatismo, often in a hyperbolic fashion, that my looking for a small 
indigenous community was a kind of escape from it all. This does not mean I did not read 
and enjoy – and use – the existing literature.  I have. But I hope these next pages will cast 
some light on why this thesis ended up as is did.  
Towards the end of this chapter I will discuss the thesis of this work, and give a 
summary of the structure of this paper. 
 
The frustrations of a student facing history – a discussion about literature 
This discussion on the existing literature about Zapatismo is caused by the frustration of 
this student when confronted with what scholars actually have written about the uprising in 
Chiapas in 1994. After having read much of what has been written on the topic, my 
impression is that there hardly exists any neutral books or articles. This has made the 
handling and election of which secondary sources to use in the process of writing this 
thesis a difficult one.  
It can be repeated: A lot has been written about EZLN. According to Octavio Gordillo y 
Ortiz, who has gathered much of the literature about Zapatismo, there are more than 700 
research publications, books, articles and NGO reports out there on the topic.10 In other 
words: The bibliography on Zapatismo is impressive in its amount. After having read some 
70 books – most of which are recognized as the “classics” in this field of study – and 
having tried to avoid the most politicized approaches, I need to ask: But what about the 
quality of this massive body of literature? And the political tendentious speculations? 
Juan Pedro Viqueira, historian at el Colegio de Mexico, whose work focuses since many 
decades back on Chiapas, claims that most of what is written about EZLN and Chiapas 
since January 1994 are folders of propaganda rather than academic works.11 In Viqueira’s 
                                                
10 Gordillo y Ortiz 2006. I have not found all the books I know of in Gordillo y Ortiz´ collection, which 
shows, of course, that there are many more publications than that, even. 
11 Viqueira 1999 
 4 
view, the problem is the improvised “chiapanólogos” buying into the scheme of the 
Zapatistas and the diocese of San Cristobal:12 
 
In this interpretation, we have some voracious, exploiting finqueros13 who enjoy the abundant richness 
generated in the region and who throw the Indians off their ancestral lands with the help of their white 
guards and the repressive forces of the government.14 
 
On the other hand, says Viqueira, we have the good Indian; he who kept his culture 
alive during 500 years of repression; a democratic man living in harmony with nature – not 
so far away from the old anthropological notion of the “noble savage”. 
I tend to agree with Viqueira. Several scholars who write about EZLN team with the 
guerrilla and try to evade all the darker sides of it or – not mentioned by Viqueira – they 
criticize the Zapatistas and defend the government or the official policy with immensity. 
Neither side prioritizes accurate, historical accounts of what happened in Chiapas and 
Mexico leading up to 1994 and the Zapatista uprising. To give but a few examples: 
Spanish writer Manuel Vázquez Montealban writes in his personal account of meeting 
with subcomandante Marcos in the Lacandon jungle about the ignorance of the Mexican 
right, blaming the government for all the sorrows of the poor. He makes no intention of 
hiding how impressed he is with the political project of EZLN, a project he considers to be 
fair and necessary and driven by the indigenous population and an internal democracy that 
is missing in official, public Mexico. This is not necessarily wrong, but whereas 
Montealban analyzes the sorrows of western modernity with clarity, he does not apply the 
same standard when discussing Zapatismo. Instead he discusses literature, fine arts and the 
movies with Marcos, and is clearly impressed with the guerrilla leader’s knowledge and 
wit. He goes on to present the subcomandante as a city intellectual, a joker and a mystical 
figure that joined forces with the suppressed to make the revolution possible. This is the 
image the Zapatistas want to sell, and have succeeded in selling to the European 
intellectuals. Equally typical of the European approach is the understanding of the 
indigenous project – without making a serious effort to find out for one self what this 
project really is. Montealban’s description of living in the Zapatista community with other 
“revolutionary tourists” from Europe, showing how impressed he is with them, seems 
                                                
12 The diocese of San Cristobal shares many of the Zapatista interpretations of Chiapas’ socio-economic 
structures, as we will see in chapter 5 and forth. 
13 A finquero is the owner of the finca, which in Chiapas is the common name for hacienda; farm 
14 In Viqueira 1999 
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rather emblematic: This is first and foremost the account of how the Zapatistas came to be 
the favourite of the European left in the post Berlin wall 1990s.15 
Scottish Sociologist John Holloway, working in the Autonomous University of Puebla 
(BUAP), Mexico since the early 1990s, is the editor of an anthology that represents another 
tendency in the literature on Zapatismo – that of (over-)analyzing the politics of 
Zapatismo. Zapata vive! Reinventing revolution in Mexico is interesting in its take on the 
politics of the Zapatista struggle, about the newness of Zapatista politics and the 
movements use of post-modern symbolism etc.16 The scholars contributing in this 
anthology, ranging from economists to anthropologists, discuss some important issues, 
such as whether EZLN is a post- or anti-modern movement. The tendency is that EZLN is 
not anti-modern, but rather that the movement is driven by resistance to the only modernity 
acceptable in the world after The End of History, as pronounced by US-American historian 
Francis Fukuyama after the fall of the Soviet block in the early 1990s.17 The book launches 
EZLN as the solution to the political impotence of the left after the fall of the Berlin wall, 
and concludes that the only viable way for a left revolution today is that of the Zapatista 
preguntando caminamos – we walk asking, meaning that the revolution be created along 
the way, that nobody holds all the answers.18 To counter this view: Mexican literature 
professor Juan Lopez Pellicer at the University in Oslo claims that EZLN is an anti-modern 
movement, struggling to revoke some of the unfortunate aspects of western civilization and 
returning to a more innocent way of life, in peace with nature.19  
The two positions represent two radically different views if put in perspective: In the 
former, the Zapatista may pave the way for worldwide change. The latter seems to reduce 
the Zapatista project to the local sphere of Chiapas. Most of the literature seems to argue 
that the first take is truer than the latter – EZLN is all about an indigenous rebellion, but 
not solely that. Zapatismo is not limited to Chiapas. This is also in accordance with EZLNs 
own approach – they are not comfortable with being just a spokesman for indigenous 
emancipation, they seek more profound change.20  
Mexican economist Luis Lorenzano claims that the Zapatista rebellion is based on an 
agrarian community organized as an urban worker’s commune. This commune is the 
                                                
15 Montealban 1998 
16 Holloway & Pelaez 1998 
17 Fukuyama claims in his essay The end of History and the New Man that the battle of ideologies came to an 
end with the end of Soviet communism. Now, says Fukuyama, we live in the Global world, intertwined by 
liberal capitalism. (Fukuyama 1992) 
18 Holloway 1998 
19 Pellicer (unpublished) 
20 Le Bot 1997 
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material base of the armed community (but also part of this armed community), and their 
worker’s federation is EZLN. In continuation, this means that Zapatismo is not based on 
ethnicity, but rather is a class rebellion.21 This argument is somewhat refined by John 
Holloway in the book Change the World without taking power.22 Holloway says the 
Zapatistas are right in not trying to overthrow the Mexican government and take power. 
The state is embedded in a network of power relations, and, thus, the world cannot be 
changed by taking over state power. The central point is that negation is at the very heart of 
revolution – negation of capitalistic structures and state power, and that EZLN is the 
hithermost representative of this way of thinking about politics. Holloway’s claim that in 
the beginning of the revolution there is the scream, a spontaneous, deepfelt protest, is a 
reference to the Zapatista yell of Basta!, of the Zapatista negation of this world.23 
These perspectives are interesting, but not really helpful to a student of history. Many of 
the theories seem to be taken out of thin air – Zapatismo is adapted to the theory rather 
than the other way around. None of the above mentioned authors claim to describe the 
origins of Zapatismo. But neither do they seem to emphasize the understanding of the 
historical roots. And what happens to Holloway’s theory if the historical roots of EZLN are 
not about the primal, intuitive scream of Basta!, but rather the work of traditional socialist 
revolutionaries? Will all his efforts of explaining the Zapatista “newness” then be in vain? 
And is that maybe why discussions of the origins of Zapatismo does not enter the equation 
in the openly left leaning works on the subject? For as we will see, EZLN does not 
represent anything new in political thinking upon settling in Chiapas. At that point the 
organization rather is a traditional leftist guerrilla, aiming at overthrowing the government. 
Subcomandante Marcos, portrayed as the new thinker of the left, admits for the first 
time that EZLN holds its origins in the traditional, political-military movement Las 
Fuerzas de Liberacion Nacional (FLN) – the Forces for National Liberation in 1997.24 He 
states this in an interview with French anthropologist Yvon Le Bot in the book El sueño 
zapatista, one of the rather few attempts of writing an accurate and complete account of the 
movement by some one who has actually been granted an interview with the 
                                                
21 Lorenzano 1998 
22 Holloway 2002 
23 Holloway 2002 
24 FLN was a national political-military organization that sprang out of the Mexican 1968 movement. They 
worked with both peasant and rural workers, capacitating their members in preparations for revolution. The 
leadership consisted of mostly young students. More on this in chapter 7. EZLN’s origin in FLN is not 
controversial today (see for instance subcomandante Marcos’ letter to comandante German in footnote 102), 
but this fact is still somehow silenced by many of the Zapatista supporters and their work. 
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subcomandante and who sympathizes with EZLN.25 But even with the knowledge of this 
background, many scholars keep trying to forget it is so, or they try to minimize this 
historical past of EZLN. Hector Diaz-Polanco and Consuela Sanchez, authors of the book 
Mexico Diverso, talk about the origins of what we today know as EZLN and how it differs 
from the traditional guerrilla movement in Latin America. “Even though, in its early days, 
EZLN held similar positions [as these movements], these were changed rather fast.” That is 
the sum total of the discussion on the origins of Zapatismo – what may seem problematic 
for the authors thesis and that of the Zapatista supporters, is brushed off as something that 
“changed rather fast”. The rest of the chapter in question is devoted to a discussion on all 
the new ways of making politics that are instigated by the Zapatistas.26 
Also, on a little bit different note, it is worth mentioning the work of Carlos 
Lenkersdorf. Having lived and worked in the Tojolabal region for many years, this German 
anthropologist became a professor at the Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico – the 
National Autonomous University of Mexico – (UNAM) in Mexico City. He has written 
extensively on the Tojolabales, also in connection with the Zapatista uprising. For my 
taste, Lenkersdorf leans too much towards the “noble savage” in his work. He blames the 
problems in the indigenous communities solely on the arrival of the Spanish, and thus 
gives strength to the myth of the spiritual Indian, never harming nature etcetc – with titles 
such as Filosofar en clave Tojolabal and Los hombres verdaderos.27 Needless to say: 
Lenkersdorf is the house anthropologist of many an academic apologists of EZLN.28 
Also among those who oppose EZLN, many of the works lack academic groundwork 
and / or are very polemical in the way they treat the movement as a subject of study. One 
example of this tendency: In his essay Los zapatistas y el arte de la ventriloquia, Mexican 
anthropologist Pedro Pitarch writes: 
 
[…] I am positive that el Subcomandante Marcos has not renounced his conventional communist ideas, 
notwithstanding his public and ironic distance to those ideas. In his discourse – not so much in his 
communiqués – it is not hard to find small signs and hints.29 
 
This quote from an essay written in a polemical fashion more than an accurate one, is 
but an example of the many attacks from the “right” on the Zapatista movement; It does 
                                                
25 Le Bot 1997 
26 Diaz-Polanco & Sanchez 2002. The authors are referring to the EZLN roots in FLN. Having said this: This 
is not really a book about the origins of Zapatismo, nor is it an account of the historical reasons for 
Zapatismo. As the title of the book indicates, it discusses questions on autonomy, based in parts on the 
Zapatista experience. 
27 The book titles are telling enough: Philosophize in the Tojolabal key and The true men. 
28 Having said this: Lenkersdorf has done great work in Chiapas, both human and academic. My critique is 
not at all written with the intention of diminishing his efforts.  
29 Pitarch 2003 
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note really provide any proves or relevant sources or quotes. Another example of the same 
tendency is the book Marcos: La genial impostura, by European journalists Bertrand de la 
Grange & Maite Rico. The two want to look at the darker aspects of EZLN, but end up 
attacking Marcos more than anything, leaving the reader with an impression that they got 
mad because he did not give them an interview.  
In left-centre historian and journalist Carlos Tello Diaz’ book La Rebelion de las 
Cañadas, the approach is also a critical one. In the latest edition, he gets his sources 
straight, but when the book was first published in 1996, it contained mistakes, 
misinterpretations and even false claims. It is known that this book was written under the 
influence of Mexican intelligence sources, which provided Tello Diaz with inside 
information, but also with pro-government propaganda.30 That being said, the book 
probably is, in its newest edition, the most complete and accurate account of the origins of 
Zapatismo in Chiapas, maybe alongside sociologist Carmen Legorreta’s Religion, politica 
y guerilla en Las Cañadas de la Selva Lacandona.31 This first hand account of events in 
Chiapas in the late 1980s and early -90s has been criticised for its critical approach to 
EZLN and almost silenced by supporters of the movement. This, of course, may be proof 
that Viqueira is right in his pessimistic view on the scholars of Zapatismo. 
Overall, there are more books written from a ”left” perspective on the Zapatistas, thus 
the danger of ending up with purely positive sources, lacking in historical perspective, is a 
real one for students of the movement. The main focus of the left leaning scholars in 
Mexico (and in the world as such) when writing on the Zapatismo is the “newness” of the 
Zapatista movement. They read the poetic language of subcomandante Marcos about how 
the EZLN is only asking for “Dignity and Justice for the indigenous population of 
Mexico”, and they interpret all the different documents, communiqués and declarations 
from the subcomandante’s hand. And they find what they look for. Slogans such as “It is 
like going to a school that has yet to be built”32 and “Everything for everybody, nothing for 
us”,33 “A revolution to make the Revolution possible”34 to name but a few have resonated 
among Mexican (and international) scholars and students.35 They have been interpreted as 
                                                
30 Flores 2004. According to Genoveva Flores, a lot of writers were offered this information from the 
Mexican government. Tello Diaz was the only one who accepted the offer. 
31 Legorreta 1998. Legorreta is a sociologist in UNAM and former activist in indigenous Chiapas. 
32 Le Bot 1997 
33 EZLN 2001 
34 Subcomandante Marcos, quoted in Blixen and Fazio 1995. The capital R is Marcos’ own – he speaks of the 
small revolution (taking place in Chiapas) that will prepare the scene for the big one. 
35 One thing are all the communications (EZLN 2003). Marcos has also shown his poetic and playful side in 
his writings. Some of the best examples are his conversations with the old Antonio about how he has learned 
from the indigenous (Subcomandante Marcos 1998) and the travels around the world in his short stories 
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meaning such different things as leaving the old left behind to create a new one36, Marcos’ 
opposition to theory and the Zapatistas creating something truly new.37 
That scholars are concerned with those topics is fine. But when asked by this student 
where the Zapatistas bought their weapons, for instance, none of the scholars I spoke to, 
who had been working on the Zapatismo for years, could give me an answer. “I have never 
even thought about that”, one of them told me.38 
Of course there exists literature – by scholars, journalists, NGOs – that really tries to 
accurately describe and discuss the historic events in Chiapas. Two rather recent works in 
this category should be mentioned: Dutch anthropologist Gemma van der Haar’s study of 
the community of ejido San Miguel Chibtik is an account of how Zapatismo has changed 
life in the community and the Tojolabal region of Chiapas. She offers a serious historic 
account of the 20th century in the community and of land reform in Chiapas.39 Mexican 
sociologist Marco Antonio Estrada Saavedra in el Colegio de Mexico published his book 
La comunidad armada rebelde y el EZLN in May 2007. This book is an account of the 20th 
century in Tojolabal Chiapas, offering a good, balanced historical analysis. The description 
of the social and military structures of EZLN is detailed and good, and offers new, source-
based knowledge of the origins of Zapatismo as well as of present day Chiapas.40 
I could go on mentioning good academic work, such as left-leaning (and ex-zapatista 
advisor) historian Antonio Garcia de Leon’s historical work41, that of the afore-mentioned 
Juan Pedro Viqueira42, anthropologist Mario Humberto Ruz43, of US sociologist Jan Rus44 
and other. But these scholars and journalists tend not to be taken seriously – or to be 
silenced – by the “chiapanólogos”. The tendency to leave out critical voices is, to some 
extent, understandable when one considers that the Zapatista movement is still active and 
still divides Mexican society, academic as popular. This becomes clear in Genoveva 
Flores’ book La seduccion de Marcos a la Prensa, that deals with the first ten books 
published about Zapatismo. Flores shows how the viewpoint of the writers differs, and how 
                                                                                                                                              
about Don Durito de la Selva Lacandona, the worlds most politically aware and anti neo-liberal beetle 
(Subcomandante Marcos 2005). These short stories combine political analysis, humour and poetic 
descriptions. 
36 Holloway 1998 
37 For instance Holloway 1998 
38 From economists to historians, including most academic disciplines in social sciences and humanities. I do 
not wish to mention any names here. 
39 van der Haar 2001 
40 Estrada Saavedra 2007 
41 For instance Garcia de Leon 1997, 2002, and 2005 
42 Like Viqueira 1999, 2001, and 2002 
43 For instance his four volume anthology about the Tojolabales, Humberto Ruz 1981-1986 
44 Who has written extensively on indigenous Chiapas, mainly on the highland around San Cristobal de Las 
Casas. See Rus 1994, and 2005 
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this shows in their use of sources.45 The same tendency, although concerning journalism, is 
obvious in the three books containing a complete collection of newspaper articles about 
Zapatismo from 1994 to 1998 in the series Chiapas para la historia.46 
The reasons for this abundance of polemical literature may be possible to explain, but it 
does not help move the understanding of the Zapatista project forward. All of the above 
caused me to rethink my project. To be able to look beyond this wall of facts and opinion, I 
would have to look for my own primary sources. Through that, I hope to be able to go 
beyond some of the weaknesses of the literature that I have tried to discuss in this section.  
But then one may object: Where do I stand? If all the fine scholars discussed above lose 
the overview when writing about Zapatismo, why wont I, a mere master student, do the 
same? This will be discussed in the following chapter. 
 
Reaching a definition: What am I looking to solve? 
Based on literature discussed above, we can say that two main positions can be identified 
among scholars writing on the reasons for the Zapatista uprising:  
1. The indigenous population had been subdued for too long a time; state and local 
ladino47 – Hispanic – repression and the lack of land reform had paved the way for this 
rebellion. It was, hence, just a matter of organizing the necessary revolution.48 
2. Intellectual ladino revolutionaries from the city saw a political opening in Chiapas, and 
went there to prepare a Marxist revolution, cynically using the local population as a mere 
tool to reach their goal.49 
Of course I am over-simplifying, but the two factions mentioned above dominate the 
general picture. My claim is that both of them are wrong.  
My thesis is that the Zapatista uprising is only one of many events in a historical 
process of indigenous struggle for land and emancipation, in a world structured and 
organized by a Spanish elite during Spanish colonial times50 and its descendents in 
independent Mexico. Thus, EZLN is but a phase in a struggle against the power 
                                                
45 Flores 2004 
46 Diaz Arciniega & Lopez Tellez 1997 
47 Frequently used in Mexico to separate Spanish descendents from the indigenous peoples. In Chiapas, the 
term caxlan, bearing the same meaning, is used as frequent, if not more. 
48 This view can be found in González Esponda & Pólito Barrios 1994, in an essay called Notes to 
understand the origins of the Zapatista uprising. The essay focuses solely on the material situation and 
suppressed indigenous peoples.  
49 A good example would be the above quoted essay Los zapatistas y el arte de la ventriloquia, by Pedro 
Pitarch. (Pitarch 2003) 
50 When Mexico was a viceroyalty under Spain. The Spanish arrived in Mexico in 1520, and were thrown out 
some 300 years later. (Escalante Gonzalbo, et. al 2005) 
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structures imposed on the indigenous with the arrival of the Spanish and the 
inclusion of Latin America in the European sphere of influence.  
I will try to show that the Zapatista uprising is the result of the indigenous struggle to 
find a place in modern Mexico in the 20th century, a process that was taken on by the very 
government EZLN was to attack in 1994. Some background for that claim: In the aftermath 
of the Mexican revolution, a ten year long civil war that started in 1910 and ended with the 
formal imposition of democracy in Mexico, the country started a process of modernization, 
a process in which also the indigenous peoples were included in the national project. The 
most radical phase was the Cardenista reforms in the 1930s.51   
This modernization meant a qualitative change in the very structural limitations of 
indigenous life. They went from being villains, depending on the landlord, to collectively 
owning land and participating in the world market. But the government never followed this 
project through – it was abandoned in the following decades. Thus, the old order was 
broken, but nothing really replaced it. This was the starting point of a struggle to 
adapt and gain ground that culminated in the Zapatista uprising in 1994. 
This struggle has roots in indigenous culture and history as well as that of the Hispanics 
who joined forces with the local peoples. EZLN is but one of at least three outside actors 
who left an important mark in indigenous Chiapas in the 20th century.  
To test my thesis, I will give a historical explanation of this process of struggle. 
 
Choosing ejido Tabasco and some remarks on the structure of this thesis 
In order to explain this historical struggle for land and emancipation, I have chosen to tell 
the story of people who participated in the Zapatista movement and in the chain of historic 
events discussed in passing above. Knowing that the Zapatistas intend to control the flow 
of information to the outside world I decided to look for an ex-zapatista community.52 I 
                                                
51 President Lazaro Cardenas (1934 - 1940) annexed the lands of big landowners and redistributed them to 
the peasant population. This implied that the indigenous agricultural workers who formerly had been working 
in villain-like conditions on big farms were enabled to own the lands they were working, thus attaching them 
to the world market as producers. This process of profound, structural change will be discussed in chapter 4. 
52 Finding a community with Zapatista experience proved difficult. The Zapatistas are, since 2003, organized 
in what they call Caracoles – Escargots. The Caracoles house the Junta de Buen Gobierno (JBG) – the Board 
of the Good Government, of which there are five. The JBGs control the access to the Zapatista communities. 
Once inside, they will follow you around to make sure your questions are appropriate. There are also 
limitations as to the topic of conservation. I thus chose to look for an ex-Zapatista community. Even if I had 
wanted to go a Zapatista community, it would have been difficult: In May 2006, repression of civil unrest in 
San Salvador Atenco close to Mexico City made the Zapatistas declare red alert, making entrance to 
Zapatista communities even harder. At that time, the presidential election campaign was in its finally stages, 
and subcomandante Marcos was travelling Mexico on a tour called La Otra campaña – an alternative 
campaign for people ”on the bottom, to the left” (EZLN 2005). The group crushed by the police in Atenco 
were supporters of La Otra. Thus, Marcos cancelled La otra and declared red alert. 
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found this society in ejido Tabasco in the region of Las Margaritas, Chiapas. This 
community offered the opportunity I was looking for – a chance to ask questions to real 
people about their participation in EZLN, in a region where both primary and secondary 
sources are scant, but available. I will in the following chapters tell the history of ejido 
Tabasco from the late 1930s towards the end of the last century. I focus on four historical 
phases in this struggle, all of which have their own main chapter in this thesis:  
Chapter 4. The Cardenista land reform, during which the villagers get formal freedom 
and collective communal ownership of the lands they work. This was a process of 
restructuring rural, indigenous societies in Mexico in the 1930s. I will show how this 
process changed the structures, and how the project was abandoned in the following 
decades, leaving a void that could be filled by other actors. 
Chapter 5. The role played by the Catholic Church and the liberation theology in 
indigenous Chiapas from the mid-1960s, filling the void described in chapter 4. Through 
this encounter, the indigenous get formal training (reading, writing, first aid, law, the 
bible). This is the starting point of a process of capacitating rural, indigenous Chiapas. 
Chapter 6. The leftist movements and the focus on social and political organization in 
the 1970s and -80s, creating inter-communal organization in rural Chiapas and thus an 
indigenous identity. Here I will also show how structures are created that EZLN could take 
advantage of upon arriving in Chiapas. 
Chapter 7. The rise of the Zapatista movement in Chiapas and the role this movement 
was to play in ejido Tabasco until the villagers decided to leave the movement in the late 
1990s. We will see how EZLN differs from other actors present, but also at the many 
shared features and the shared goals. 
I will try to place ejido Tabasco in a broader context, telling at the same time the story of 
the municipality of Las Margaritas, and of Chiapas and Mexico. It is necessary to include a 
brief summary of Tojolabal history in the region to get the historical context right. This I 
will do in chapter 3, where I also will describe, in brief, life on the finca as experienced by 
the Tabasqueños – the people in ejido Tabasco.  
EZLN is a social movement, with historical roots. Therefore, I will try to contextualize 
EZLN using theories on social movements. These theories will be discussed in the chapter 
2, together with a discussion of methodology and sources.  
This thesis is basically the written history of ejido Tabasco, a small indigenous 
community in the municipality of Las Margaritas, Chiapas. Ejido Tabasco is situated in the 
Tojolabal heartland of Chiapas, and thus consists of solely people from the Tojolabal 
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ethnicity. The Tojolabales are one of the four most important ethnicities that make up the 
EZLN.53 In the chapter 8, the concluding pages of this thesis I will discuss whether 
studying a small Tojolabal community really offers any answers about the Zapatista project 
as a whole. I hope it does. My hope is that this thesis will cast some light on the origins of 
EZLN, the guerrilla movement that reached international fame when it declared war on the 
Mexican government January 1. 1994. 
                                                
53 The others are Tzotziles, Tzeltales, and Choles. 
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Chapter 2: Theory and methodology 
This thesis is a study of EZLN. Yet, more than half of it deals with other actors and a pre-
EZLN Chiapas. I have chosen this approach because I want to understand the historical 
process(es) that led to the creation of an indigenous guerrilla movement in the periphery of 
Mexico. I try to give an account of historical forces enabling the creation of a guerrilla 
movement in Chiapas. To understand this process, I have chosen to look at EZLN as a 
social movement. This theory chapter is, thus, dedicated to a discussion about different 
theories on such movements. In section two of this chapter, I deal with the methodology. 
 
Theory 
What defines a social movement? 
In this, I follow Sidney Tarrow in his work Power in Movement , where he says about 
social movements that they are created by people or groups in a mutual confrontation with 
collective challenges. In order to achieve their common goals, such movements are based 
on solidarity, in interaction with elites, opponents and authorities or governments.54 
The social movements that we know today emerged with the creation of the modern 
national state and capitalism in the western world – in short with what we may call 
modernity. I will discuss this later on if Mexico can be said to participate in the same 
processes of modernization as European countries, the USA or other British colonies. 
With the creation of modernity in the western world, new battlefields were created. 
Following Norwegian social scientist Stein Rokkan, these battlefields are, among others: 
The conflict between centre and periphery, between urban and rural areas, conflicts over 
religion, and, with the consolidation of the capitalist economy, between labour and 
capital.55 Also, with the creation of a central government, the very infrastructure of the 
state (physical as well as institutional) and the concentration of power make rebellion 
against a clearly defined enemy – the central government – and group solidarity across 
geographical divides possible. Thus, local, spontaneous riots,  food riots due to bad harvest 
etc, will not fall within the definition of social movements. 
Therefore, a clear distinction between modern social movements and pre-capitalist, 
historic movement can be found. According to Norwegian historian Knut Kjeldstadli, we 
can say that what separates the internal dynamics of the modern form of social movements 
from the older ones, is, in its ideal type: 
                                                
54 Tarrow 1998  
55 Rokkan 1970 
 15 
1. The permanent character; these are not ad hoc-movements created to confront an 
emerging problem of short duration (again, food riots may serve as an example).  
2. The ability to move the masses; the mass character. Such movements are popular 
movements, and have democratic structures.  
3. Strict internal organizational structures, but the movement is not limited to impose its 
goals on the members of the organization. 
4. Modern social movements have clearly defined goals, such as the changing of power 
structures or the imposition of abstinence in society as a whole.  
5. A collective identity due to taking part in this movement, an identity that separates 
them from the outside world. 
6. Modern social movements are ridden by an inner paradox: They distance themselves 
from society and live according to other rules, standards or structures, but at the same time 
want to change the very society they choose not to be part of. 56 
 
How do social movements see the light of day? 
This is one of the most important questions in the study of social movements. How come 
such movements emerge in one historical setting, while in other times, characterized by 
what might even seem more favourable conditions, nothing happens?57 Different political 
thinkers have come up with different answers to this question. I will briefly discuss some 
of these theories here, hoping that this helps understanding the processes working for and 
against the creation of such movements. 
 
The traditional theories58 
Karl Marx claims, in accordance with the teleological59 take on history, that the objective 
factors, such as ownership to the means of production and the structures of power, will 
create the conditions that make social movements and social upheaval possible and, even, 
necessary.60 While Marx himself clearly states that man creates his own history61, some of 
                                                
56 Kjeldstadli 2002, p 37 
57 This will be discussed in relation to EZLN in the concluding pages of this thesis, because of the seemingly 
improbability of an armed uprising against a national government in a modern country in the 1990s. 
58 This short overview is based on Tarrow 1998, page 10-25. References to primary sources are mine. 
59 A teleological school of thought claims there is an inherent purpose for everything that exists. Seeing 
history as linear is an inherent consequent. Whether Marx subscribes to this point of view is disputed. 
60 Granted, this is a ”vulgar” understanding of Marx and his theories of change (but much in accordance by 
the one offered by historiographer Georg G. Iggers in his Historiography in the Twentieth Century (Iggers 
2005)). It does not consider Marx’ discussion of agents of change (for instance in Marx & Engels, 1970) nor 
his distinction between ”what is” (verhalten) and ”how reality is perceived” (verhältnisse) (Op.cit.). For the 
purpose of this thesis, I will leave the discussion about Marx at this. 
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his followers tend to have a more deterministic interpretation of this teleology. If social 
uprising does not occur, a tendency among some Marxists is to explain this with the term 
of false consciousness62 – of how the suppressed people (the working class(es)) are not in a 
position to see their own misery, or worse: they have been “bribed” by the powerful 
capitalists or capitalism and consumerism.63 It seems most of the “leftist” scholars writing 
about Zapatismo follow this interpretation of Marx in their understanding of the reasons for 
the uprising Zapatista. One example: “[The Chiapan] situation as political and economical 
subordinated territory allowed conditions of misery and marginalization so extreme that 
they could only manifest in a violent way.”64 This may seem convenient enough in the 
aftermath of an undeniable historic fact, but it also may hide the workings of other actors 
than the strictly objective forces of history, and thus hardly explains what happened in 
Chiapas in the decades before the Zapatista uprising. That being said, these structures of 
power and the material reality can hardly be overlooked when trying to explain why people 
choose to declare war on the national government. 
In trying to explain why the objective, historical forces of Marx only sometimes lead to 
the creation of social movements and eventually the changing of power structures and the 
overthrow of the governing bodies, Russian revolutionary leader and first Soviet chairman 
Lenin introduced to praxis and theory the vanguard.65 In short, this means that the 
objective forces need an agent of change to help create to social movements, somebody 
who see the objective forces and analyze them, and trough coming up with the solution can 
attract people to his movement. In Lenin’s version, the Party is to be (and was) the 
vanguard and the spearhead of the Revolution. The most critical voices on Zapatismo seem 
to follow this logic: That EZLN imposed itself as the vanguard in Chiapas and somehow 
managed to lure the indigenous peoples into joining their project. 
                                                                                                                                              
61 “The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals… Men can 
be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion or anything else you like. They themselves begin 
to produce their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical organization. By 
producing their means of subsistence men are indirectly producing their actual material life.” (Marx & 
Engels, 1970, p 42) 
62 “Ideology is a process accomplished by the so-called thinker. Consciously, it is true, but with a false 
consciousness. The real motive forces impelling him remain unknown to him; otherwise it simply would not 
be an ideological process. Hence he imagines false or apparent motives.” Friedrich Engels to Franz Mehring 
(in Marx & Engels 1942, p 511) 
63 One typical approach is that of Lenin, claiming that the British working class has been bribed by the goods 
of imperialism. (Lenin 1999) 
64 García de Leon 2002. It would not be fair, however, to indicate that García de Leon, in this excellent book, 
is blind to other processes that combined to make the Zapatista uprising possible. 
65 From Lenin’s work What is to be done: “Social-democratic consciousness… would have to be brought to 
[the workers] from without. The history of all countries shows that the working class, exclusively by its own 
effort is able to develop only trade-union consciousness… The theory of socialism, however, grew out of the 
philosophic, historical, and economic theories elaborated by educated representatives of the propertied 
classes, by intellectuals.” (Lenin & Christman 1987, p 74) 
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Another dominating theory on social movements is that of Italian Marxist political 
thinker Antonio Gramsci. Gramsci uses the term hegemony to explain the power 
structures, i.e. that the people’s worldview is limited by the discourse that is imposed on 
society. Gramsci claims that the ruling classes have managed to get the whole of society to 
accept their interpretation of the world. Thus, the subdued see the world through the 
categories of their rulers, internalizing their norms.66 Yet, there is resistance. Gramsci 
introduces the two terms common sense and good sense as two antitheses. Common sense 
is what is generally agreed upon (or imposed) in society, and establishes a set of rules and 
conceptions that work in favour of the hegemonial power structure.67 Good sense, on the 
other hand, is “a conception that manifests itself in action,”68 as the negation of the 
hegemony and direct conflict with the latter.69  The working class is the carrier of this good 
sense, that emerges in extraordinary political times.70 According to Gramsci, the working 
class can fight the hegemony of bourgeois culture through good sense. In short: to redefine 
the world according to its way of thinking, the working class (or the agent of change) must 
fight the cultural structures that stand in the way of the realization of the change.71 
 
Peasant movements 
Seeing as the subjects in this thesis are the indigenous peoples of rural Chiapas, I also 
would like to include some brief remarks on peasant movements. According to 
anthropologist Eric Wolf, peasants “often harbor a deep sense of injustice, but this sense of 
injustice must be given shape and expression in organization before it can become active 
on the political scene.”72 Wolf goes on to suggest that peasant rebellion is facilitated in 
situations where the peasants no longer can rely on the traditional institutional context, and 
alternative institutions are either “too chaotic or too restrictive to guarantee a viable 
commitment to new ways.”73 Wolf also claims that the transition to capitalism or at least 
attachment to world markets and thus a new logic of economic thinking is the most radical 
                                                
66 Kjeldstadli 1991 
67 Like popular support for repression of a demonstration, because ”the radicals deserve it”, notwithstanding 
that the demonstrators could be fighting for a ”common” good such as fair payment for workers. This 
reaction lends support to the government’s monopoly on violence, and hence confirms state hegemony. 
68 Gramsci, quoted in Ytterstad 2004 
69 ”[One should develop] a conception of necessity which gives a conscious direction to one’s activity. This 
is the healthy nucleus that exists in ”common sense”, the part of it which may be called ”good sense” and 
which deserve to be made more unitary and coherent.” (Gramsci, quoted in Ytterstad 2004) 
70 Accumulated good sense also seems a possibility, but who is then to be the carrier of this accumulated 
thought? The vanguard? There is no room for that discussion here, however. 
71 Ytterstad 2004 
72 Wolf 1969, p xvii 
73 Op.cit., p xix 
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stage in peasant areas known in the 20th century, but that this move is necessary for a stable 
country: If the periphery is dominated by the past (traditions) and other regions are in the 
grip of the future, a country may have a waiting disaster in its hands.74 
 
Modern thought on social movements 
The theories mentioned above are found in most “new” thinking on social movements and 
change as well. The sociological approach of the 1960s focused on structures and 
grievances suffered due to these structures, not only on class struggle. The approach still 
emphasised the Marxist approach, where the objective, outer reality is the most important 
one. Another theory in vogue in modern times has been that of American economist 
Mancur Olson claiming that people join social movements after having analyzed, 
rationally, the different options – thus a theory along the line of the rational, economic 
man.75 This theory focuses on the individual, both the ones who join as members and on 
the leaders, who have to be charismatic and make others join their project because of 
incentives – in their function as vanguard. In this theory, many will join as not-so-
motivated free passengers, soon to abandon ship if achieving their goals or if the project 
seems doomed.76 
Lastly, the cultural approach, the one that bears resemblance to the ideas of Gramsci, 
focuses on a extra-material reality, where the battlefield is the meaning of symbols and 
words.77 One example from Chiapas and EZLN may be the use of Emiliano Zapata, the 
revolutionary general. The government used Zapata in their official rhetoric of the 
institutionalized revolution. This stopped when the very same government was attacked by 
a movement calling themselves Zapatistas, claiming they were taking back a symbol that 
belonged to the people.78 This could be called “framing”79 – a struggle over identity, of 
who can define his goals as being good for the most people – through the use of symbols. 
It is possible to see these three as mutually working together, that its totality gives an 
accurate understanding of the processes at work when social movements are created. It is, 
however, somewhat difficult to see how Mancur Olson’s theory about the rational, 
                                                
74 Op.cit., pp 278-285 
75 Olson 1997 
76 Historian Knut Kjeldstadli gives this description of this theory: It assumes free human being with clear 
goals and intention of achieving them. All action are intentional, that humans choose and make rational 
choices, that they have full information about their situation. Humans look for personal benefit, and go at it at 
maximum speed. (Kjeldstadli 1996). Kjeldstadli explicitly uses the theory as a straw man, but seems to be 
rather spot on. 
77 Giugni 2001 
78 Rajchenberg & Heau-Lambert 1998 
79 Tarrow, McAdam & Tilly 2001 
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economic man can be used in the Chiapan setting, with semi-literate people struggling for 
their place in society. Can these indigenous protagonists have all the information required 
to make absolutely conscious choices? Just a brief mention here of a theory that counters 
Olson’s view: French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu introduces the term habitus. This 
describes a system of internalized dispositions that intermediate between social structures 
and activity. These dispositions are formed by structures and regulate human activity. 
Thus, the choices open to this rational human being are, according to Bourdieu, limited.80 I 
will still, though, try to keep all the mentioned theories in mind in this thesis, and come 
back to these theories in the conclusion chapter. 
 
Conjunctures of emergence of social movements 
In the context of the national state in modernized western countries, scholars operate with 
three historical conjunctures for the emergence of social movements: 
1. The transition to modernity. The conflicts generated by the sudden migration to cities 
and in the wake of enlightenment were typically those of rural versus urban areas, centre 
and periphery, and conflict over religion. In Chiapas, as we will see, this integration began 
in the 1930s, and is somehow distinct from the features described above. 
2. The classic modern period, with the creation of a strong industrial class and conflict 
over surplus and ownership of the means of production, globally starting in the late 1800s 
or early 1900s. The conflict is the emblematic one of labour and capital and that of 
growing peasant movements. This thesis deals with the latter, albeit in a context different 
from that of the classic modern period in the industrialized countries.   
3. The period of post-materialism, dominated by new social movements.81 The people 
now fight over symbols and softer values than labour and capital, in what has called been 
called the “silent revolution”.82 As we have seen (in the discussion about literature), some 
scholars have called the Zapatista uprising the first post-modern rebellion – thus indicating 
it is a battle over symbols, and that EZLN is one of these new social movements.83 
                                                
80 Some important features of habitus: Humans are formed early in life, having experienced with body and 
soul, in contact with other people, in actions and language. This formation is strong and slow, but can be 
changed by later experience. It is generated socially, but is an individual feature. Different groups in society 
are formed differently. In a class society, people from the same class think and act alike at some levels. This 
integrates the individual, and makes sure the societal structure does not fall apart. Thus, people act according 
to some internalized codes, depending on origin and social position. This has consequences for people’s goals 
and dreams, it tells man what he can hope for in life. Human action thus takes part within a framework that 
limits it. (Kjeldstadli 1996) 
81 Giugni 2001 
82 Roland Ingelhart, quoted in Giugni 2001 
83 The information in this section is taken from Kjeldstadli 2002, p 42; Tarrow 1998; and Giugni 2001 
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Structure of possibility for the emergence of social movements 
As we have seen, scholars agree that social movements as we know them emerged with the 
creation of the national state. According to US-American historian and political scientist 
Charles Tilly, social movements can only be studied in combination with political 
structures.84 Thus, I will take a brief look on what is called the political structure of 
possibilities for the creation of social movements. Sociologist Douglas McAdam claims 
that the success of a social movement depends on external structures such as: 
1. The degree of opening in the political system in the nation of study. 
2. The stability in the power balance of the ruling elites. 
3. Do possible allies in the elites exist? 
4. The means available to the government and its possibilities to use these.85 
Sidney Tarrow adds to this one interesting point: Social upheavals tend to take place 
when the suppressed have been granted some space to exist in, but not a complete opening 
and full participation in society.86 This seems to be an accurate description of indigenous 
Chiapas after the Cardenista reforms in the 1930s, as we will see. Thus, this theory will be 
discussed in the concluding pages of this thesis. We will in see how the political structures 
in Mexico enabled the Zapatista uprising, and to what degree the government was able to 
contain the rebellion once it had emerged. But before we get that far, I will discuss the 
context in which social movements emerge. Tarrow claims that the study of social 
movements has not been tried much outside the western world.87 Do these theories, then, 
apply to the Mexican reality? When, if at all, did Mexico enter what we call modernity? 
 
Mexico – a modern, western national state? 
I would like to argue that such a discussion is not of great importance for this thesis.88 My 
claim is that Mexico is a modern, western national state, at least politically. With the 
Mexican revolution, Mexico got its constitution, guarantying a secular, democratic and 
plural country. Granted, PRI held power for 70 years through a corporative system, where 
all major sectors of society (rural and labour unions and organizations, important industry, 
                                                
84 Tarrow 1998, p 18 
85 Tarrow, McAdam & Tilly 2001 
86 Tarrow 1998 
87 Op.cit. Western world defined as a zone of mutual or similar political evolution. 
88 I could claim, with Knut Kjeldstadli, that ”it is worth mentioning that many phenomenon that we call 
modern, have roots that go at least a few centuries back in time. And traditional features still existed after the 
first world war.” (Kjeldstadli 1995) I could also argue that the term modernity in itself is problematic, or 
analytically imprecise, in the words of Kjeldstadli. Does it imply eternal growth in a capitalistic economy? 
Secularization? (op.cit)  
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communications etcetc) where tied to the political project of PRI.89 That does not 
disqualify from being a modern, secular state. Feudal structures did survive even the 
Mexican revolution. But changing these structures was the very idea behind the Cardenista 
reform in the 1930s, when president Lazaro Cardenas tried to reform the Mexican 
countryside by tightening relations between the rural communities and rest of society – 
modernizing and capitalizing traditional (and mostly indigenous) rural communities.90 
For the purpose of this thesis it suffices to say that Mexico started its path to 
modernization with the Cardenista reform in the 1930s and that the existence of institutions 
and a central government makes it possible to study social movements in the country. 
 
Post-material world? What post-material world? 
This does not mean that EZLN and indigenous Chiapas automatically can be seen as part 
of a post-material wave of social protest, for instance. The fact that many have called the 
Zapatista rebellion “the first post-modern rebellion”91 does not imply that the social unrest 
in Chiapas can be separated from the power structures and those of access to lands and 
means of production. One of the driving forces behind the indigenous struggle in Chiapas 
has been that of landownership. I thus find comfort in the words of Knut Kjeldstadli: All 
social movements can be understood as being sedimentary layers, where old movements 
and older forms of organization live alongside with newer ones. This, in my understanding, 
enables the use of theories on social movements on different historical stages.92 
Before I close this chapter, I would like to make some points about the theories on post-
material social movements and the disappearance of the struggle between labour and 
capital. First of all, can it not be claimed, as does Craig Calhoun (in Hvor nye er sosiale 
bevegelser), that even at the height of the labour movement, the struggle was not solely 
that of labour and capital, a struggle over material goods? 93 Can it not be claimed that the 
focus on this one aspect of struggle was the result of a successful framing, of the 
interpretation and definition of the situation, on the part of the labour movement? With that 
in mind: is not possible that we fool ourselves to see more diversity than what really exists 
today? There are women’s movements and groups fighting for one specific ethnic group 
etcetc. But: western societies are still organized around capital and the central government, 
                                                
89 This will be discussed in chapter 4 
90 See Escalante Gonzalbo et.al 2005. This will be discussed in chapter 4. 
91 Like for instance Holloway 1998 
92 Kjeldstadli 2002 
93 Calhoun 1994 
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and organized in national states. Is not, hence, the struggle of labour and capital still real 
today, even in rich and powerful western national states? And whether Mexico is western 
or not, I find support in Craig Calhoun: “The affiliation to organize social movements 
seems to be one of the few features that connects the distinct history of western 
modernization to that of the new one emerging…”94 
 
Methodology 
The research that is the basis of this thesis is a mixed one. In some parts, I rely heavily on 
secondary sources – books, articles, NGO reports; other parts are based on archive 
documents from official archives; and, finally, large parts are written on the basis of oral 
interviews and, to a lesser extent, anthropological observations. I have chosen – and was 
forced due to lack of written sources – to base much of the research in ejido Tabasco on 
oral sources. This means I have opened for the implicit danger of what Pierre Bourdieu 
calls reproducing the self-perception of the Tabasqueños rather than analysing the history 
of the community.95 This, in turn, may imply reproducing the Gramscian common sense. I 
try to use my informants the other way around: I do not try to understand the world 
(Chiapas, in this case) based on the worldview of the Tojolabales. Rather, I try to explain 
historically processes that help create the Tabasqueño world view in different periods of 
time.96 To be able to do so, I need to balance the oral sources against other material. 
Combining sources of such different natures may be difficult. I will, where possible, try 
to use written sources as a tool of correction of the interviews. The structure of the thesis is 
decided by some indisputable facts: The land reforms of the 1930s and the creation of ejido 
Tabasco; the emergence of liberation theology in the region of study in the 1960s; the 
arrival of outside political activists in the 1970s; and, finally, the creation of EZLN and the 
armed uprising that followed. These events I find support for in archives and the literature. 
In that sense, it would also be possible to say that I mix my sources the other way around: 
That my interviews serve as a correction to the other material. When I find it necessary, I 
will discuss the different sources and this balance in footnotes throughout this thesis. 
 
                                                
94 Op.cit., p 40 
95 Kjeldstadli 1996 
96 I follow Knut Kjeldstadli when he says that the researcher wants to ”explore how the big history enters the 
small history, how society intervenes in the individual biography”. (Kjeldstadli 1996, p 17) 
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Archives 
I have used the Registro Agrario Nacional (RAN)97 in Tuxtla Gutierrez, the Registro 
Publico de Propiedades (RPP)98 in Comitan and the Diario Oficial de la Federacion in the 
research of this thesis. Here I found the information I was looking for; historical facts, 
figures and government declarations regarding ejido Tabasco.99 These archives will be 
accounted for in the bibliography. 
I want to mention some archives to which I never was granted access. Both the Comisión 
Nacional de Derechos Humanos (CNDH) – the National Human Rights Comity – and the 
Comisión Internacional de Derechos Humanos Fray Bartolomé de las Casas (FRAYBA) – 
International Human Rights Committee Fray Bartolomé de las Casas100 – would not let me 
use their archives, even when I had specific requests. The police in Las Margaritas would 
not approve my request for documentation on some arrests or reports that would have 
served the purpose of this thesis. Neither was I granted access to documentation on 
landownership in ejido Tabasco today.101 
In my search for official documents and archives, I found that in more cases than not 
were the archives non-existent.102 In the archives of the diocese of San Cristobal I found 
nothing of particular interest, the same goes for the Archivo Historico del Estado de 
Chiapas – The Historical Archive of Chiapas in Tuxtla Gutierrez.  
I do not use many newspaper articles. Despite having gone through many archives I 
found little of great interest. On a curious note: I visited the FLN – the Zapatista “mother 
organisation” – museum in Monterrey, in the old house of the Yañes brothers, both of 
which were leaders of the FLN at one time.103 I was the only visitor during summer and 
fall 2006, and the place was turned into a left leaning summer camp for kids. But I got to 
see the paper press hidden in a hole in the basement as well as some weapons and an 
escape tunnel and some propaganda material.104 
                                                
97 Documents are identified by 07 52 04 (for ejido Tabasco), year and page number in archives 
98 Documents are identified by name of finca and year of last update of file 
99 I was lucky: The archive of the Registro Agrario Nacional in Tuxtla was flooded in 2006, but the archives 
on ejido Tabasco were not harmed 
100 Created by the diocese of San Cristobal in 1988, this organization is probably the one with the most 
complete archives on human rights abuse in Chiapas 
101 This is not, however, very relevant for this thesis, which covers a time scope of some 60 years, from the 
mid 1930s to the end of the 1990s 
102 This was the case of ejido Tabasco, Tierra y Libertad and la CIOAC, as well as La Castalia. 
103 Big brother Cesar Yañes was killed by the police in the 1970s dirty war, his brother Fernando Yañes was 
to become Comandante German – the only one superior to Subcomandante Marcos in EZLN / the FLN. 
(Tello Diaz 2005) 
104 The full name of the museum is Casa Museo del Doctor Margil, in Monterrey in northern Mexico. 
Subcomandante Marcos mentions this museum in a letter to comandante German in 2002: “In this house 
museum, we find testimonies of a fundamental part of our history as Zapatistas, history that we are proud of 
… That house museum is Zapatista.” (EZLN 2002) 
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Fieldwork among the other 
When entering ejido Tabasco, I found myself a stranger among the other, visiting the 
unknown at its own turf. This inter-cultural communication is not easy. One necessary 
question must be asked: Is it possible for me – a westerner – to understand the Mexican 
Tojolabal? Or more general: Can we hope to understand the other? 
Norwegian historian Finn Fuglestad discusses this from the perspective of a scholar on 
African history in the essay How to Write African History in the postmodern Era.105 
Fuglestad claims that the material (”western”) historical approach does little more than 
reduce Africa and its history. Fuglestad claims that the academic discipline of history is 
only useful in two kinds of societies: The ones who have a Year 0 – when some goddess 
manifested, and in the secular societies. This leads Fuglestad into stating that history is a 
western discipline. He asks whether it is possible to apply material (economic) driving 
forces to what he calls ”total-religious” societies – and the answer is no. The way of 
thinking and rationalizing is totally different in such societies. 
That does not, however, mean that Fuglestad gives up hope of being able to understand 
other continents (and other times, for that matter). He finds comfort in what he calls his 
”Post modern laundry list” – meaning he picks what serves his purpose from post-modern 
thought. Thus, says Fuglestad: Hayden White, American historian, says that history also is 
historical philosophy – the philosophy of man. This means that history is not a purely 
empirical science – it is alo a philosophy. Writing about human beings of the past, we do 
so based on some assumptions as to what man is, and about the driving forces behind his 
actions. This implicates that history never become a real science, according to Fuglestad. 
There are no laws in history, just regularities. Thus, says Fuglestad, there can be no proof 
of rights and wrongs in history – just plausible explinations.106 
Fuglestad also discusses the term cultural relativism, and whether it is possible for the 
scholar to disengage from his Weltanschauung. If not, says Fuglestad, the (historical) study 
of different societies becomes nothing more than some kind of competition over which has 
the best civilization. If one adds to this that, according to Fuglestad, objectivity is 
impossible – because history is not a universal discipline, and the historical line of thinking 
that dominates in the west leaves no space for the other to be understood on his own terms 
                                                
105 Fuglestad 1999  
106 Op.cit. Fuglestad’s discussion is somewhat more profound than what is offerd here, but for the purpose of 
this discussion, this is a sufficient summary. 
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– the other becomes the looser, and not someone worthy of respect. This is, in Fuglestad’s 
term, writing history standing on only one foot.  
And that is that? I will not, then, be able to understand ejido Tabasco because of the 
distance in time, kilometres and traditions? That does not seem to be Fuglestad’s 
conclusion. History may work also in other societies than the western ones – but 
considering where one stands is of great importance. 
Knut Kjeldstadli, in the essay Det fengslende ordet. Om den ”språklige vendingen” i 
historiefaget writes that the linguistic turn in historical science seemingly leaves us with an 
understanding of an ”us vs. the other”, and that our very culture impedes the understanding 
of others.  Our horizon is different than theirs; our language blocks understanding – and 
language, in post modern thought, constitutes reality; translation from one to the other is 
impossible; and, thus, history becomes the history of and about foreign places, and foreign 
places are impossible to understand, according to the more consequent adherents of the 
linguistic turn. 107 
But then Kjeldstadli turns the linguistic turn on its head. The other does have an idiom. 
This feature – having a language – is shared by the other and us. That we are all of the 
same species thus gives us something to build on. That is, to Kjeldstadli, the first step on 
the road to a common platform of understanding. Does it have to be either all dark or fully 
transparent? Is not partial understanding better than no understanding at all?  This does not, 
however, mean that differences do not matter. But it means that the road to mutual 
understanding is discussing and acknowledging the methods we use when writing and 
researching. It does not, then, have to be one or the other. 
 
How to get access, and keeping in mind the gatekeepers 
With the above in mind, I entered Chiapan reality. Ejido Tabasco is situated some 22 
kilometres from the town of Las Margaritas, the capital of the region, in La cañada de 
Soledad – the valley of solitude (see maps 2.1 and 2.2). To get to ejido Tabasco from Las 
Margaritas, I had to catch the local transportation, a small bus holding some 12 passengers. 
This transport would take me to the crossing leading to ejido Tabasco alongside the paved 
road, but not without surprises: We would wait, for hours, for the bus to fill up, or we 
would go shopping for some of the passengers or stop for hours in one of the communities 
located between Las Margaritas and ejido Tabasco. From the paved road, there is a 45 
                                                
107 Kjeldstadli 1997 
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minutes walk to the heart of ejido Tabasco, which today consists of four communities: 
Ejido Tabasco, Tabasco 2000, Medellin del Carmen and Emiliano Zapata.108 
In ejido Tabasco, I contacted the only name I knew, that of a social leader in one of the 
four communities that today make up what used to be the united ejido Tabasco.109 He 
granted me an interview and promised to establish contact with the rest of the community 
for me. But as time went on, I found that I was unable to contact other people in the ejido. 
Despite talking to the comisariado ejidal, the formal head of the community, leaving letters 
and recommendations explaining my intentions, I was not accepted by the community, 
even sensing suspicion and hostility towards me. 
This went on for the first two weeks, during which time I only got to interview the above 
mentioned leader, a representative of ejido Tabasco in Las Margaritas and the community 
of Medellin del Carmen collectively.110 The interviews were controlled by the social leader 
with whom I first established contact. When seeking contact with the people of Tabasco 
2000, through the comisariado ejidal, I was denied access and eventually chased out of the 
community by people yelling ¡Que se vaya, cabron! – Get out of here, you bastard! 
After this initial period, Padre Ramon Castillo of the Catholic Church institution la 
Castalia in Comitan, an institution that has played an important part in the recent history of 
ejido Tabasco, as I will show in chapter 5, invited me to go to ejido Tabasco with him. 
When introduced by Padre Ramon Castillo as a friend of his and a university student, not a 
government agent, doors opened for me in ejido Tabasco. I was granted access to talk to 
most of the people I wanted to interview.111 
That I was introduced by a Catholic priest – an outsider and a Hispanic – has some 
interesting points to it. It shows, first of all, the influence of the Catholic Church. It also 
meant that I was seen as part of the Catholic Church. This opened doors for me, but I guess 
it also coloured the conversations about the history of the community – nobody would 
criticise La Castalia in my presence, for instance. That would probably never have been a 
                                                
108 Access to the village was facilitated in 1998, by the new “highway” – a two lane, paved road, taking 
travellers east from Las Margaritas, towards the Lacandon jungle. 
109 The community split into four smaller ones in the late 1990s, due to internal conflict and access to more 
land in the aftermath of the Zapatista uprising. Today, the relationship between the four communities is 
basically sound and good, as opposed to some rather difficult years immediately after the split-up. 
110 Though not the ideal form of interviewing, such group interviews at least given an impression of the truth 
agreed upon by the society as a whole. As the US based historian and anthropologist Jan Vansina writes: 
“Group interviews, while not desirable in principle, are often unavoidable, and in certain circumstances 
become desirable. [...] The information is minimal. But group testimony may also be customary and a 
guarantee of truth. [...] Statements acquire the character of official accounts.” (Vansina 1985 p 62) 
111 My experience thus proves these words from anthropologist David M. Fetterman: “Walking into a 
community cold can have a chilling effect on ethnographic research. Community members may not be 
interested in the individual ethnographer or in the work. An intermediary or go-between can open doors 
otherwise locked to outsiders.” (Fetterman 1989 p 43) 
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problem, seeing that many of my informant were catequistas, people who are educated by 
the church and are the representatives of the church and the social leaders in such 
communities.112 
Due to internal conflicts, I had to choose which parts of the ejido I wanted to speak to. I 
was, as I have explained, granted interviews in Medellin del Carmen before Padre Ramon 
Castillo helped me contact the rest of the community. After the Padre’s introduction and 
my choosing to focus on ejido Tabasco, the biggest of the four communities originating in 
united ejido Tabasco, the people of Medellin del Carmen treated me with less enthusiasm. 
As for Tabasco 2000, I was never allowed to speak to them in public, but I managed to get 
some good interviews by individuals driving me back to Las Margaritas at night etc. The 
part of the community that still remains loyal to the Zapatistas, Emiliano Zapata, did not 
welcome me to visit. But I was nonetheless granted an interview with one of the leaders of 
the community. 
 
Interviewing in the field 
I wanted for my informants to tell the history of ejido Tabasco. Thus, I set out to do so-
called life-span interviews, but focusing more on some specific events than others.113 For 
this, I used an interview guide with some 20 questions about key events based on what I 
had read about other communities and the general history of Chiapas. I used this guide as 
exactly that; a guide in the process of interviewing, without letting it limit the 
conversations. Thus, I used a semi-structural interview guide, but mixed this approach with 
what anthropologist David M. Fetterman calls “informal interviews” with “a specific but 
implicit research agenda.”114 All interviews were done in Spanish. The people in ejido 
Tabasco, the men at least, speak very good Spanish, but at times use words and phrasings I 
was not familiar with. My Spanish is that of city and university. That caused some minor 
communication problems, but was not a big problem in general. But as Jan Vansina says: 
Some words are key words, and cannot be understood by someone not thoroughly 
acquainted with the culture of origin.115 I cannot exclude the possibility of that having 
happened to me. 
 
                                                
112 For a full definition of the catequista function, see chapter 5 
113 Much as suggests Norwegian historian Dagfinn Slettan: ”For a Master student [...] interested in one 
particular field, it would be fruitful to have some clear limitations of the subject and relatively few and 
distinct issues.” (Slettan 1981, p 47) 
114 Fetterman 1989, p 48 
115 Vansina 1985 p 84 
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Tradition and collective memory 
The chronicles I have recorded cover a time span of some 100 years, the oldest accounts 
stemming from the early 20th century. That means none of my informants actually lived in 
the first period they speak of. Thus, according to Norwegian professor in the studies of 
folklore Bjarne Hodne, these accounts are traditions, meaning they have been through a 
filter of tradering, or communication.116 Such accounts are what Hodne calls kronikat; 
accounts of actual events not exposed to fictitious additions. With time, the kronikats 
change when “the details disappear and the account moves closer towards similar accounts 
in form and content. The kronikat becomes a historical saga.”117 Another important note on 
traditions: They have been communicated, and this happens in a social environment. Thus, 
such accounts will “to a great degree reflect the environment’s perception of the accounts 
and relationship that they describe”.118 All the accounts, also the ones of a more recent 
nature, in this thesis fall into this category of communicated memories.119 Thus, the 
meaning is socially formed in the community. Can they then be trusted and used as 
sources? Hodne concludes that with awareness of the nature of the sources, they can and 
should be used. If nothing else, traditions may serve as sources of knowledge about 
worldviews and norms in the environment of study.120 In any case I will, as mentioned 
above, balance my oral sources against other sources where possible. 
 
The informants 
In total I have done 23 interviews, totalling some 36 hours of tape. Nine of these interviews 
I did with people from ejido Tabasco, many of them I did with more than one person at the 
time. Most of my informants were social leaders in past or present time, or key actors that 
provided “detailed historical data, knowledge about contemporary interpersonal 
relationship (including conflicts), and a wealth of information about the nuances of 
                                                
116 Hodne separates between memories and traditions. The former are “not communicated” personal 
memories or experiences. The latter are accounts of personal experiences in past or present time, fixated and 
communicated to other, thus becoming “communicated memories”, and as such become traditions. Another 
form of traditions are accounts by different informants/story tellers spread in time, that, trough fixation, 
become different genres of traditions. (Hodne 1981, p 35) 
117 Hodne 1981, p 37 
118 Op. Cit, p 39 
119 A short note on traditions in the areas of Zapatista influence: As is common in popular sectors in Mexico, 
events are described and performed through songs, the so-called corridos. This phenomenon appeared during 
the Mexican Revolution as a way of making news travel from place to place. Just one example of the 
Zapatista use of this: I bought a disc in the Zapatista community of Oventic by local outfit Nuevo Amanecer. 
They sing of the bad government and about the heroics of EZLN, and thus reproduces the communicated 
memory that Hodne speaks of. (Nuevo Amanecer 2006) 
120 Hodne 1981, p 43 
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everyday life.”121 My key actor informants gave valuable information, but at the same time 
had their own interests in mind when talking to me. They had also participated actively in 
the events discussed in. What would they tell me? And what could they tell me – would not 
their view be blocked by the proximity to the events?122 I have tried to choose between 
different versions or balance the informants against each other to avoid getting totally lost 
in my informant’s world view. To help in the selection of versions, I rely on other, outside 
sources when these exist, or try to balance the information against outsider’s version of the 
same accounts. In total, I formally interviewed some 30 people in the community 
(including the group interview). In one case I have found it best to hide the informants 
identity and I have somewhat altered and generalized the informant’s account. This is done 
to protect the informant from internal repercussion as well as that of the government, 
seeing as the nature of the information is disputed and delicate.123 As for the identified 
informants, they accepted that I would use their names in my work. When they talk about 
their participation in EZLN, they are free to do so because the government already know 
who they are (as we will see in chapter 7). 
The rest of the interviews I did with scholars, activists, and Catholic Church 
representatives. I have hidden the identity of one of these outside informants, who speaks 
of his past with FLN, the political-military organization that created ELZN in the early 
1980s.124 I taped all of the interviews, to ensure that I would be able to play them back.125 
 
I have it on tape. Now what? Some remarks on the trust in the oral material 
So, what is it I have recorded? What do these interviews actually contain? Are they useful 
sources? Knut Kjeldstadli writes that when it comes to approving or using an oral source, 
the process is no different from that of other sources. The interview must be tested by its 
inner consistency, cross-checked against other material and placed in a bigger context. This 
means seeing the interview as a whole, weighing every claim up against the source’s total 
                                                
121 Fetterman 1989 p 58 
122 Knut Kjeldstadli quotes Mao Zedong, saying that “the frog in the well sees the opening of the well and 
thinks it sees all heaven”. (Kjeldstadli 1981, p 67) 
123 I hide the identity not only because of my thesis and the information used here, but also because of other 
outsiders who may be interested in the account offered by this informant. Without any illusions of the 
readership of a master thesis, I follow Fetterman here, when he claims that anonymity may help protect 
informants from the researcher’s larger audience. (Fetterman 1989, p 134) 
124 The reasoning is similar to that above – a hidden identity is necessary due to the topic of the interview: 
The violent past of this informant in this organization. (Interview with “Enrique”) 
125 ”[The use of a tape-recorder] enables repeated analysis not only of the source’s data, but also the very 
situation in which it happened, and is thus a primary document of the greatest value.” (Borchgrevink 1981, p 
86). Also, working as a journalist, I have experienced that once you stop taking notes, the conversation will 
come to a halt. 
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reliability, character, overview, etcetc. It also implies confirming, and mixing, oral sources 
with other sources. Does the information seem plausible compared to other accounts?126 I 
have found most of my sources to be reliable, but there are large portions of the material 
that I doubt as well. The discussion about my informants and my use of the information is 
a constant one in this thesis, based on what has been mentioned in this section. 
 
Gender 
I barely touch the topic of gender in this thesis. Where I mention the role of the woman as 
opposed to that of the man, it is to show a general evolution the historical process of ejido 
Tabasco. This is due to the focus of this thesis, and in part to the lack of female informants. 
This may be considered a weakness, but limited time and space make for priorities. I only 
did one interview with the women in the community of study, a collective interview with 
the whole female population of Medellin del Carmen.127 The lack of women informants is 
caused by the fact that the women were not comfortable speaking to me, a male outsider; 
that all the interviews were done in Spanish, a language many of the Tabasqueñas do not 
speak that well; and that the men would not let me speak to the women. Outside of ejido 
Tabasco, however, I interviewed basically the same amount of women as I did men.128 I 
also spoke Tabasqueñas informally. This leads us to the last topic of this sub-chapter: 
 
Observations in the field 
This is a historical work, not an anthropological one.129 Therefore I will not use too many 
field observations. But when I find it useful or necessary, I will give some short accounts 
of what I did see in the community. But most of the observations serve more as a 
background, helping me to understand and conceptualize the reality of Tojolabal Chiapas.  
One note: Most of the sources I have used, oral as written, in the process of writing this 
thesis are Spanish. All translations are mine where not otherwise indicated. 
                                                
126 Kjeldstadli 1981 
127 This interview was conducted by Jessica Allande, my female companion in the field. She stayed with me, 
helping with the interviews and even taking photos filming some small clips that I use to go back to 
remember the context. Allande stayed with me for roughly half of the time I spent with the Tabasqueños. 
128 For a full overview of all the interviews, see the sources section. 
129 I never lived in ejido Tabasco; I stayed in “nearby” Las Margaritas. I spent a total of some 15 days in the 
community. 
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Chapter 3: Short summary of Tojolabal history 
Today, Tojolabal is spoken by some 38 000 people in Chiapas.130 Almost all of the 
Tojolabales live in the Tojolabal region that consists of three sub-regions: The region of 
Tierras frias; the Tojolabal Cañadas of the Lacandon jungle and, finally, the Valley 
Region, which is the region we will focus on in this thesis.131 In the Valley region we find 
ejido Tabasco, as well as the town of Las Margaritas. This region is situated on the lower 
parts of the Chiapan high planes. The altitude differs from between roughly 1000 meters to 
1500. (See maps 2.1 and 2.2) This region is where we find the longest Tojolabal tradition 
in Chiapas, dating back long before the Spanish conquest, but with centralization due to the 
emergence of the fincas – big farms – in the 19th century. 
The main agricultural products in the area are corn and beans, both sown twice a year: 
Once in fall and another time before the heavy rains set in, usually in May. The 
Tojolabales – as free men during the last 70 years, or on the finca in the 19th century – in 
this region also traditionally produce some coffee to be sold on the world market, fruits 
and, in much lesser extent after leaving the fincas in the 1930s, cattle. Coffee and cattle 
give a small income that is used to buy products needed from nearby markets in Las 
Margaritas or Comitan: Salt, sugar, medicine, etcetc.132 
 
The arrival of the Spanish 
The whereabouts of the Tojolabales in Chiapas at the time of the arrival of the Spanish in 
today’s Mexico in the early 16th century is somewhat disputed due to few existing sources 
on the subject.133 Anthropologist Gudrun Lenkersdorf134 at the National Autonomous 
University of Mexico (UNAM) claims that the Tojolabales had their strongest settlements 
                                                
130 There have been debates about the estimates of the Tojolabal population. Anthropologist Roberta 
Montagú puts the population at 40,000 or more in 1969 (Montagu 1969). Some years earlier, in the early 
1960s, Mexican anthropologist Alfonso Villa Rojas had put the Tojolabal population in Comitán, La 
Trinitaria, La Independencia, and Las Margaritas at almost 10,000. (Mattiace 2002) Later studies estimated 
the population to be between 32,000 and 33,000 in the municipalities of Comitán, La Trinitaria, La 
Independencia, Altamirano, and Las Margaritas. (Mattiace 2002) 
131 Cuadriello Olivos & Megchun Rivera 2006 
132 Op.cit. 
133 Mexican anthropologist Mario Humberto Ruz noted in 1984 that only 132 academic pages (not counting 
linguistic studies) had been written on the Tojolabales (Humberto Ruz 1984). Anthropologist Roberta 
Montagu notes that even by the early 20th century, the region was considered unpopulated by mapmakers 
(Montagu 1969). This lack of sources about the Tojolabales has been filled by the four-volume study edited 
by Humberto Ruz and works by Estrada Saavedra, Gemma van der Haart and Shannan Mattiace, but the list 
is still short. 
134 The wife of Carlos Lenkersdorf, who was described as the household anthropologist of many of the 
Zapatista supporters in the discussion about literature. The couple lived together in Tojolabal Chiapas in the 
1970s, working as Christian activists. Both have later done academic work on the subject. 
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around the area of Comitan upon the arrival of the Europeans.135 According to Lenkersdorf 
the Tojolabal region at the time of the European conquest ran from the upper basin of the 
Grijalva river to the Montebello lakes, and maybe as far north as to the actual town of 
Altamirano.136 The reasons for this lack of investigation may derive from what some 
anthropologists claim is the impression among scholars that the Tojolabales have lost 
traditional customs such as native clothing and language.137 In other word, the Tojolabales 
may be considered too little “purely indigenous” to be worth academic research. The 
indigenous praxis of self-governing through civil-religious cargo systems was also lost to 
some degree during the period spent under the patron’ controll. 
During the time of La Colonia – the 300 years of Spanish reign in Mexico – the 
Tojolabales were separated in church congregations and made subjects under Las Leyes de 
Indias – The Indian Laws. These laws, suffice to say in the context of this thesis, 
established a set of administrational and juridical rules that ensured a hierarchical order, 
where the indigenous peoples were separated from, and subjected to, the Spanish 
overlords.138 The latter all answered to the viceroy, who, in his turn was directly under the 
command of the Spanish Crown.139  
Upon the arrival of the Spanish, the Tojolabales lost control of the communal lands they 
had lived and worked on. The area around Comitán was seen by the newcomers as a good 
place for cultivating grain and sugar, and raising cattle. Dominican priests first 
administered the lands for the Spanish, making the natives subjects, tinged to the land and 
christened, thus a double dependency was created. Belonging to a congregation meant 
having to pay taxes to the head of the church. More often than not this tax was so elevated 
that it made, combined with the very nature of being subject to an outside force, many 
Tojolabales denounce their ethnicity. They went to live in the city of Comitan140 as 
                                                
135 G. Lenkersdorf 1986, p 80 
136 Ibid. 
137 Mattiace 2002. Monolingualism in Tojolabal communities is rare because of the relatively frequent 
contact between Tojolabales and non-indigenous since the colonial period. In ejido Tabasco most (men) 
speak good Spanish. 
138 After having been diminished by illness brought by the Spanish, war and deportations in the first decades 
of the Spanish conquest (75 % of the indigenous population is believed to have died in the early 16th 
century), the situation in Chiapas was stabilized upon the arrival of the Dominican brotherhood. They 
installed themselves in Chiapan land, and organised the Tojolabales (and other peoples) in congregations – 
small villages where the indigenous population worked the land of the Dominicans, protected by different 
saints, all of which were ”given” to each congregation by the Dominicans. This system was to survive until 
the end of the Spanish reign in Mexico. In the 1850s the Dominicans were thrown out of Chiapas and forced 
to flee to Guatemala. (de Vos 1994, p 77) 
139 This system was established in all the viceroyalties of the Spanish thrown in Latin America. (Williamson 
1992) 
140 American anthropologist Shannan L. Mattiace writes that “Certainly the Tojolabales became much more 
acculturated linguistically and in terms of social structure than the Tzotziles, Tzeltales, and Choles, Chiapas 
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meztisos – the mixed ethnicity of the Spanish and the indigenous peoples that later, some 
400 years after the conquest, was to become a cornerstone in the official creation of a 
Mexican national identity.141 
 
Independence and the emergence of the finca system142 
Mexico became independent from Spain in 1823, after a ten year long war over its 
freedom. Chiapas became part of Guatemala, but chose to be annexed by Mexico in 
1823.143 With independence from Spain and the creation of the finca system – a system 
where the landowner is master and head of the people working and living on his lands, not 
unlike the feudal European system of villainage – in the 19th century, the Tojolabales were 
made dependent on the emerging landowner class that positioned itself as the owners of 
basically all fertile lands in the Tojolabal region of Chiapas.144 The finca system was both 
an economic system and a system of domination, being the hub of regional life, laying the 
foundation for (mostly indigenous) peasant colonization.145 
According to historian Jan De Vos, la franja finquera – the finca belt 
 
[...] extends, in the shape of a half moon, from Palenque to Comitán, passing through Yajalón, Ocosingo, 
Altamirano and Las Margaritas. This sub region, separating Los Altos from the Lacandon, was populated 
by haciendas [fincas] from the end of colonial times and has been, due to the agricultural activity, 
integrated in Chiapan economic and social life ever since.146 [See map 2.1] 
 
The finca system is tightly connected to the loss of lands on the part of the indigenous 
population. During the 19th century, with the enforcement of the big landowners, the 
indigenous peoples had little choice other than move to the fincas and offer their services. 
This led to a self-enforcing circle: Because of the ever expanding fincas, the indigenous 
population had to work for the white owner of the lands, and because of the easy access to 
manpower, the finca sector could grow fast and steady. When appropriating new lands, the 
                                                                                                                                              
three other large Maya groups – groups that, together with the Tojolabales, would dominate the Zapatista 
movement”. (Mattiace 2002) 
141 “The world of the Tojolabales retreated to the periphery, or Indian belt, that began in the marginal 
neighbourhoods of the old city of Balún Canán [Comitán], where it alternated with the castas in mixed 
neighbourhoods, and, above all, to the region’s constellation of farms and some ranches” (Humberto Ruz, 
1992, p 18, translated by and quoted in Mattiace, 2002). For a discussion on the subject of Meztiso Mexico 
and the distance between official rhetoric and praxis, The book Mexico profundo offers good information 
(Bonfil Batalla 1992) 
142 In the Mexican population censuses before 1960, “hacienda” and “finca” were used inter changeably. 
(INEGI) 
143 Escalante Gonzalbo, Pablo et.al 2005 
144 The land that was made available when the Dominicans where forced to leave the state of Chiapas in the 
mid 1850s was handed over to families such as the Dominguez and the Castellanos, thus creating what is still 
today called La familia Chiapaneca, a handful of powerful landowning families. (Garcia de Leon 1997) 
145 Leyva Solano & Ascencio Franco 1996, p 58 
146 de Vos 2002 
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new elites quite simply also appropriated the manpower needed to work the lands, or, in 
plain English: The indigenous peoples living on the land followed the land. Thus, the 
indigenous peoples were transformed into a class of finca workers. In the region of Los 
Llanos de Comitán and the rest of the finca belt, the expansion of the fincas, where cattle, 
maize and beans were the main products, happened on the lands formerly belonging to the 
indigenous population (mainly Tojolabal and Tzeltal) and leaving these with few other 
options than to start working for the new elites, the patrones of the fincas.147 
 
The significance of the finca system 
The new conditions laid on the Tojolabales with the emergence of the finca system were 
hard. Starting with the independence, the subordination of the native population was not 
purely based on ethnicity, but also on the heavy debts owed to the landowners for using the 
lands or buying goods in the store on the fincas. The Tojolabales were basically villains, 
not having the opportunity to pay their debts and, thus, buy their freedom. By law, the 
landowners could renumerate the indigenous workers as they pleased, as well as the land. 
As a consequence, the properties of the landowners got bigger, and the Tojolabales, with 
very few exceptions, were made subjects to the finqueros – the finca owners, working the 
lands of the fincas for little or no money. 
The finca was not just the centre of production in Chiapas. It was also the place where 
the political and social order was reproduced. Life on the fincas had many and very 
different impacts on the Tojolabal population. Life as villains was hard, but the finca 
system offered at least stable access to food and lands, thus making sure the Tojolabales 
could survive physically. But the finca also offered the possibility of reproducing the 
cultural aspects of being Tojolabal. Just one example of this: Subjects to the Catholic 
Church, the Tojolabales were still free to live out their religious ceremonies.148 This 
created a strange mix of dogmatic Christianity and indigenous ”nature” religions that we 
will look at in greater detail in chapter six. 
The system of the fincas also created internal division among the Tojolabales. As 
mentioned above, some went to live in the cities as meztisos, and were in that way 
incorporated in the national project of Mexico. As for most of the Tojolabales, they were 
                                                
147 Humberto Ruz 1992, and García de Leon 1997 
148 Op. cit. 
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made subjects to the local elites, living at the mercy and will of the finqueros. They 
became what I will refer to as mozos in the rest of this thesis.149 
Thus, being Tojolabal in a rural settlement meant living at the will of the finquero. From 
the mid-1800s the suppression was no longer based solely on ethnicity, but the racist 
rhetoric and the material situation combined to make the position of the Tojolabales even 
harder. The finqueros where hispanics and held the power, the mozos were indigenous and 
subjected to the power of the former. This hierarchy was grounded on a combination of 
biology, social structures and status, economy and cultural aspects, and recreated itself 
with each new generation.150 The Tojolabales worked constantly to improve their position 
within the existing system, something that enabled them to conserve important parts of 
their culture and autonomy. The power of the elders and the holy men, to name but a few 
examples, was not broken by life on the fincas. This has led anthropologists Gomez 
Hernandez and Humberto Ruz to argue that Tojolabal identity instead of being lost was re-
created on the fincas during this period – roughly from the 1850s to 1940s.151 
 
Life on finca Medellin – the future ejido Tabasco152 
What was life like on the finca? The few accounts we have all tell a story of low payment, 
if at all. The Tabasqueños talk of the tienda – a drugstore on the finca where the patron 
sold goods at stiff prices. This is a brief account on how Javier Solis, later to be the owner 
of (the remains of) the finca Medellin, enriched himself at the cost of the Tojolabales 
working the land when he was supervisor, or mayordomo, on La Floresta in the 1930s: 
 
He sold booze, clothes, soap – anything. If you bring him a pound of salt, he would only give you a fistful 
of salt in exchange… The mayordomo controlled everything. He buys on the cheap and sells it expensive. 
This went on, the prices rising, until he one day had gathered enough to buy Medellin.153 
                                                
149 On the fincas, workers separated in two groups: los acasillados – those who worked to pay off their debts 
– those we have called the villains above; and los baldios, free men working the lands. In other parts of 
Chiapas, this distinction was an important one, but no so much in the Tojolabal region, where none of the two 
groups in reality were free to do anything but work the lands of the patron. The baldios could leave, but 
where to, and to do what? They had to pay a rent to work the only accessible lands – that of the fincas. They 
were granted the right to use la milpa – small parts of the land for personal cultivation. For the rest of their 
work they received very low payments. The acasillados could not leave until they had paid off their debts, 
something that was made close to impossible by the prices of necessary goods in the store owned by the 
landowner. I use, somewhat unprecise, the word mozo to describe both the acasillados and the baldios, seeing 
as the distinction serves little purpose in this thesis. As describes Shannan L. Mattiace: “In Chiapas, the 
existence of the baldío became more widespread after state laws were passed in 1847 that dispossessed 
Indians of their lands and obligated them to live permanently on fincas as baldíos, exchanging their manual 
labour for permission to live and work on the land.  In the Tojolabal region, the term most often used to 
describe the sharecroppers on the fincas was mozo baldío” (Mattiace 2002) 
150 This did not mean that there was no dialogue and mutual affection between the groups. Even the finquero, 
despite his power, depended on his subjects. 
151 Gomez Hernandez & Humberto Ruz 1992. 
152 See figure 3.1 for a photography of finca Medellin. It is, as can be seen, modest. 
153 Humberto Ruz & Goméz Hernández 1992, p 390 
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The tiendas on the fincas was a way of indebting the workers. Debts were inherited from 
generation to generation, and the prices the people had to pay in these tiendas were way 
above “market price”. Padre Ramon Castillo of La Castalia in Comitan, one of the 
religious workers with the most knowledge and influence in the region of Las Margaritas, 
found a Tojolabal man hiding in the mountains from the landowner and the landowners 
family.154 He had fled from his patron because of his debts, knowing he would never be 
able to pay him back. The debt amounted to less than 100 pesos.155 
Also, this account from one of the elders of ejido Tabasco, makes it possible to 
understand parts of life as a mozo on the finca Medellin: 
 
The patron had different jobs that needed to be done. [The mozos] worked from 6 am to 6 pm, and what 
did they earn? Not a single cent. The patron gave them all the tools, but they never made any money. They 
got some maize, some beans and salt.156 
 
This same interview also lets us understand how work on the finca was organized. The 
patron’s men supervised the indigenous labourers. 
 
The patron had a mayordomo, and he again had his puntero. The puntero was responsible for getting the 
mozos to work. The two of them supervised the workers. They worked every day. Clean sugar canes, work 
the milpa… they did it all. They had to build and maintain the main buildings, and their tools were 
primitive. Axes were used for all the wood work… the women were moling the salt, they had to clean the 
toilets of the patrones…157 
 
With what kind of products did the mozos work? The production on the fincas was 
almost exclusively agricultural, except for the odd construction or maintenance of 
buildings. Most of it was for self-consumption: 
 
More than anything, sugar cane and coffee was the main commerce here. Maize and beans we produced for 
our own consumption. Moling the sugar into Panela was hard work. But from the Panela you get booze, 
which could be sold. They also worked with cattle. But, of course, everything was owned by the patron.158 
 
The people of ejido Tabasco talk of suffering, but still we have no accounts of physical 
abuse of the mozos in ejido Tabasco. From other fincas there are many stories of 
punishment, ordered arbitrarily by the patron. This one is from ejido Plan de Ayala: 
 
There was a lot of punishment before. They hung people on a hook. If you lost kettle, you had to sign a 
piece of paper admitting to having stolen it and eaten it [thus making the labourer indebted, making sure he 
                                                
154 Albeit in the 1960s and thus not in the period of discussion here, but still the account gives an impression 
of the situation discussed. 
155 Interview with informant 7 
156 Interview with informant 4 
157 Interview with informant 4. As we have seen above, the mayordomo on finca Medellin got rich enough 
doing his job to buy the whole finca. He was not the only one taking advantage of the Tojolabales by selling 
them goods at high prices in the region. (Humberto Ruz & Goméz Hernández 1992) 
158 Interview with informant 4 
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would not leave the finca]. If you declined, claiming you never had stolen, you would be punished, 
sometimes to death… They would hang you, and leave you to die.159 
 
The finca system comes to an end 
The breakdown of the finca system started in the central parts of Mexico, with the state of 
Morelos and the movement of general Emiliano Zapata – the first Zapatistas.160 This 
happened during the Mexican Revolution, a civil war that ended the almost 40 year long 
rule of dictator Porfirio Diaz and lasted from 1910 to the early 1920s. Land reform was one 
of the driving factors behind the revolution, at least the peasant revolution in central 
Mexican states such as Morelos. The revolutionary manifesto Plan de Ayala demanded that 
land be given back to farmers where big fincas had expanded on their behalf. Even more 
radical was the suggested expropriation of lands to benefit small rural communities. In the 
Mexican constitution of 1917, these claims from the Plan de Ayala were included.161 
When the revolutionary forces came to Chiapas, they burned the books keeping track of 
debts and promised to redistribute lands, making the indigenous the owners of their own 
lands. But the Mexican Revolution never really made a difference in the question of 
landownership in Chiapas.162 Not only did the troops of the revolutionary general Carranza 
not succeed in Chiapas. The Tojolabales and the rest of the indigenous population in the 
finquero belt did not receive these radicals and their world altering message with joy. In 
more cases than not, the mozos chose to fight with their patron against these outside forces, 
including saving the books keeping score of their personal debt from being destroyed.163 
The reason for this support for the landowners may have differed, but I follow many others 
in subscribing it to the relationship of dependence that had been created and recreated over 
the generations between the patron and the mozos. Entering a new and unknown world 
solely because outside manipulation made it possible was too big a step for the Tojolabales 
in Chiapas.164 But this triumph of the finca system was to be its last days of glory, as we 
will see in the next chapter. 
                                                
159 Interview with informant 11. Ejido Plan de Ayala is turned into a museum showing how the Tojolabales 
lived and worked on the fincas. 
160 I call them the first Zapatistas because that is what one of these original Zapatistas says to the masked 
EZLN members in a scene in the movie Los últimos Zapatistas - Héroes olvidados: “We were the first, now 
you are taking over,” the old revolutionary who fought with Emiliano Zapata during the Mexican revolution 
says to the young ones from EZLN. More than 80 years separate their struggles. (In Taboada Tabon 2002) 
161 Womack, Jr. 1970 
162 Many scholars claim that the revolution never came to Chiapas, and some speak of the Chiapan counter-
revolution (like Núñez Rodríguez 2004, pp 31-45). It is possible, however, to claim that land reform was not 
realized to a great degree in Mexico at all between 1910 and -20. John Womack, Jr. seems to make this point 
in his classic work Zapata and the Mexican Revolution. (Womack, Jr. 1970) 
163 van der Haar 2001 
164 Garcia de Leon 1997 
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Chapter 4: The end of villainage – a new era in an unknown world 
May 1, 1940. A new era begins for the people of ejido Tabasco. For the first time in 
history, they have government documents proving their ownership to their own lands, 
complete with finger stamps from the new ejiditarios.165 A presidential resolution, 
published in el Diario Oficial October 7, 1939, states that from this day on, Tabasco is 
officially an ejido.166 The new ejido is granted a sum total of 635, 7 hectares of land, all of 
it annexed from the fincas of Medellin and La Soledad.167 
The same handover document from May 1 1940 tells us that 32 men were granted 
ownership of ejido land in ejido Tabasco.168 The National Census from 1940 operates with 
a number of 130 inhabitants in the new ejido, 65 men and 65 women. Half the men in ejido 
Tabasco were thus granted land in the endowment process, the rest of them either still 
worked for the patron on the finca or were younger members of their families, working the 
family land and living together with their seniors. According to the same 1940 census, only 
33 people chose to remain on the finca Medellin when their fellow mozos applied for land 
rights.169 Ten years earlier, in 1930, the census operates with a total of 140 people living 
and working at the finca Medellin.170 
The Tabasqueños applied for ejido land on February 16, 1937.171 Two years later they 
could call themselves rightful owners of the land they had been cultivating for generations. 
A new era had begun. 
 
The Cardenista reforms 
Lazaro Cardenas was elected president of Mexico in 1934. He was the first president to 
actually live up to Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution, a remainder of the Plan de Ayala 
manifesto in the Constitution of 1917: 
 
Those rural settlements that lacks lands and water, or do not have these in sufficient quantities to meet the 
necessities of their population, have the right to be endowed with these, by taking them from neighbouring 
properties, while respecting private smallholdings.172 
 
                                                
165 RAN 07 52 04, 1940: 03 – 08 
166 RAN 07 52 04, 1940: 01. Under Mexican law, an ejido creation and all redistribution of land had to be 
made public in the Diario Oficial – the official newspaper where all new laws and official appointments are 
published – in the form of a presidential decree. 
167 Land dotated from Medellin: 470 hectares from Eldemira Dominguez, 22 from the property of Eduardo 
Dominguez Mandujano. The remainder, 143, 7 hectares, was obtained from the property of Sra. Maria Castro 
de Serrano, hacienda La Soledad. (Map of dotacion, RAN 07 52 02, 1939: 09, signed July 12, 1939) 
168 The same numbers also appear in Núñez Rodríguez 2004, p 230 
169 National census 1940, INEGI 
170 National census 1930, INEGI 
171 Diario Oficial, October 7, 1939 
172 Quoted in van der Haar 2001. Her translation. 
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Cardenas was to redistribute almost 20 million hectares of land from 1934 to -40, 
whereas his predecessors173 together reached a total of some 7 million hectares from 1917 
to -34.174 Cardenas used Article 27 as a means to change and modernize the Mexican 
agricultural sector, beneficiating both his political project and the peasant population, in 
large part indigenous. To Cardenas, the agricultural sector was a key factor in modernizing 
Mexico. To sustain industry, Mexico needed a more efficient agricultural production. Due 
to the international crisis of 1929, Mexico could no longer sell its goods on the 
international market. Where the earlier strategies had been to attract foreign investment, 
Cardenas (and his successor, Calles, to a lesser extent) sought to create an internal market. 
This was also important in order to increase the population, at the time of the crisis of 1929 
totalling no more than 16,5 million in a scarcely populated country. 
Cardenas radicalized the repartition of land. In Chiapas, in the period from 1930 to 1939, 
2.903548 hectares were redistributed, benefiting more than 20 000 farmers.175 In giving the 
dependent peasant population the right to own their own land, Cardenas created the 
Mexican corporate state. This was to have a major impact on life in ejidos such as Tabasco 
and Mexican history as a whole, laying the framework for a way of doing politics that 
lasted until the end of the 20th century. In creating the ejidos, Cardenas was able to draw 
the peasant population closer to the apparatus of the federal state, at the same time 
diminishing the power of local landlords and governments. The same was true for the 
urban workers – Cardenas created the Confederación de Trabajadores de Mexico – the 
Workers Confederation of Mexico (CTM) – in 1936 and the Confederacion Nacional 
Campesina – the National Peasant Confederation (CNC) – in 1938.  
 
Cardenas intended to organize the working classes and attach them to the government so that they would 
back him up and serve as a counterweight against pressure from other groups, such as important 
businessmen from Monterrey [the financial capital of Mexico, in the north of the country] and other 
countries, especially the US.176 
 
Also in 1938, Cardenas created a new political party, Partido de la Revolucion Mexicana 
– the Party of the Mexican Revolution (PRM) – on the basis of the governing party. The 
new party, later to change its name to Partido de la Revolucion Instituticional – the Party 
of the Institutional Revolution (PRI), was to rule Mexico for a period of 70 years. Cardenas 
built the party on different sectors: workers, farmers and the military. 
                                                
173 Alvaro Obregon (1920 – 1924), Plutarco Elias Calles (1924 – 1928), Emilio Portes Gil (1928 – 1930) and 
Pascual Ortiz Rubio (1930 – 1932) 
174 van der Haar 2002, p 49 
175 Montellano García 2001, p 81 
176 Escalante Gonzalbo et.al 2005, p 268
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In this corporative scheme, the president reaffirms his role as leader of the party organisations, in charge of 
mediating between the different political groups. More than through elections, political problems were met 
and solved within the official party.177 
 
The Cardenista reforms ended with the end of Cardenas’ presidency in 1940.178 One short 
note here, as we are dealing with land reform: By 1993, more than 50 % of the land in 
Chiapas was either communal or ejidal. Less than 25 % was in private hands.179 In Las 
Margaritas, the latter number was even smaller.180 
 
Leaving the finca 
Getting the endowment for ejidal land and rights was just a first step in the process of 
creating an independent community. The Tabasqueños tell a story of struggle when they 
talk about the first ejiditarios. Lack of knowledge of how to work the land without the 
patron after generations of villainage, the bad lands given to the new ejiditarios and the 
obstruction from the patron combined to make the process difficult. 
 
We were given our freedom by the government, in 1939. The governor fought for our rights. But we were 
given the bad lands, pura sierra [plain mountainside, rocks]. The finqueros held on to all the good lands, 
all over this cañada. But through sacrifice, struggle and unity we got our lands. When we left the finca, not 
only did we get the bad lands that had never been cultivated before, we had to construct new houses. The 
patron tried to get the people to stay, telling them they would starve if they left. Those who left had to fight. 
The mozos were given food to survive; when our fathers left, they had no guarantee of getting food. Some 
left, only to go back to live with the patron.181 
 
As the quote above implies, the patron, seeing his cheap labourers leave him, tried to 
make the mozos stay on, using both pressure and rewards. There are accounts of patrones 
using their political influence to prevent the creation, or at least minimize the effects, of the 
ejidos in the region of Las Margaritas, as there are accounts of higher wages to make the 
indigenous workers stay.182 
The patron had power over his subjects, and in many cases tried everything – bribing the 
bureaucrats of the Reforma Agraria, the governing body of agriculture, and negotiations 
                                                
177 Escalante Gonzalbo 2005 
178 This does not, however, mean that all redistribution of land came to a total halt. Ejido Tabasco gets more 
land in the period treated in this chapter. But the tendency is one of decline in the redistribution of farmland 
for the ejidos. Much of the redistribution that was to take place in the following decades was driven by the 
handing out of national lands as well as land in the Lacandon jungle. It should be mentioned that according to 
historian Antonia Garcia de Leon, “the Cardenista reform was, in the last instance, favourable for the land 
owners”. Garcia de Leon backs this claim by showing that properties with more than 5000 hectares made for 
27 % of all private property in Chiapas (as a whole) in 1940 as opposed to 29 % ten years earlier, before the 
presidency of Cardenas. (Garcia de Leon 2002, p 51) 
179 Viqueira 1999 
180 van der Haar 2001 
181 Interview with informant 4 
182 In Estrada Saavedra 2007 
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with the mozos, offering better pay, threats (to death, even) – he could to make his mozos 
stay with him. 183 But oftentimes these tactics were not even necessary. Many mozos chose 
to stay on with the patron. In the book Memoria Baldia, Humberto Ruz and Gomez 
Hernandez have gathered accounts of former mozos, including some from ejido Tabasco. 
One of them, Pablo Cruz Mendez, stayed on with the Patron before he “asked permission 
to join the ejiditarios”.184 He confirms that hard work and low pay were the main reasons 
why he left the patron after having, initially, decided to stay with him. 
 
That is why I now am here, because of my two sons. [The ejiditarios] almost declined when I asked 
permission to join the ejido, but finally they gave me room. But I left to help myself and to help my two 
sons; I would not let them see all the bad things with the patron. That is why I am a free man today. But I 
stayed on with the patron for a long time; that is true.185 
 
Pablo Cruz Mendez also explains how the patron used the fact that his mozos could not 
read and write to manipulate them to stay on or to make it hard enough to leave so that life 
on the finca would seem an easier option than starting a new life: 
 
Sometimes people thought of leaving the patron, move to another place. And the patron would let you go. 
“Leave, get out of here”, he would say. “I will leave. Look at my bill. I have been working so many days”. 
And the patron would look at your bill, but not to give you money for the days you had been working, he 
only raised your debt. He would write a note, and give it to you. “Show this at the people with whom you 
want to work”… So you are carrying, in your own hands, a piece of paper that says that you should not be 
offered work. You can leave, but you have to go far.186 
 
After having lived in the world of the fincas for generations, many Tojolabales knew no 
other life than the one at the finca, living under the rules of the patron. Many mozos thus 
stayed on. For did the patron not offer food and stability? And was not the world of 
hierarchy a world where everyone knew his place?187  
Pablo Cruz Mendez also gives us an example of how hard it could be for the indigenous 
to imagine a new life, outside the known environment of the finca. Why believe in the 
people who came to tell him that it would be better to live on his own lands, to be his own 
master? This reaction seems typical: “What do you make of it; somebody comes to fool 
me, to tell me that the work should be done in this or such way? I have seen work, I know 
how it is supposed to be done.”188 
The fact that some of the mozos chose to leave the finca and become ejiditarios caused 
some internal problems among the Tabasqueños. For those who stayed behind, the 
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187 van der Haar 2001, and García de Leon 2002 
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situation was to become one of double strains: The patron would need them to work harder 
than before, and the newly become ejiditarios would not necessarily want to give a hand to 
those who had not fought for the ejidal rights. 
 
There was conflict. The ones who stayed were criticising those who left. The ones who stayed were 
suffering, my father told me. They were pressured, and had to work even harder than before. But even 
those who left were starving. They had to leave what they had been cultivating behind, with the patron, and 
start all over. They had to cultivate land that had never been used for cultivation before. But, as time went 
by, the ones who stayed with the patron saw that those who had left were better off, that they were their 
own masters. And one by one, they came to ask permission to join the ejiditarios, due to violence and 
pressure [from the patron].189 
 
In other regions of Chiapas, this process was not as peaceful as the one described here. 
The colonization of the Lacandon jungle, almost unpopulated until the 1950s, took place 
because landowners were able to prevent the endowment of their lands, lack of available 
land or internal fighting in the indigenous communities. But the Tabasqueños were able to 
stay on the land they had worked for generations. “We suffered a lot. And thus, for better 
or for worse, we have to stay on these lands, because here our forefathers were suffering, 
and they built, with their own hands, what we see here today.”190 As it turns out, they were 
willing to fight for their right to this land, as we will see in the following chapters. 
 
Effects of Cardenismo in ejido Tabasco 
We have seen that president Cardenas built his political project on corporativism. How did 
this affect the Tojolabales of ejido Tabasco, Las Margaritas, Chiapas?  
Most of all, it altered relations between the patron and his subjects. The former used to be 
the master of the Tojolabales. On the finca, the patron took on every form of power: judge 
in conflicts, police authority, teacher, doctor... The patron and his family, with almost 
eternal bloodlines and eternal rights, were the kings of the finca system, and thus of the 
Tojolabal world. Because it could take days to get from the town of Las Margaritas to the 
fincas, the Catholic Church let the patrons perform religious ceremonies, even weddings, 
thus adding to his power.191 The patron organized the property, production and labour. He 
made the necessary investments, kept control of the animals and gave rights to the mozos 
concerning farming. When the Tabasqueños were granted ejido rights, the patron, 
                                                
189 Interview with informant 13. The accounts I got from the Tabasqueños on this topic all coincide. Seeing as 
they are talking about their ancestors and retelling stories they have only heard, it would be fair to assume 
that the version I get is the one they have agreed on in the passing of time. Thus, is tradert information, as 
discussed in chapter 2. 
190 Interview with informant 4 
191 van der Haar 2001 p 112, and collective interview in Medellin del Carmen, May 8, 2007 
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naturally, lost his stronghold on them.192 The state government, in many ways, replaced the 
patron as the rule-maker, and, in doing so, in many aspects entered into indigenous life in 
Chiapas for the first time. The relative autonomy of Chiapas, a state ruled by the local 
ladino elite – the Chiapan Family – was challenged. 
To be able to control the ejidos, the Mexican government needed some sort of political 
organization within the ejidos. With the emergence of the ejidos and formal freedom, the 
former mozos also needed to find ways of organizing themselves, and they had to maintain 
relations with the federal government. For this purpose, the new ejido system and the 
corporative state created by Cardenas came to fill the void. 
 
Ejido structure 
In order to be accountable for ejido rights, many formal criteria had to be met. The 
settlement in question had to exist for a minimum of six months prior to the endowment 
request. The applicant had to be Mexican citizens, be more than 16 years old and male (or 
a female head of household, meaning a widowed mother). The community needed to 
gather more than 20 such persons before they were in question for endowment. With these 
formalities met, the mozos could request endowment of the land of the finca to which they 
belonged.193 
Every application, once received by the governor, had to be published and communicated 
to the Comisión Agraria Mixta (CAM), the Mixed Agrarian Committee. The latter then 
decided the amount of land that was to be given to the applicants. Once CAM had had it’s 
say, a presidential resolution in the Diario Official was needed to close the deal, as we have 
seen in the case of Tabasco. In most cases, by this time the ejido was already populated 
within the borders set by CAM.194  
As we have also seen in the case of ejido Tabasco, this process was slow. The two years 
the Tabasqueños had to wait for the execution of their request is not at all bad compared to 
many other communities.195 
In order to petition for land, the soon-to-be ejiditarios had to form a Comité Agrario 
Ejecutivo. This formal institution was responsible for all contacts with the government in 
                                                
192 Actually, even the world of the big patron and his family was limited to the finca. Many of them spoke 
Tojolabal. The patron and his family were just as scared of the outside world as the mozos, except that the 
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193 van der Haar 2001, p 80 
194 Op.cit. 
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before they were granted formal rights to their lands. (van der Haar 2001) 
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the process of requesting land, and was to be replaced with the comisariado ejidal – 
elected by an ejidal assembly, also a government construction – once the endowment was 
granted. Thus, this new form of organization replaced the caporales of the finca regime. 
The caporales were caretakers chosen from the peasants working on the fincas. They were 
in charge of organizing the labour of the mozos on the haciendas, but were always 
controlled by the patron. Now, with no patron around to make decisions, the comisariado 
ejidal was to be given new responsibilities that far overreached the role of the caporales. 
The comisariado ejidal is now the highest authority in Tojolabal communities. Given that 
this form of organization derives directly from government initiatives, this needs a closer 
discussion. Did the communities accept this form of governance because they saw it fit in 
the relations with the government? That seems likely, and more so if we accept that the 
communities felt some kind of gratitude towards the governor and president that helped 
them in getting their freedom.196 
It seems another key factor in explaining the willingness to accept the new forms of 
organization was that the newly independent mozos knew very little about how to 
organize, politically, their new lives in the ejido. When the patron was removed, it seems 
an institutional vacuum emerged. In the words of Gemma van der Haar:  
 
Coming from a situation of peonage, in their new condition as direct controllers of land, the Tojolabal were 
in need of a model on which to build their institutions for internal co-ordination and representation to the 
outside. The ejido provided such a model at least partially.197 
 
The ejidal assembly elects the comisariado and his two “helpers”, the tesorero – in 
charge of the economy, and secretario – the referent, for a period of three years. These 
comisariados become autoridad – authority, a word used to describe the people who, due 
to personal skills or official titles, are listened to in the Tojolabal communities. Their 
power goes far beyond the agrarian issues that the government had in mind while setting 
up the system, although not in the formal sense. He – it is always a male – holds the power 
to convoke the people to assembly, and is the outside face of the community in most 
matters. But his power is constrained by the assembly, which holds the power to withdraw 
authority as well as bestow it. 
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The government demands we assemble once a month, but we meet at least two or three times a month, due 
to necessities in the community. It has always been like that. The authority holds the word, he has 
information he wants to share with us. Afterwards the people get to speak. Everybody who wants, speaks, 
they just ask to speak. Or they are asked to speak, the ones with good minds and good hearts. It is very 
democratic… Sometimes we vote, other times we reach consensus. The authority asks us to vote.198 
 
The assembly makes it possible for the right-holders – the ejiditarios – to exercise control 
over land tenure and over individual members. “Right-holders define what a “right” 
entails, condition membership, co-ordinate duties and enforce sanctions.”199 
Although being an authority means great honour as well as power – maybe even more 
than what is democratically sane, it is not easy to find those willing to hold the position. In 
the words of Eduardo Lopez Mendez and Augusto Mendez Lopez: 
 
The assembly chooses the authority. If there is more than one candidate, we vote by lifting our hands. It is 
common that nobody want to be authority, it is not paid work. So the assembly has to pick one. We have to 
ask the wife, not only the candidate. She can say no, that the husband has to work the land, that she cannot 
cope alone…200 
 
In ejido Tabasco, all grown men (above the age of 16), not only the right holders, gather 
in the assembly. The women do not participate. “The women do not participate in the 
assembly, they have their own. They discuss what they need… money for the stores, 
medicine… They also have authorities. They are chosen the same way.”201 
Before we close this subchapter, a short note on who is eligible and who is not for 
positions of authority in the Tojolabal communities: The tesorero has to know how to read 
and write, and keep track of the money. Other than that, you are only required to be a 
grown man, claim Eduardo Lopez Mendez and Augusto Mendez Lopez.202 That is not 
totally true. Status is important in Tojolabal communities, and such status is achieved 
through, among other things, education and holding positions. The two often walk hand in 
hand, and is not for everyone to grab. We will look in greater detail on this power structure 
when we discuss the role played by the catequistas, the Catholic Church representatives in 
the indigenous communities in Chiapas, in the next chapter. The catequistas are trained lay 
teachers, schooled in the basics of Catholic dogmas, social organizing and first aid etcetc 
by the Catholic Church. 
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A de facto local government 
The government model of organization in ejidos says that only the ones with rights as 
ejiditarios assemble, but praxis is, as we have seen, that all adult men gather to discuss 
issues concerning the community – all issues, not only land tenure and issues concerning 
relations with the government. In fact, the assembly can be said to constitute a de facto 
local government. 
 
[It is] the totality of inhabitants of a settlement that, gathered in a meeting, dictate the norms that govern 
every sphere of local social life. For example, the meeting programs, the work in the communal milpa, the 
construction of public buildings, and creating or cleaning footpaths; and it designates civil and religious 
authorities.203 
 
As is true for the other aspects of ejido organization in ejido Tabasco, this function of the 
assembly was established in the early phases of the system, in the 1940s. 
This de facto status of the assembly and the comisariado ejidal as a local government has 
gradually grown into a position that is not in the interest of the Mexican government, and 
has paved the way for a sort of autonomy that later will be used against the very same state 
institutions that imposed this organizational structure. But from the 1940s up to the 1980s 
it served as a means to get stable voters for the official party (PRI), as well as to organize 
the new agricultural project of Cardenas. 
But what could the government expect? Once thrown into a world of the unknown, it was 
only natural that the Tojolabales chose to organize around the structure offered to them by 
the government. But in a world where there suddenly was no patron and the need to 
redefine the identity was urgent, it is equally natural that this form of organizational 
structure would be taken further than the government had intended.204 
The ejido is today considered to be part of Tojolabal tradition by the Tabasqueños. It thus 
seems that the Cardenista scheme hit the nail on the head. The fact that this form of 
organization was as widespread as it came to be, proves that, once “alone” in the world, the 
Tojolabales were eagerly grasping outside guidance in order to find their own way.205 But 
at the same time, seeing as the ejido was rapidly adapted as a traditional way of life, it also 
proves that the Tojolabales were quick to adapt to new forms of life and self-governing. It 
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is also plausible that the collective way of reaching agreements and making decisions felt 
natural and not too far away from earlier forms of organization. 
 
[The ejido] works as an environment of protection against the outside world, and a bastion for the intra-
communal autonomy… As opposed to the regional government, that had the Tojolabales excluded from 
power until recent years, the farmers “exercise a strict internal control in their community”… Thus, not 
withstanding the detailed juridical regulation that allowed the agrarian authorities to intervene in ejidal life, 
the reach and control of the latter is more limited than it might look, due to the fact that the legal norms are 
redefined locally by the feeling of membership and property of the lands as well as Tojolabal praxis, 
experience and believes.206 
 
Even though, as we have seen, the ejido structure was accepted by every known 
Tojolabal community, a mutual identity across the different community borders did not 
develop. Being Tojolabal was of great importance, but inter-community cooperation and 
organization was not pre-eminent. 
 
Life in the new ejido 
The following sequence is an account by a government engineer visiting ejido Tabasco in 
1960: 
 
The ejiditarios use the terrain to cultivate maize and beans, and, to a lesser extent, to cultivate coffee. The 
lands not used for cultivation are the grassing areas of the animals. The ejido is supplied by the river called 
Rio Medellin, that passes close to the populated area. The main centres of consumption of their products 
are Las Margaritas and Comitan, the former some 20 kilometres away, the latter 45. The ejido has no 
streets. The indigenous people of the ejido speak the Shol dialect (sic) needing the use of interpreters as 
their Spanish is very bad. Their clothing consists of pants and shirts without pockets.207 
 
Thus, in order to get to their markets, the nearest towns of Las Margaritas and Comitan, 
the hike for the Tojolabales in ejido Tabasco was a tough one. There was no other transport 
available than walking, using mules for transportation of heavy goods. “You would leave 
at one o’clock in the morning to get to Comitan, and you would not be home before late the 
following night.”208 And people had to go there, to sell their coffee and meat and what was 
left of the beans (most of it went to self-consumption), and to buy whatever could not be 
gotten in ejido Tabasco. When they were still mozos, the goods had to be brought to 
Comitan because that was where the patron had his city household. After the creation of 
ejido Tabasco the travel to the local market got somewhat easier – now they could go to 
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Las Margaritas, half the distance.209 But still: Going to the doctor or getting your child 
baptized – basically every operation that included doing something out of the ordinary 
(working the land, sleeping and eating) meant going to Las Margaritas. Even as late as 
1988, ejido Tabasco offered the following facilities; 
 
Incomplete Primary School Building… Most of the schools in the area are incomplete. These communities 
do not have means of communication: Telephone; Telegraph; Mail. In this sense they are totally without 
communication. In emergencies they use the radio transmitters established in: The City of Las Margaritas: 
XEVFS La voz de la frontera sur [the voice of the southern frontier]…210 
 
In 1960, 140 people were living in the ejido; 63 men and 77 women.211 These 140 souls 
had requested their ejido being expanded one year earlier, due to the eternal problem of not 
having enough lands to work. It would take 10 years to get the extension, and only in 1980 
was the problem solved for good. 
In the preparation for the extension of the terrains in ejido Tabasco, the Cuerpo 
Consultivo Agrario – the agrarian consultant committee – noted the following about ejido: 
 
… a total of 161 inhabitants, of which 37 are heads of the household, of which only three do not have 
rights to land; 17 single men above the age of 16; two women with rights to land, thus making a total of 22 
capacitated persons with 84 heads of big kettle, 90 small ones and 222 poultry.212 
 
The inhabitants cultivated – as have done throughout the whole ejidal history of Tabasco 
– corn, beans, bananas, coffee and different fruits, as well as the above mentioned small 
scale animal farming. Most of this went, at least until the above mentioned extension of the 
terrain, to self-consumption, but the coffee and the fruit was, in large parts, sold at the 
market in Las Margaritas.  
Working with the former patron, paid work at seasonal level, was still an important 
source of income for most ejidos in Chiapas and Las Margaritas, but the former mozos of 
ejido Tabasco chose not to work with Javier Solis, the former Mayordomo and since 1946 
the owner of Medellin. Solis was, according to the Tabasqueños, abusive, and they had 
also sworn never to enter work relations with the patron – any patron – again.213 This 
seems an exaggeration. The Tabasqueños did work with the patron as late as the 1980s, 
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when the new owner of La Floresta, Efren Bañuelos Rios offered them double the pay, 
raising the daily payment from five to ten pesos.214 
There was a school in ejido Tabasco (the same incomplete primary school building 
mentioned on the previous page), and the children did attend. But normally not for long, as 
this account by Eduardo Lopez Mendez, one of the best educated in ejido Tabasco today 
and a holder of a most prestigious position clearly indicates: 
 
I was born in 1954… Little by little, the level of education was elevated. With the very limited help that the 
government offered, we could finish third grade. The little we learned gave us inspiration to do something 
for the community… Yes, we have had a primary school here, but we never got to finish it. I never reached 
sixth grade, for instance. Never got further than third grade.215 
 
Lack of money, too many mouths to feed and the need for more hands working the land 
hindered the education of Tojolabal children. There are, however, stories of leaders in 
different communities “making it big”, either by joining some lower regional leaders or by 
subjugating his whole community – the so-called cacique. In trying to gain more land 
rights, many Tojolabal communities sent people to the state capital of Tuxtla, or even to 
Mexico City, or they hired lawyers. Ejido Tabasco did both.216 Being responsible for the 
contact with the outside world gave access to power abuse, and there are many known 
cases of it. We will look at this aspect of the new social leadership emerging and the inherit 
dangers of power abuse in the indigenous communities in the next chapter. 
 
Leaving behind a vacuum to be filled by other actors 
As I have shown, the social aspects of the Cardenista project were abandoned in the 1940s. 
Even as the president Lazaro Cardenas never really challenged the great landowners, 
repatriation of land in the decades following his presidency did even less to change the 
power structure in Chiapas. Redistribution of land went on, but hardly at the cost of private 
property – mostly national lands and the Lacandon jungle were given to the applicants for 
ejido land.217 And the ejidos were basically left to themselves, only given some rights 
when complaining, and used as voters in the election process, local as national. “In those 
days, PRI was the only alternative. There was no other party”, says Eduardo Lopez 
Mendez.218 In the words of historian Antonio Garcia de Leon: 
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[The Party elites] considered the farming classes… their own creation, a class tied to this by multiple 
mechanisms of subordination, loyalty and “thankfulness”, which had to be proven in every election... The 
old fears of the Zapata general Rafael Cal y Mayor… that the redistribution process was nothing but a 
simple lollypop to control the farming classes, were proven to be extremely accurate.219 
 
The indigenous farmers needed credit to be able to cultivate in an efficient manner. Thus 
they got even more dependent of the party that gave them, at times, what was needed to 
survive. The Chiapan countryside was reduced to not much more than a means to winning 
elections and a good place to produce coffee and hold cattle. The federal state removed 
itself from Chiapas, leaving the state at the will of local leaders such as the infamous state 
governor Absalon Castellanos (1983-88) and the big landowners, who often were the same 
people.220 This absence of an efficient, balanced governing body left a vacuum that soon 
was to be filled by other actors.221 
That the former mozos owned their lands did not mean that they were free to live a life 
out of reach of the landowners. The ejiditarios in ejido Tabasco applied for an extension of 
their terrain in 1959, an extension that would affect the patron of (the remaining parts of) 
the finca Medellin, as well as the lands of a neighbouring ejido of fellow Tojolabales. The 
build-up to the formal application was not without drama, and exemplifies the power (and 
lack of such) of the landowner over the ejiditarios, as well as the – at least some times – 
tense relationship between the two: 
 
And the cabron [bastard ] landowner knew we were in the process of trying to get more land… He came to 
kill the comisariados, he came to kill us. But the comisariados did not die, because his father took the bullet 
for him… But the people got scared, and chose not to go on with the process. This was in 1958, I think.222 
 
Extending the terrain and internal division 
We have seen that inter-community identity was not widespread in Tojolabal Chiapas in 
the first decades after the Cardenista reforms. One of the reasons for this was the struggle 
for land. The Tabasqueño’s request for more ejido lands, leading to armed struggle from 
the landowner as we have seen above, may serve as an example. 
November 24, 1959: The Tabasqueños needed more terrain. They made a request for an 
expansion of the ejido, applying for a total of 904 hectares more. They would have to wait 
almost ten years to get the extension. On February 9, 1968, they did the provisional move, 
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according to the official documents. June 16, 1969, the president sealed the deal by signing 
the request, and a month later, July 14, 1969, it was published in the Diario Oficial.223 
Ejido Tabasco was only extended by 659 hectares. The remaining 245 hectares in the 
application were already occupied by the neighbouring ejido of La Morelia, also Tojolabal. 
This led to years of discussion and argument between the two communities. December 6, 
1980, sees the Tabasqueños sign, at last, the handover document. In this document 
relations with neighbouring La Morelia are discussed, and the remaining 245 hectares are 
accepted as lost to ejido Tabasco.224 
There is no historical hostility in ejido Tabasco towards the neighbours in ejido 
Morelia.225 That was not always the case in post-war Chiapas. As mentioned above, there 
never really existed any inter-community ties other than the “being Tojolabal”. From the 
1940s, the lack of such an identity could even turn into hostility. This was due to the 
patron-client relationship with the authorities as well. We have barely mentioned the need 
for credits, which would be too complicated to go into. But with limited access to land and 
money, looking at neighbouring communities as rivals is not hard to understand.226 The 
very same structure that tied the bond between government (patron) and farmers (clients) 
did also create divisions among the latter. 
The quarrel between La Morelia and ejido Tabasco never escalated into conflict. But 
mutual organization was not on the table. Friendships existed between inhabitants of the 
different ejidos, if only because male members of different communities would socialize227 
when meeting on the markets in Las Margaritas and Comitan. But it seems that a 
combination of consolidating the structure of the ejido, fighting for the existing 
government means and the lack of any overall identity, or at least an ideology that could 
make use of such an identity, the Tojolabales of la Cañada de Soledad first and foremost 
based their lives around the ejido – granted a Tojolabal ejido, where ethnic and cultural 
aspects of being Tojolabal were important features in every day life – more than on 
whatever mutual interests they must have had with their fellow Tojolabales in other ejidos. 
                                                
223 RAN 07 52 04, 1959: 01 – 09, and DOF, June 14, 1969. The presidential resolution granted more land to 
the Tabasqueños than did the governor’s motion in 1960: the 245 hectares suggested by the local authorities 
augmented to 904 hectares with the presidential resolution. 
224 RAN 07 52 04, 1969: 01 – 08 
225 I base this on my interviews. That proves, at least, that relations are good between the two today. 
226 Even more serious was the inter-communitary divide between the already settled ejidos and newly arrived 
applicants. This, however, was not that important in the region around Tabasco, where lands were normally 
distributed between already settled former mozos. This was rather a problem in the mentioned newly settled 
communities in the Lacandon jungle. (van der Haar 2001) 
227 Meaning, as I will show in the next chapter, drinking booze and beer together. 
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This was about to change when another outside agent filled some of the void left open by 
the returning Cardenista reforms. 
Another point worth noting is that, in the before-mentioned handover document, signed 
in 1980 (due to the conflict with La Morelia mentioned above), 22 out of the total 28 
signatures by the inhabitants of ejido Tabasco are written in Latin letters. Only 6 are finger 
stamps. This as opposed to the first handover document, from the original redistribution in 
1939, where 100 % of the signatures were finger stamps. Even in 1959, in the request for 
the lands that were handed over some ten years later, only four of the signatures are in 
Latin letters. Something had happened, obviously, in the period between 1959 and 1980. 
This we will focus on in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 5: The word of God comes to the Tojolabal communities 
We barely touched in the former chapter the way the ejiditarios, in ejido Tabasco and other 
places, depended on outsiders – lawyers and politicians – to get their land and to apply for 
the different programs of credit that the PRI government offered. This was in large parts 
due to a situation in which the ejiditarios knew little about how to behave in the “outside” 
world – they were still “cultural mozos”, not withstanding the fact that they now had 
papers proving their rightful ownership of land, and that they were, strictly speaking, their 
own masters. 
There are many examples of lawyers and government officials taking advantage of this 
situation. The ejiditarios worked the land, in many cases barely surviving on what their 
milpa gave them, and had neither time to apply for help on their own nor the knowledge to 
do so. The little they sold on the market – in the case of ejido Tabasco in Las Margaritas 
or, to a lesser extent, in Comitan – did not offer the opportunity to save money for more 
than a visit to the doctor or buying the absolutely necessary medicine. Coming up with the 
necessary money to finance travelling to Tuxtla Gutierrez or Mexico City to talk to the 
relevant authorities was often difficult. This is an account from the ejido of San José Nueva 
Esperanza, probably about something that occurred in the late 1960s or early 1970s, also in 
Las Margaritas, that shows that this was of little concern to the bureaucrats of la Reforma 
agraria: 
 
When the last government official came, offering to speed up the paperwork, he asked for 10 000 pesos… 
He settled with five or six thousand. He said that if we did not give him the money, we would never see the 
paperwork solved.228 
 
This situation lasted until the late 1960s or, in the case of ejido Tabasco, the early 1970s. 
In the words of Eduardo Lopez Mendez, born in the early 1950s: 
 
A group of us, young people, said no!, we will do things ourselves. Our fathers have suffered a lot, but 
without really accomplishing much. So we left the liceniados [a university title. Lopez Mendez is here 
talking about educated Hispanics] to themselves, and with them their lawyers, and started our own fight, 
making headway. Maybe that way we could get somewhere. Because the lawyers… we gave them money 
to fight for us, but nothing happened. This way, little by little, we managed to change things.229 
 
I finished the last chapter showing how most of the people in ejido Tabasco had learned 
to write their names sometime between 1959 and 1980. The quote from Eduardo Lopez 
Mendez is part of the same development: the former mozos, used to living at the mercy of 
                                                
228 Interview in nearby ejido San Jose, quoted in Estrada Saavedra 2007, p 153 
229 Interview with informant 13 
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the patron or, after he left, at that of the bureaucrats and other powerful, mainly hispanic, 
men, were adapting to the new life in a new world.  
Something had happened. The reformed Catholic Church had come to Las Margaritas, 
and ejido Tabasco. Or, more correct: La palabra de Dios – the Word of God, that is the 
way the Tojolabales themselves denominate the way the Diocese of San Cristobal, inspired 
by the en vogue theory of Liberation Theology, got in contact with the indigenous 
communities of Chiapas in the late 1960s and early -70s – had arrived. That was to change 
a lot in the lives of the ejiditarios in Tabasco. “In 1972 or -73… when La palabra de Dios 
came to the ejido, we opened our eyes somewhat more,” explains Eduardo Lopez Mendez, 
one of the first catequistas in ejido Tabasco.230 The catequista was an invention of the 
Diocese of San Cristobal. They trained indigenous men to be lay religious teachers. The 
catequistas were initially intended as a means to spread the word of God in the sparsely 
populated Tojolabal region (and other regions of the diocese), and to compensate for the 
lack of priests in the region. But as time went on, the institution was to influence far 
beyond the strictly religious world, as we will see.231   
We have seen how the Tabasqueños got their formal freedom and how they gained 
ownership to their own land. We will see how the Catholic Church in Chiapas, lead by 
Samuel Ruiz Garcia, the bishop of the diocese of San Cristobal, and his priests and co-
workers in La Castalia – a Catholic brotherhood in Comitan – entered the world of the 
Tojolabales, and with them the Liberation Theology. 
 
The creation of La opcion por los pobres 
Samuel Ruiz became bishop in San Cristobal in 1959. He was an orthodox, conservative 
man of God in his early years as bishop, but seeing the poverty and misery of the 
indigenous people of Chiapas made him realize that these people needed more than just the 
word of God and to attend mass and be buried in Christian soil.232 With his changing view, 
Ruiz was to change the lives of the indigenous peoples of Chiapas in a substantial manner. 
Allying himself with the emerging concept of liberation through theology, a movement that 
was gaining strength all around the world and in particular in Latin-America at the time, he 
                                                
230 Interview with informant 13. This informant, Eduardo Lopez Mendez, has climbed in the extra-clerical 
hierarchy of the Catholic Church, and is today deacon. 
231 ”The training of indigenous catechists who took on social and political roles in their communities that 
extended well beyond preparing people to receive sacraments was an imperative move in respecting 
communities' ability to create their own path to liberation.” (Kovic 2005) 
232 Morales Bermúdez 2005. This is how Ruiz himself explains his change of heart. 
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redefined the very concept of being a catholic servant of God in Chiapas.233 Ruiz and his 
reformed diocese of San Cristobal were to focus on the ”option for the poor and the 
liberation of the oppressed”, with active insertion of “the social reality, in history and 
incarnation in the indigenous cultures.”234 
The personal evolution of bishop Ruiz is not the subject of study in this thesis, but with 
him his diocese changed. It is therefore possible to see the development of the bishops 
outlooks as the development of the Catholic church in the indigenous areas of Chiapas. 
One of the main features of the project the bishop was central in creating was the education 
of the catequistas. The title was used to describe the (male) indigenous young people who 
got a – rather basic, at least initially – education in bible studies, first aid, craftsmanship, 
agrarian laws and economics, and who were to function as the prolonged hand of the 
Diocese in the indigenous communities. 
 
We started a process of formation. We did not know what to call the results of that formation; the 
Tojolabales called it Monoman. It would be like a sort of promoter. In Spanish, the name catequista got 
stuck, even though they are not really catechists [in the traditional sense of the word. My aggr].235 
 
The first schools for capacitating catequistas were established in 1961, in the towns of 
Bachajón, San Cristobal and Comitan. In Comitan, the brotherhood Los Maristas was the 
first institution to establish this kind of education. They were soon accompanied by La 
Castalia. Two periods stand out in the relationship between the Catholic Church and the 
indigenous Chiapan population: 
 
1961 – 1968 
This first period is characterized by attempt of generating development through outside 
guidance, according to sociologist Marco Estrada Saavedra.236 In this first period, the 
church can be said to have a paternalistic approach to the Indian subjects.237 In these years, 
the church picked the candidates for the catequista education without asking what the 
Tojolabal communities themselves thought about the matter. Classes were given in a 
traditional way, focusing on the message of the bible as a means to get to paradise. Thus, 
one can say that the catequistas were educated in preaching the gospel to his fellow 
                                                
233 Important renovations in catholic theology came after the Vatican Council in 1965 and the Latin American 
Episcopal Conference in Medellin, Columbia, in 1968. (Morales Bermúdez 2005) 
234 In Estrada Saavedra 2007, p 185 
235 Interview with informant 7 
236 Estrada Saavedra 2007 
237 Op.cit, p 190 
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ejiditarios upon returning from the three to six months of classes in, mainly in the case of 
the Tojolabales, San Cristobal. 
Thus, as is to be expected, the church members tutoring the indigenous youth did not 
possess a great knowledge of the people they were supposed to educate. Although an initial 
attempt to help improving the life of the indigenous subjects, the relationship between 
church and the different indigenous peoples of Chiapas was not very different from the 
way it had been starting with the arrival of the Spanish. In the words of padre Ramon 
Castillo at La Castalia: “[This was] in 1963. Don Samuel, the bishop, installed some nuns 
here, specialists in “Indian Christianity”. At that time, it was all about Indians, not about 
Tojolabales, Choles etc.”238 
Samuel Ruiz wanted to christen the indigenous, in a way the goal was to “westernise” 
them so that they could get on the gravy train of modernization.239 
Seeing as the period of interest for this chapter lies beyond this first period, I will 
continue to the next one without touching the details of the years before 1968, when the 
formation of the catequistas went through important changes and, a few years later, was to 
influence life in ejido Tabasco. In the mid-1960s240, the diocese of San Cristobal was split 
in six administrative regions, based on the culture and linguistic characteristics of each 
region. The region of interest in this thesis in the Zona sureste – the southeast region of the 
diocese, where virtually all Tojolabal speaking ejidos and communities are located, 
including, of course, ejido Tabasco.241 
 
1969 and beyond 
It is not coincidental that an important change in the pastoral work of the diocese of San 
Cristobal took place in 1968, the year of the Latin American Episcopal Conference in 
Medellin, Columbia. Here the frameworks for a decade of hegemony for the Liberation 
theology were laid down. Liberation theology intends to relate Christianity or more correct: 
Catholicism, to political activism. Even though the movement, if such a word is correct, 
had its written theory and intellectual vanguard, the preeminent aspect is the organization 
of church practice through the model of a sort of Christian based community, or, as Marco 
                                                
238 Interview with informant 7. Padre Ramon Castillo uses the Spanish word indios, not indigenas, here to 
prove a point, thus the translation Indians instead of indigenous. 
239 Of course, the Tojolabales and all indigenous tribes were already Christians, as we have seen. 
240 Castillo Aguilar 1999. This happened in 1966, to be precise. 
241 Estrada Saavedra 2007, p 186. The other regions are: zona chol, zona sur, zona centro, zona Tzotsil and 
zona Tzeltal. There is a remarkable accordance between these administrative regions of the diocese and the 
Zapatista stronghold in the 1990s. We will get back to this in chapter 7. 
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Estrada Saavedra puts it; La civita Christi. The philosophy behind the project was never 
really what mattered the most in the Tojolabal region, at least not according to Padre 
Ramon Castillo: 
 
We never really knew much about the theology and philosophy and that word en vogue in those time… 
Dialectics. We just did what felt right, in a mutual understanding with the Tojolabales, we responded to 
their need and wishes.242 
 
Not withstanding the organic development of the project, it is worthwhile to look into the 
theoretic framework in some detail before we move on, seeing as the reformed diocese of 
San Cristobal is to play a major part, always present, as this paper moves on. The church of 
Samuel Ruiz was considered so radical that the bishop himself was accused of being a 
Zapatista leader immediately after the 1994 uprising. In accordance with Liberation 
theology, the diocese of San Cristobal changed. The vertical relationship between church 
and subjects was strongly criticized by many of the younger ministers and priests. Even the 
word of God had to be viewed critically; would it not be possible to adjust it, or at least its 
meaning, so that it also spoke to the indigenous peoples in Chiapas, so far away from 
Jerusalem both in time and distance? In other words: Would it be possible to create a truly 
universal church?243 To evangelize people based on its needs in their own culture – from 
the perspective of this very culture? With the administrative reorganization mentioned 
above, and now even a critical look on its own praxis, the church of Samuel Ruiz was 
ready to change life in indigenous Chiapas in a qualitative way. We will now see how this 
reorganisation, spiritual as well as profane, worked in reality, in La Castalia, Comitan. 
 
La Castalia 
La Castalia was established in Comitan in 1967. The diocese of San Cristobal wanted to 
get in closer touch with the Tojolabales of the newly established Zona Sureste: “In 1967, 
the sisters who came here [to La Castalia] started going to the communities, not knowing 
what they were, they just accepted the invitations they got from the parish of Las 
Margaritas.”244 Upon seeing that the former work (in what I have defined as the period 
from 1961-1968) did not really carry the desired results, the Diocese changed its way of 
relating to the indigenous communities; they started going out to actively listen to the 
needs in the communities. This coincided with the Latin American Episcopal Conference 
in Medellin in 1968, where the poverty question and the role of the church in that field had 
                                                
242 Interview with informant 7 
243 Estrada Saavedra 2007, p 191 
244 Interview with informant 7 
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been on the table. The newfound Catholic radicalism that came to light in Medellin gave 
the Diocese the necessary framework to look for a more direct way of interacting with the 
indigenous peoples on many fields.245 “From that moment on we started to uncover what 
happened, how life was here. We started to work this region, getting to know that the 
people were Tojolabales,” as Padre Ramon Castillo explains.246  
The Catholic Church had been an important factor of power in Chiapas from the days of 
the Spanish conquest, and, with a few exceptions, always supporting the stronger part; the 
hispanic ruling class. This caused the Tojolabales to be cautious, if not sceptical and 
negative, towards the church. Little by little, the new ways of the church was to break the 
mistrust. 
 
I got here in 1971, thinking of the gospel in the traditional way… But I found, in the Tojolabal 
communities, that nobody bothered with us when we got to the ejidos. The earlier priest never used to go to 
ejidos, and if they went, they stayed in la Casa Grande [where the patron and his family lived].247 
 
In accordance with the new gospel of the church of liberation, La Castalia staff had to 
learn that matter comes before mind, at least in the desperate situation they found in the 
Tojolabal communities of the Zona sureste: 
 
And when we got there, to my first community, an epidemic had broken out. So no one [among the 
inhabitants of the community] bothered with us. “Now what?” I asked the sisters. “Now we attend the sick, 
the gospel must wait!” they told me…248 
 
Padre Ramon Castillo also learned that he had to change the way he was preaching the 
very gospel. During the sermons, the clergy found that the indigenous were paying 
attention, but not in the way one would expect: 
 
They related everything to their own lives, to their own tradition… They have the water cult, and they have 
the cult of the cross. And they are mixed… Our message did not come through. But then they started 
inviting us, into their lives and ceremonies. And we learned to be Indians…249 
 
This, that the ministers “learned to be Indians”, may explain why the Father and the 
Sisters of La Castalia managed to play the role they were to play in the history of the 
Tojolabales and, in particular, ejido Tabasco, as we will see. For the first time, the 
                                                
245 Morales Bermúdez 2005. It is possible to object to this positive description of the church’ attempts to 
establish close relations with the indigenous. Did it happen out of necessity, in a world that was rapidly 
changing, so that the Catholic Church had to find its new base in the outskirts of modernity? And did not the 
church only establish itself as the new patron on top of the existing hierarchy? The first question will not be 
answered in this paper. As to the latter, this will be discussed when we se, later in this chapter, how the 
communities responded to the arrival of the Protestant churches that became an important factor in the region 
from around the 1980s.  
246 Interview with informant 7 
247 Interview with informant 7 
248 Interview with informant 7 
249 Interview with informant 7 
 59 
Tojolabales met hispanics that really made an effort to understand them.250 In the words of 
Padre Ramon Castillo: “We never learned, in school, the Liberation theology. But it came 
natural, being with the Tojolabales. This happened everywhere in Don Samuels 
mission.”251 
For the first time, getting to learn the native language was considered necessary for the 
clergy, where before speaking indigenous language had been left to the arbitrary Fathers 
and sisters themselves. Now, all the ministers learned the native tongue.252 
 
The encounter with ejido Tabasco 
According to the people of ejido Tabasco, La palabra de Dios first came to the region in 
Lomantan, a Tojolabal community in the kilometres from ejido Tabasco. Some of the 
young men in Lomantan had gone to study in San Cristobal. They came back carrying a 
message of hope for the Tojolabales. Eduardo Lopez Mendez was one of the first 
Tabasqueños to get in contact with the new, radical church and its messengers. He explains 
how he first heard of this new direction: 
 
Because of their [the newly educated catequistas from Lomantan] enthusiasm, the word was spread, they 
travelled around and spoke to the other communities. First came the catequistas from Lomantan, and 
shortly after that the priests started coming to the communities… in 1974, I left to study La palabra de Dios 
in La Castalia.253 
 
Eduardo Lopez Mendez was, together with two other young men, the first catequista in 
ejido Tabasco. Of course, the Catholic Church had been present in ejido Tabasco before 
that, but always “siding” with the patron, leaving some religious functions to him254 and 
always staying with the patron when going on one of the sporadic visits.255 
According to Padre Ramon Castillo, the first contact La Castalia ever made with ejido 
Tabasco was through a man called Jose Gomez, catequista in ejido Saltillo in the same 
region. Jose Gomez invited the Padre to visit the community. 
 
                                                
250 I have seen to what degree the people of La Castalia have adapted to the Tojolabal way during religious 
ceremonies. During mass, they all pray, even the representative of the Holy Church of Rome (in this case 
Padre Ramon Castillo) facing each corner of the church building – east, west, north and south, to pay homage 
to nature and the gods in everything. When the Padre finishes his sermon, he gives the word to one of the 
congregants to reflect on the word of the day, often connecting it to a recent experience in the community. 
(Field observation in ejido Tabasco, June 2007) 
251 Interview with informant 7 
252 Interview with informant 7 
253 Interview with informant 13 
254 See chapter 3, on how the patron could marry people and throw religious feasts 
255 See interview with informant 7 above, on how the Tojolabales did not believe he was a priest seeing as he 
ate and lived with them, or this quote from the same interview: ”The former priest always came to visit 
Tabasco through the patron, staying with him…” 
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In Tabasco they [the church representatives that had visited the ejido before] would stay in the patrons 
house, Medellin… But I wanted to live with the Tojolabales. They did not believe I was Padre, therefore.256 
 
The encounter with ejido Tabasco was an encounter with a struggling, dependant 
community, says Padre Ramon Castillo. “They were very modest people, dependant of the 
patron, Cesar Solis. They were poor. They were quiet. But they named their own 
catequistas… [This happened] in 1973, or 1974.”257 
Because of the bad communications, the church people had to walk to get to ejidos such 
as Tabasco.258 Thus, the Fathers and Sisters stayed for a long time in every community, or 
the catequistas had to stay for weeks in La Castalia in Comitan to get their education. In 
the late 1970s, the catequistas in ejido Tabasco started giving classes on their own in the 
community, at times assisted by the people from La Castalia. This was, of course, the 
whole idea behind the catequista education – making easier the contact between the 
indigenous in their communities and the church, as well as always having a representative 
of God present in the communities.259 That was necessary from a strictly religious point of 
view, as this quote from Padre Ramon Castillo and Sister Catalina Damian indicates: 
“When we got there, they prayed the Rosario and that’s it, more or less. But after we 
arrived, they started making reflections on the bible. And they started washing.”260 
The Tabasqueños also remember changing upon the arrival of La palabra de Dios, even 
though they remember more religiousness than do the La Castalia workers: 
 
Before we had catequistas, before La palabra de Dios, the custom was… We had a sister, a Rezadora – a 
prayer lady – who prayed according to her memory, not using the bible. The women were singing and 
praying with her. Then the catequistas from Lomantan came… But they could not stay here, so we had to 
name our own catequistas [this happened in 1974].261 
 
Before we move on to the more strictly social significance of the contact between ejido 
Tabasco and La Castalia, I would like to mention a few “archaic” phenomenon that deserve 
being addressed. The encounter between the Catholic Church and ejido Tabasco gives us 
an opportunity to briefly touch on some important cultural features of Tojolabal life that 
were major obstacles in the process of creating the Civita Cristi. 
 
                                                
256 Interview with informant 7 
257 Interview with informant 7 
258 The road was just a gravel one, with barely room for one car at the time, and impossible to drive in the 
rainy season. This lasted until the early 1980s, when the road going east from Las Margaritas towards the 
Lacandon jungle was paved and extended due to the necessities of oil workers from national oil company 
Pemex. (Estrada Saavedra 2007) 
259 Interview with informant 7 
260 Interview with informant 15 
261 Interview with informant 16 
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Brujeria – witchcraft 
We have seen how the Tojolabales of ejido Tabasco and elsewhere were forced to live on 
the fincas of the finca belt until the Cardenista reforms gave them right to landownership in 
the ejido structure. We have, in passing, said that some cultural aspects survived the 
centuries of La colonia and life on the finca. Some of these features still were in use when 
La Castalia came in contact with ejido Tabasco. One of them was the belief in witchcraft – 
Brujeria. Although not as strong in the region of ejido Tabasco as in other parts (the reason 
for that will be discussed in the next paragraphs), the custom was present even in ejido 
Tabasco in the 1970s, as this quote from Padre Ramon Castillo tell us: “They had witch 
doctors and killed people due to superstition, for being “bad” people, witches. Even 
children.” 262 
The Tabasqueños themselves also recognize that the custom was alive until the 1970s: 
“In those days, the Brujeria existed… They would accuse people of being witches, of 
eating human beings. But La palabra de Dios changed that. It made us rethink our 
customs.”263 Still, Brujeria was never as strong in la Cañada de Soledad as in other regions 
of Chiapas.264 One reason for this may be that this region never was the scene for 
rebellions by the indigenous, thus not making the patron look for ways to create conflict 
among the mozos by accusing the social leaders of witchcraft. This is known to have 
happened in other regions in Chiapas.265 Brujeria has not been seen – in ejido Tabasco, at 
least – after the arrival of La palabra de Dios in the 1970s. 
 
Bolo – drunkenness 
Another feature that the Diocese representatives in La Cañada de Soledad and the 
Tojolabales of ejido Tabasco tried to change in mutual struggle was the ever-present 
alcoholism in the indigenous communities. 
In ejido Tabasco and the neighbouring communities, the men used to go to Las 
Margaritas on Saturdays to buy and sell the little merchandise they had to commercialize. 
Normally, because of the long walk – as we have seen, communications were poor – they 
would need to spend the night in the town of Las Margaritas, returning to their ejido 
                                                
262 Interview with informant 15 
263 Interview with informant 16 
264 Interviews with informants 7 and 13 
265 Castillo Aguilar 2004. As we have seen, landowners tried to hinder the loss of work force on the fincas. 
The landowners lookeed for ways to maintain thing as they had always been, using the tools available. There 
are several accounts of this happening regarding accusations of witchcraft. (Interview with informant 7, and 
Humberto Ruz & Gomez Hernandez 1992) 
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Sunday night. It was part of the weekend customs to spend Saturday night in Las 
Margaritas drinking – in times of good sales beer, otherwise homebrewed liquor or the 
cheap, sugarcane rum that is so typical for Central America. The alcohol frenzy would lead 
to drunkenness, loss of most of the money earned on the market, fighting and gambling. 
Upon returning to the ejidos, still drunk the next afternoon, the men beat their women, who 
had been home with the children on the milpa.266  
 
There was a lot of drunkenness. A kid, watching his fathers drink, he would get used to it. And from 15 to 
18 years, wow, did the people drink. But we had no point of reference for thinking differently… When the 
organizations267 started here, and we started receiving money, for instance credits or from different co-
operations, people drank a lot. The store [the local bodega, a small kiosk in the ejido] was full of booze. 
And the men got drunk. But if you had 100 pesos, you would drink with your friend, and thus forget sugar 
and clothes for your kids.268 
 
According to the people involved, this was stopped – or at least stalled269 – by the women 
in the ejidos. Thus far, we have focused on how the male population was educated in the 
bible and different crafts by the church. But also the women received education – mostly in 
baking, sewing and preparing medicine.270 The women decided then, in the women’s 
assembly: Before the next man had time to hit, they would scream. And then they would 
summon and take the violator to prison. For this purpose, a prison was built in ejido 
Tabasco.271 
 
The first one to suffer this was the comisariado ejidal. He never hit his wife before she screamed, and he 
was brought to jail. The men, after this, when they go to Las Margaritas, still drink, but they return after 
having sobered up, and they eat chewing gum. This happened in 1979, more or less.272 
 
Creating a religious community 
When the Catholic Church decided on its new approach towards the indigenous 
communities in Chiapas, they filled an institutional vacuum that was created when the 
                                                
266 This may seem a cliché and exaggerated, but there are numerous accounts confirming this version. 
(Humberto Ruz & Gomez Hernandes 1992, and interviews with informants 7 and 16) 
267 This is a reference to what we will see in the next chapter, how the inter-communitary organizations 
established in Chiapas. In this quote, it refers to how the Tabasqueños could get credits for cultivating the 
land, and how this money was spent on alcohol. 
268 Interview with informant 16 
269 Seeing the Tojolabal men drink upon going to Las Margaritas is still an everyday feature. 
270 Padre Ramon Castillo, upon asked to describe the most significant change, in his view, in ejido Tabasco in 
the 1970s and -80s, speaks about the women. They used to say when asked to create something on their own: 
”That is only for the white man, señor”, according to the Padre. ”And now, look at them: Proud, independent 
women.” (Interview with informant 7) 
271 Interviews with informant 7, 16, and 6 
272 Interview with informant 15. It deserves to be mentioned in passing that these are not the words of 
conservative Christians trying to blame all that is bad on alcohol and immoral lifestyle. With the help of La 
Castalia, the Tabasqueños have a bodega full of contraceptives, for instance. Now, the evangelical 
(protestant) churches that – as we will see in this chapter – were to set roots in Chiapas in the 1980s, banned 
alcohol all together, as did EZLN. Not so La Castalia – I have seen with my own eyes how the arrival of the 
Padre is celebrated with a toast of strong liquor at 7 a.m. (Field observation in ejido Tabasco, June 2007) 
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mozos left the fincas to become ejiditarios. The Tojolabales had, within the framework of 
the ejido structure, found a way to organize politically. Yet, as we have seen in this 
chapter, they were in search for a way of organizing their communities beyond the formal 
organization of the ejidal system – a way in which they could actually apply for credits – 
guaranteed in the ejidal framework, as they got to understand when learning the agrarian 
law – without having to go through outside agents such as lawyers. La palabra de Dios and 
the reformed Diocese of San Cristobal gave them, at least to some degree, what they were 
looking for. 
We have seen how the Tojolabales lived in separated communities, with social problems 
such as alcoholism, witchcraft and superstition, and a rather sceptical view on the outside 
world. They were ready for a change, as the younger generations, later to become 
catequistas and social leaders, became men in the early 1970s and came in contact, as is the 
case of ejido Tabasco, with people from their own culture who actually had been outside 
their communities – the catequistas from Lomantan, and had found that the outside world 
could offer something. It soon became popular among young men with ambition to attend 
classes to become catequistas: 
 
There is a Tojolabal mission in Comitan [La Castalia]. There we learned… How to read the bible, first aid, 
carpenters work, sewing… About the laws… From I was young I wanted to go, to learn something, learn 
how to study La palabra de Dios. This was in 1975, -76…273 
 
Also, the church, through the Liberation theology, had something to gain by the contact 
with the Tojolabales. Not only was it a way to recruit new and loyal supporters of the 
church: The diocese of San Cristobal wanted to create a kind of “kingdom of God on 
earth”.274 Thus, the combination of indigenous peoples looking for another social, 
collective project and a Catholic Church on the search for poor people with whom to work, 
created a whole new way of social organization: The lands, now in the ownership of the 
Tojolabales in the form of ejidos, were given a new meaning: It was the Promised Land. 
Here, a process of liberation would, of course, be the logical next step. “At times, we 
compare our leaving the fincas to Moses and the escape from Egypt,” as Caralampio Cruz 
Cruz, one of the catequistas in ejido Tabasco that was educated in this early period, puts 
it.275 Another important aspect was that of the recuperation of being Tojolabal, which was 
now filled with a positive meaning. A rather curios result of this, is that being Tojolabal in 
                                                
273 Interview with informant 2. Just in the passing: In ejido Tabasco, La Castalia has educated a total of 12 
catequistas until today, most of them until 1994 and the Zapatista rebellion. 
274 Estrada Saavedra 2007, p 225 
275 Interview with informant 2. This aspect is stronger, though, in the newly colonized Lacandon jungle, 
where the former mozos had to populate and cultivate entirely new land. 
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many cases requires being catholic. In ejido Tabasco, they have a document, signed by all 
the ejiditarios, prohibiting the very presence of Protestant churches – sextas, as the 
Tojolabales know them276 – in the ejido. The reasoning behind is rather interesting: 
 
[It is] because of the culture. It is very delicate; we may lose our culture, what makes us what we are. Some 
Protestants had been here, and we saw that people were bothered. Sects want to destroy our culture… We 
reached this agreement in the 1970s, when we still were too young to participate… We need to have it [the 
document stating that ejido Tabasco is to remain catholic.] in writing, so that we will not have conflict over 
it. Nobody enters, and it is still valid to day. The last time we reauthorized it was some 10 or 12 years 
ago.277 
 
Of equal importance as the new meaning of identity, the material needs of the 
communities had to be fulfilled. In order to achieve this, the communities were reformed 
both spiritually and materially. 
 
Thus, the result is a situation of reflection and learning collectively through dialogue and discussion. The 
articulating axis of the two would be the revitalization and re-signification of the catholic “faith”, tinted 
with stains of liberationism.278 
 
Even such seemingly innocent and easy tasks as starting a choir or a band to sing and 
play inside and outside, at the door, of the church, meant that a whole range of new work 
had to be done, thus creating belief in the power of the community. Padre Ramon Castillo 
gives the following account of how little the Tabasqueños believed in their own skills and 
abilities to do even tasks that seem obvious in everyday life: 
 
The answers we got [when the people of La Castalia tried to teach the Tabasqueñas to do everyday 
labour.]… “We don’t know how. We cannot do it. Only the white man knows”… But when they learned 
how to bake bread, for instance… Now they are proud, the women there.279 
  
This process was built on a dialectic axis of what the church wanted to achieve and the 
needs of the Tojolabales, but the former was to be lifted up and incorporated in the latter 
from an early stage of this encounter between church and community, from the early 1970s 
as we have seen in the case of ejido Tabasco. “This was not initiated by us, but by the 
                                                
276 The word for sect in Spanish is secta. For some reason, the Tabasqueños say sextas. 
277 Interview with informant 16. The rest of the account is also interesting: “Before, we wore white pants, 
even when I was young, with the red ribbons. It was beautiful, and you could tell a Tojolabal by his clothes. 
This is very important for the elders. So we cannot let other sects enter. Before, we had a man called 
Francisco. He was very respectable. He was in touch with nature. If he was to water his milpa, he asked the 
water to forgive him for changing its natural course. We learned a lot from him. We are close to our culture. 
We are resisting, we don’t want to lose the harmony. When we started out as catequistas, danger lured.” 
(Interview with informant 16) 
278 Estrada Saavedra 2007, p 226 
279 Interview with informant 15. Baking bread is not part of indigenous culture in Mexico, nor is it common 
in urban families. The Mexicans eat tortillas, a flat corn bread. 
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Tojolabales themselves. It was all based on their reflection, or praxis. The first thing we 
did, was teach to read and write. And the girls learned to sew.”280 
 
Creating inter-ejidal relations 
Another important change in the worldview of the Tojolabales that took place when the 
pastoral work combined with the aspirations of the young generation of Tojolabales in the 
1970s, was the creation of inter-communal relationships between the different ejidos, thus 
almost redefining the whole meaning of community in La Cañada de Soledad and ejido 
Tabasco. This process took place at the same time in the whole state of Chiapas, due to the 
same process that we are discussing in this chapter. In part, this was due to the creation of 
an intellectually curios group of catequistas with aspirations beyond their own community, 
and in part La Castalias position as the natural meeting place for the catequistas in the area. 
 
The Tojolabales do not have a natural centre, unlike many other peoples in Chiapas. But from 1972 or so, 
they started organizing, by cañadas – valleys. The church initiated this. Before, they lived, isolated, in their 
own communities, with little contact with the others… But these catequistas wanted to organize, to meet. 
And they chose to meet here, in La Castalia. Thus, we became the centre of Tojolabal organization. This is 
where they met.281 
 
The Tabasqueños who were educated as catequistas in those early days of the reformed 
Diocese thus got impulses from the outside and brought new ways of thinking back to the 
community. 
 
Everything we learned [in La Castalia], we brought back to the community… We were chosen by the 
community to be catequistas, to represent the community, to represent the needs of the community. We 
have made a promise to the community, to work for them. And La palabra de Dios says: if you want a 
better life, you have to get it through living in a better community as a whole.282 
 
But of even greater importance in making a new identity across ejido borders than these 
sporadic inter-communitary encounters in La Castalia was the organization of the 
Indigenous congress in 1974, as we will see in the following. 
 
Congreso Indigena in San Cristobal de Las Casas in 1974 
This event, held in San Cristobal, the old colonial capital of Chiapas between October 12 
and 15 in 1974, is one of the important hallmarks in the organization of social movements 
in Chiapas, only surpassed by Zapatismo. It marks, in the words of Antonio García de 
León, the end of a total standstill in the agrarian, indigenous sectors of Chiapas, a standstill 
                                                
280 Interview with informant 7 
281 Interview with informant 7 
282 Interview with informant 16 
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that started in 1939 with the end of the Cardenista reforms.283 The congress was organized 
by the diocese of San Cristobal, with at least initial help from the state government.284 It 
united people from the four biggest indigenous groups in Chiapas. 1230 delegates from 
327 communities were present; 587 Tzeltales, 330 Tzotziles, 152 Tojolabales, and 161 
Choles. Four subjects were debated in great detail; lands, commerce, education, and health. 
“The fifth subject, that of politics, was not allowed by the original organizer,285 but without 
a doubt, it was the subject that bathed every colour during the congress.”286 
El Congreso indigena allowed peoples from all over the state of Chiapas to meet and 
discuss their problems, needs and desires. Before the congress, the organizers287 had 
gathered information on what the people wanted to discuss in sub-congresses and meetings 
in ejidos and municipalities. During the congress, the diocese of Samuel Ruiz showed their 
impressive apparatus: Seeing as the four different ethnic groups do not understand each 
other, there were simultaneous translations in four languages (including Spanish) at all 
times, and the congress published a newspaper, also in every language spoken by the 
representatives present at the congress. Without the apparatus of the church, a project of 
this size could never have been taken on.288 
The congress was in many ways a continuation of the pastoral work in the communities, 
but in a much bigger scale. The contenders reflected in the same way they had done in their 
work as catequistas. The result was a radicalization of the indigenous struggle in Chiapas, 
as this speech from a Tzeltal leader indicates: 
 
Fray Bartolomé289 is not alive today… Who is going to defend us from injustice and give us our freedom? I 
do not think the hispanic is going to defend us, the government might or it might not, so: Who is going to 
defend us? I think that our only defence is organization, that we all organize so that we can be free and 
work better. We all have to be the new Bartolomé: We will make it once we are capable of defending the 
organization, because unity makes strong.290 
 
The Congreso Indigena was to be a starting point of a new era, so to speak, in Chiapas. 
The discussions and reflections that were floating in the air, in many languages, in San 
                                                
283 Garcia de Leon 2002. The author is here talking about outside, dramatic developments. As we have seen, 
the wheels of history where in motion even in the period discussed in this chapter and the last. 
284 The latter withdrew its support and presence when the delegates from San Juan Chamula, an emblematic 
indigenous community close to San Cristobal, denounced electoral fraud by the ruling party – the ever-
present PRI – in the municipio. (See García de Leon 2002, p 169) 
285 The state government, see above 
286 García de Leon 2002 p 168 
287 The church and the catequistas this time, not the government 
288 See Garcia de Leon 2002, but also interviews with informant 7, and Tello Diaz 2005 
289 Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas (1484-1566) was a Spanish priest and later bishop of Chiapas. Upon seeing 
the consequences of the conquest for the indigenous population he turned into a stern defender of indigenous 
rights. He argued, in the face of the papal church, that the indigenous peoples did have a soul, and thus 
managed to prohibit direct enslaving of the indigenous peoples. He is known as the “Apostle of the 
Indigenous”. (Escalante Gonzalbo et.al 2005) 
290 In García de Leon 2002, p 171 
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Cristobal in October 1974 were to live on, albeit not necessarily in the same form. In the 
words of Eduardo Lopez Mendez, the delegate from ejido Tabasco in the congress: 
 
In 1975 [Mendez Lopez misspeaks, the right year is 1974] they announced the congress in San Cristobal. 
They gathered all the indigenous peoples of Chiapas. I was lucky enough to participate… After the 
congress, we organized an indigenous council, to keep the ideas, what we had agreed on, alive.291 
 
This Consejo Indigena – the indigenous council – Mendez Lopez speaks of was set up in 
each region, organized by the church and young, urban activists that were coming to 
Chiapas in big numbers in the mid-1970s (more on them in the next chapter), in the 
aftermath of the congress in San Cristobal in 1974. In that way, the discussion and the ever 
stronger inter-communitary bonds were kept alive. 
 
An indigenous identity is created 
The praxis of the catequistas was changed according to the wishes and needs of the 
communities. Thus, after the Congreso Indigena in 1974, being catequista meant more than 
working within the ejido of origin. Through the extensive web of catequistas, originally 
intended as a means to spreading the word of God, representatives from different ejidos 
saw that they had a tool with which to communicate with other ejidos and peoples. Based 
on the experience in San Cristobal in 1974, knowing that their common struggle united 
more than the division between ejidos (an example of which is, as we have seen, when 
ejido Tabasco was fighting neighbouring Tojolabal ejido Morelia over the extension of the 
territory), the catequistas started using this infrastructure as a means to put more pressure 
on the government.292 
Based on this, the peoples of Chiapas, ejido Tabasco included, starting seeing themselves 
as dignified people, worthy the love of God without having to give up their own culture 
more than what had already been done during 500 years of Spanish supremacy. Thus, the 
catequista became the  
 
                                                
291 Interview with informant 13 
292 There is, however, one important exception to this newly found common identity: The evangelical ejidos 
and people. As we have already seen, the different Protestant ”sects” were not welcome in Tabasco. The 
division between those who followed (and follow, still today) the diocese of San Cristobal and the Protestants 
is a big one. This proves, off course, that the emancipation that we have seen in this chapter was in large parts 
due to, and dependent on, the Catholic Church, and that this church saw it chance to become even more 
powerful in the region. This becomes even clearer if one considers that the reform of Samuel Ruiz church 
took place only after the arrival of the evangelical movements in the region of Las Margaritas, for instance. It 
is also true, however, that Catholicism had been a part of indigenous tradition for hundreds of years, and was 
incorporated as such. (Estrada Saavedra 2006) 
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spokesman for the communal reflection, not the teacher bringing the pre-fabricated answer. The word of 
God reflects in the womb of the community, starting with the events and group dynamics, and the 
catequistas are the collectors of the harvest of communal thought.293 
 
But the emancipation process of La palabra de Dios had its limits. The priests, such as 
Padre Ramon Castillo, had helped give the Tojolabales the means to create their own path, 
helping them to define this path. Ejido Tabasco came in touch with La Castalia more than 
30 years after receiving their ejido rights. They were still in search for an identity in their 
“new” role as free men and women working the land years after leaving the finca. In 
accordance with Liberation theology, together the indigenous peoples and the church had 
overcome the “artificial divide” between religion, social reality and politics through a 
circle of evangelization – conscious raising – organization.294 The last word is a key word 
here. The church, contrary to all its good intentions, had neither the man power nor the 
knowledge to take that last step in the scheme it had created. Together with the Tojolabales 
in ejido Tabasco and elsewhere, they had pinpointed the problem. An inter-ejido 
organization was created. A clear perception of the government – both regional and 
national – as an obstacle to overcome in the struggle to better indigenous life in Chiapas 
was developed. Both church and the ejiditarios themselves realized that better organization 
and more power behind the newly formulated demands were needed.  
To better be able to organize in tighter, more stable structures, the indigenous peoples of 
Chiapas looked to the newly arrived political activists that had helped the Diocese of San 
Cristobal with the organization of the congress in San Cristobal. They would be happy to 
help out, as we will see in the next chapter. 
A few closing remarks before we move on to the next chapter: The success of the diocese 
project in Chiapas has many explanations. I would like to mention two of them here. The 
first one we have already discussed; the indigenous peoples were constantly looking for 
ways to improve their conditions, socially and culturally. Another important reason, tightly 
connected to the first one, was that the indigenous ejiditarios were now, for the first time, 
part of the Mexican national project. The patron was no longer the – only, at least – 
authority. Through the Cardenista reform the national government had entered the 
indigenous communities as an important power factor, and one with which to negotiate. 
Thus, the different indigenous peasants were now looking for a way to improve their 
position not only in the power struggle with local elites, but, as a group, in the very 
national project. 
                                                
293 Estrada Saavedra 2007, p 191 
294 Op.cit., p 263 
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In other words; not only did the internal and local structures change with the emergence 
of the Catholic Church in Chiapas, but also the way of thinking about the dynamics of the 
nation as a whole. This, of course, would not have been possible without the Cardenista 
reform; the “freeing” of the mozos and the incorporation of the ejido structure in the 
corporative apparatus of post-revolution Mexico.295 
To finish off with the words of Antonio García de León: 
 
The Congreso Indigena unleashed the hidden forces of the Chiapan reality. It was like the trunk of a tree 
with 500 year old roots and which branches and leafs started to bloom immediately afterwards in a huge 
variety of peasant organizations that grew and consolidated with the same social basis.296 
 
In the next chapter we will deal with the inter-ejidal organization and the many actors 
pushing and pulling in different directions. One of these actors will still be the Catholic 
Church, of course. With the words of Knut Kjeldstadli from the theory chapter: “All social 
movements can be understood as being sedimentary layers, where old movements and 
older forms of organization live alongside with older ones.”297 
 
                                                
295 Legorreta 1998, p 29 
296 García de Leon 2002, p 169 
297 Kjeldstadli 2002 
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Chapter 6: Social projects in Chiapas 
We have seen how the diocese of San Cristobal played an important role in the 
emancipation process that was initiated when the Tojolabales left the finca to become 
ejiditarios, through re-structuring the social bonds and conscious raising in the indigenous 
communities such as ejido Tabasco. But not all the work the church did was successful, off 
course. We will start this chapter by looking at some of the major limitations to the 
liberation project taken on by the Catholic Church in Chiapas, and, more general, of the 
internal workings of the indigenous communities themselves.  
 
The catequista as a cacique 
One major problem was created in the very focal centre of the structure created by the 
pastoral work: The institution of the catequistas. We have seen the positive effects of this, 
now it is time to turn the coin and show the other face. 
Once somebody was handpicked to be catequista, in the early stages, as we have seen, by 
the church, with time by the communities themselves, the groundwork was laid for the 
creation of a new category of people: The intermediaries between the outside world and the 
ejidos. Obtaining the honour of such a role gave, as is to be expected, some personal 
advantages when seeking alliances and personal prestige. And despite the fact that the 
catequistas did good work for their community, there is little doubt that the upper-hand that 
was granted the catequistas in areas such as knowledge, contacts and access to resources, 
thus gave “natural access” to creating a new elite within the community, with themselves 
as leaders, albeit informally.298 
This is called cacicazgo in Mexico – the strong man using all the room permitted by the 
system to get personal (or communal) advantages. The danger of the cacicazco is inherit in 
the forming of catequistas, and thus a problem with the new structure created by the 
church. 
                                                
298 An observation here: My first contact in ejido Tabasco arranged for a collective interview with Medellin 
del Carmen. When introducing me and my project, he gave a fifteen minute speech, telling his fellow 
ejiditarios what to tell me (I do not speak Tojolabal, but all the key words were in Spanish). He also served as 
interpreter, thus censuring all the answers. He would never let me talk to other people without him being 
present, and if he was not there during my visits, he had a member of his close family follow me around. This 
went on for two weeks. When I later found another way of entering, and, as time went on gained the 
confidence of other people in the ejido, they told me they initially had no idea what I was doing in Tabasco 
and that they thought I was there to help this cacique with a personal project (which, in a way, was close to 
the truth; The cacique was trying to get me to finance the building of a new Church in his part of the 
community). Of course, much of the badmouthing that was shared with me is part of a power struggle 
between different strong social leaders. But that only serves to prove the point of this footnote. (Field 
observation in ejido Tabasco, May 2007) 
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Of course, the most important cacique of them all in the structures created by the diocese 
would be the Catholic Church itself. Having re-structured the very essence of communal 
life based on biblical principals – even if liberationist and in cooperation with the 
communities themselves – and having made itself the intermediate between the indigenous 
world and that on the outside, the diocese of San Cristobal was the most important 
institution of political control in these communities. 
 
Limitations in the diocese project 
Another problem, which we have barely touched this far, is the way of looking at the 
communities and the indigenous peoples. In trying to soften its paternalistic views of its 
subjects, the church took on some rather extreme views in the opposite direction.299 The 
indigenous communities are pure, not touched by the hand of evil and corruption – also 
known as western civilization – to much of the staff of the church institutions working in 
indigenous regions in Chiapas.300  
Not only is this outlook wrong in many aspects. Where, for instance, does Christianity fit 
in with the pre-columbian cultures? And was the Brujeria discussed in chapter six not a 
touch extreme coming from the innocent, pure indigenous of this worldview? More serious 
is the fact that this view impedes sober analysis of the situation and can even lead to 
paternalism (like the good father, the church forgives his pure and noble son everything).  
To sum up, one can say that the pastoral work of the Catholic Church had three clear and 
somewhat different outcomes, of which two can be viewed as agents of change and the 
third as somewhat more questionable: 
1. The redefinition of social structures in the indigenous communities, through education 
and “reflection”, and through helping these communities define themselves, based on a 
new belief in themselves and their culture. 
2. Participation in the national project, looking for ways of improving the situation in 
confrontation with the local as well as national elites. This project, as we will see in this 
chapter, was to be continued by other political and social projects in the aftermath of the 
Congreso Indigena in 1974.  
                                                
299 A limited success, seeing as the church remained on top of the chain through its credibility as the 
messenger of God, its control over the catequista institution and the education, and as the link connecting the 
ejidos to the outside. 
300 This is the approach of Carlos Lenkersdorf, for instance (see Lenkersdorf, 1999). For more on this, though 
radical in its arguments, see Pickard 2003. For a more sober discussion, see Viquiera 1999. 
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3. A dangerous, inherited consequence of the emancipation project taken on by the 
diocese and the communities is that of empowering the “Indian myth”, blaming all the 
sorrows and troubles of these peoples on the arrival of the Spanish. The conclusion at hand 
tended to be one of “the things we do wrong are not our fault, because these customs were 
not part of our culture, all the bad stuff was brought here by the Spanish.”301 
All of the three above mentioned points were to show up again in the new political 
projects in Chiapas, including the Zapatista project, as we will see later on. The latter point 
and its consequences we have even touched in the discussion of the existing literature 
about Zapatismo (chapter 1). 
 
Limitations in the Tojolabal project 
We have seen how the Tojolabales were dependent on the federal government to get their 
lands, and how the Catholic Church was needed or at least welcomed as a means to internal 
transformation in the communities. In this chapter (and the next) we will see how even 
more external actors influenced the reality of indigenous Chiapas. This openness – or, in a 
more negative approach: vulnerability, meaning the lack of defence – towards new ideas 
shows us that the Tojolabales and other peoples were looking for ways of improving their 
socio-economic situation as well as the socio-cultural and identical. This sort of openness 
towards new ideas and outside help did, as we have seen in the last chapter, pay off – with 
Liberation theology came literacy, for example. But what this constant seeking also tells us 
is the extreme dependency on outside factors, and maybe even the weakness of the 
indigenous peoples of Chiapas when it comes to defending against outside manipulation. 
This vulnerability may be easy to understand, as we now know the historical and structural 
situation in indigenous Chiapas over the last 500 years, but it is still proof of some 
weaknesses in the Chiapan indigenous emancipation project. This dependency on outside 
factors will be discussed in greater detail in the concluding phases of this paper. Now we 
will look at some of the outsiders that tried to gain ground in Chiapas in the aftermath of 
the Congreso indigena, and how they found willing partners in ejido Tabasco and other 
communities, still on the lookout for ways of improving their situation. 
                                                
301 Legorreta 1998, p 47 
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The national context 
Before we move on, it is necessary to have a short look at the national context in the late 
1960s and -70s. This was a period of rupture and social unrest in Mexico, as in the rest of 
the western world. Student demonstrations were the sign of the time, and a radicalization 
of opposition forces. PRI was still in power, and Mexico was ruled by a corporative elite 
structure – the very same one established by Lazaro Cardenas.302 
In 1968, shortly before the Olympic Games were to be held in Mexico City, a student 
demonstration was met with violence from the police and army. In what is later known as 
the massacre in Tlatelolco, the police and the army in combination shot into the masses of 
people gathered in one of the historical centres of Mexico City. Numbers differ, but at least 
a few hundred demonstrators were killed. This bloodbath was to initiate the Dirty war in 
Mexico, in which the government repressed leftist organizations – and guerrillas –with 
every mean available. There are countless stories of torture and murder during the about 
ten years that the Dirty war lasted.303 
The anti-systemical forces were forced to go underground. The hope of a socialist 
revolution was strong all over Latin America, in part because of the successful takeover in 
Cuba in 1959 and in part due to world conjunctures. The state repression radicalized these 
leftist groups, many of which ended up as guerrilla movements. One of these guerrillas was 
brutally crushed in Chiapas in 1974, the FLN, at the time of the Congreso indigena in San 
Cristobal. We will get to know that group in the next chapter. For now, it suffices to say 
that many of the clandestine groups saw in Chiapas the possibility to work for the 
revolution in a state ridden with poverty, weak governmental presence and “active 
subjects” that would enable the Revolution.304 
 
Short overview of different political projects in Chiapas 
We have seen how the Congreso Indigena in 1974 gave impulses that would lead to the 
creation of common identity in indigenous Chiapas. The Congress was also the 
introduction of other political players than the diocese of San Cristobal in Chiapas: Bishop 
Samuel Ruiz invited some leftist activist groups to help organize the congress.  
Even though the catequistas held the diocese of San Cristobal in high regard, knowing 
that they owed their status and parts of the development of their communities to the 
                                                
302 Escalante Gonzalbo, et.al 2005 
303 Montemayor 2004 
304 Carmen Legorreta offers a first hand account of how state repression forced radical students underground, 
and of how many came to Chiapas to work for the Revolution. (Legorreta 1998) 
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institution, they saw the limitations of this project of emancipation.305 The seed of inter-
community relations and the faith in the Tojolabales as a group worthy of the love of God 
was sawn, but now what? Could biblical references, a new-found pride and good relations 
with the neighbouring communities overcome poverty, deceases, social injustice, lack of 
communications and infrastructure and the different forms of racism that made the 
indigenous peoples of Mexico suffer? 
This is where different political projects enter the story. Three main alternatives became 
manifest towards the end of the 1970s; oppositional (and marginal) political parties (on the 
left), the official party (PRI) and leftist activists working underground. I will focus on the 
latter as they constitute what eventually were to become the bases of EZLN or competing 
over the same communities as the Zapatistas. 
 
Union del Pueblo and Quiptic Ta Lecubtesel  
The arrival of a group of norteños – urban political activists, denominated northerners by 
the indigenous population – to Chiapas, meant yet another reconfiguration of the social 
structure in Chiapas and Las Margaritas. These groups, whose influence was growing from 
the mid 1970s, consisted mainly of students and political activist from outside the state of 
Chiapas. They started to organize the indigenous communities according to the Maoist 
ideas of the inverted pyramid of power, trying to create the republic of the masses in the 
rural environment. Their work was, at least initially, clandestine – seeing as they did not 
rule out the need for armed rebellion.306 
The catequistas, formed and educated by the diocese, were once again the driving forces 
within the communities in this process. This did not, however, mean that they abandoned 
their work as the church representatives – working politically and religiously at the same 
time was walking down complimentary roads307, much in accordance with Liberation 
theology. Only this time, the political project was driven by other forces than the Catholic 
Church. 
The norteños came to Chiapas because of state repression and what they perceived as the 
fertile Chiapan soil for creating a revolutionary vanguard. They worked as ideologists 
(trying to create a popular, republican power based on Maoist ideas), creators and 
promoters of social and productive projects (trying to stimulate the creation of clinics, 
                                                
305 Estrada Saavedra 2007 
306 Op.cit. 
307 Legorreta 1998 
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schools etc, as well as trying to commercialize coffee in order to get better prices on the 
market etc) and as advisers in different topics. They were known as asesores – advisers – 
and had, in most cases, good contacts with universities, NGOs and government officials, 
thus facilitating the fulfilment of the different projects that were taken on by the indigenous 
communities.308 
The first group to really have an impact in larger scale was Union del Pueblo, a Marxist 
organization inspired by the Leninist theory of organization and the Maoist popular war, as 
well as on the Mexican revolutionary heroes Pancho Villa and Emiliano Zapata. This 
group participated in the Congreso Indigena, helping with the organization of the event.309 
The Congreso indigena gave Union del Pueblo the possibility to establish contacts with 
the indigenous communities in Chiapas. Seeing as the Maoist-Leninist organization was 
planning on making a revolution through constructing a vanguard of the peasant and 
working people, this opportunity was ceased with both hands. Also, being able to operate 
in Chiapas, thus in the periphery, was a blessing rather than an obstacle, due to the idea 
that the revolution is brought to the centre from the periphery, to city from countryside.310 
When coming to Chiapas in the mid-1970s, Union del Pueblo was not opposed to taking up 
arms, but all in due time. The first task at hand was to prepare the people through education 
and organization. 
After the congress in 1974, Union del Pueblo established themselves in an ejido called 
Emiliano Zapata in the Lacandon jungle.311 (See map 2.2) Union del Pueblo started giving 
classes in Spanish and agrarian law and in the history of the Mexican Revolution as well as 
the historical materialism and theories on political organization. As such, they were in 
many ways just continuing the work of the diocese, but with a more radical political 
message and offering, in theory at least, the means to reaching the goals set forth by the 
diocese work. 
Following the textbook, Union del Pueblo was looking for pretexts to create a new form 
of organization along Maoist lines. They found this is the in-communication of the ejidal 
communities in Chiapas. On December 12, 1975, Union del Pueblo and indigenous leaders 
(catequistas all of them) in the region of Emiliano Zapata reached an important goal: The 
                                                
308 See Tello Diaz 2005 
309 Estrada Saavedra 2006 
310 Legorreta 1998 
311 The manpower needed for this was not at all overwhelming: One man, a Jaime Soto, was the sole 
representative of Union del Pueblo living in indigenous communities during the first two years of 
organization in Chiapas. (Tello Diaz 2005) 
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first ejido union was created.312 Quiptic Ta Lecubtesel, as the union was named,313 
consisted of 18 ejidos. Within a few months the number of member communities more 
than doubled. Quiptic Ta Lecubtesel was created under the motto of BAC, the Spanish 
initials meaning Storage, an Aeroplane and a Bus, which was what the union aimed to 
obtain.314 
Quiptic Ta Lecubtesel was constructed according to the idea of democratic centralism, or 
the inverted pyramid. This organizational form was to inspire and thus dominate the new 
inter-ejidal organizations that were formed in Chiapas in the 1970s and -80s, including 
what was to become EZLN. For an illustration of the structure, see figure 6.1. 
To make a decision in the ejido union, the topic was first discussed in the ejidal assembly 
of each ejido, then in the regional assembly (if this institution existed, depending on the 
size of the union) before the conclusions and agreements were taken to the general 
assembly, the highest authority regarding inter-ejido topics. The general assembly would 
also name the representatives of the administrative council.315 
Shortly after the construction of Quiptic Ta Lecubtesel, Lucha Campesina – Rural 
workers struggle – was formed among Tojolabal communities in Las Margaritas August 4, 
1978, though not including Tabasco.316 We will look at Lucha Campesina later on, as we 
deal with inter-ejidal organization in Tabasco. 
Due to space limits, we cannot go into all the unions created in indigenous Chiapas, nor 
all the political groups contending over influence in the region. It suffices to say that most 
ejido unions were created along the lines of Quiptic Ta Lecubtesel. Before we have a look 
at another, more complicated form of organisation – a union of ejido unions – that was 
created in the 1980s, I would like to describe an incident of massive importance in the 
radicalization of the political scene in Chiapas: 
July 8, 1977: A conflict over land in ejido Nueva Providencia (see map 2.2) in the 
municipality of Las Margaritas ends with the brutal killing of six policemen and a local, 
                                                
312 The short time passing between the indigenous congress in 1974 and the creation of Quiptic can be 
explained by the fact Union del Pueblo was present in the Lacandon from the early 1970s, but gained strength 
only when given responsibility by the bishop. (Legorreta 1998) 
313 The name is Tzeltal, and means something like ”Our force to progress” 
314 ”Una Bodega, un Avion y un Camion”. (Legorreta 1998, p 72) 
315 In Estrada Saavedra, 2007. Union del Pueblo, more alert to the dangers of the caciques than the Catholic 
Church, looked for ways to avoid power abuse among the delegates to this general assembly. The agreements 
of the assembly ejidal had to be presented in writing, and the positions were rotative in order to avoid 
concentration of power in few hands. The norteños were present in these assemblies, always with an 
independent interpreter so that they could follow the discussion. This was not necessarily done to control the 
meetings, but to make sure that the development of the project of creating popular power went according to 
plan (Legorreta 1998). If this made the norteños the cacique is of course an aspect that could be debated. 
316 According to Legorreta, ejido Tabasco was among the founding ejidos of Lucha Campesina. This is 
wrong, as I will show further on in this chapter. (Legorreta 1998) 
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indigenous cacique. The conflict started when the cacique and his family refused to admit a 
resolution giving other ejiditarios the right to use some land that they considered theirs. 
When the police arrived, it was to help the cacique keep his land. They arrested and 
harmed, together with the caciques men, a young farmer. The ejiditarios asked Quiptic Ta 
Lecubtesel, which was holding an assembly close by, for help. The assembly decided to 
help free the young farmer. Upon arriving, the many hundred indigenous people were met 
by the police shooting at them. The riots that broke out cost the life of the above mentioned 
seven people.317 
The governor eventually calmed down the following anger by inviting the members of 
the union to a meeting, explaining the situation and promising it would not happen again. 
But now government violence had been introduced in a very open manner in Chiapas, and 
the events in ejido Nueva Providencia was to have an impact on the way of thinking about 
organizing among the indigenous. Would it be a good idea to be able to defend against the 
violence of the government as well as that of the local finqueros and big landowners – La 
familia Chiapaneca? Another important consequence was that the local governors came to 
fear the power of the unions, which led to greater repression in the following decade. 
The position of the government after this conflict can be summed up in the following 
quote by Rene Gomez, at the time an activist in Union del Pueblo and a political advisor to 
the Quiptic: 
 
Even though we tried to establish a dialogue with the state governments, it was impossible. For them there 
only existed two kinds of organization, we were black or white: Either you were with them or you were 
against them. Despite all our efforts to tell them that we were not one or the other, that we wanted a new 
relationship, they did not accept it.318 
 
La Aric – Union of Unions 
In 1979, Quiptic Ta Lecubtesel and Maoist group Linea Proletaria took on an ambitious 
project that has to be mentioned here, however brief. Linea Proletaria (also known as 
Politica Popular) came to Chiapas in 1976, and joined forces with Union del Pueblo. They 
were important in the spreading of the organizational structure of Quiptic Ta Lecubtesel 
(the inverted pyramid) to other ejido unions in Chiapas, but after only one year in the state 
they got into a conflict with the diocese of San Cristobal and were expelled from 
Chiapas.319 
                                                
317 Legorreta 1998, p 90, and interviews with informants 7 and 8 
318 Rene Gomez, quoted in Legorreta 1998, p 94 
319 It seems we have lost sight of the indigenous peoples in this account on the political organization, that 
they are mere means in the organizational struggles of outsiders. That is, of course, not the case. The new 
organizations were formed by and around the needs and desires of the communities, as we will see when we 
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But in 1979 they returned, and with them a super-union of ejidos was introduced in 
Chiapas one year later: Union de Uniones Ejidales y Grupos Campesinos Solidarios de 
Chiapas – Union of Ejidal Unions and Solidary Peasant Groups of Chiapas. This 
organization was created by the members of Linea Proletaria as a means of deepening the 
organizational structures of what, as we have seen, the leftists saw as a “Republic of the 
masses”. The pretext this time was the commercialization of coffee. This Union of unions 
was created as an addition to the governmental INMECAFE320, but nevertheless the 
governor of Chiapas of the time, Juan Sabines, refused to help the new organization with 
credits and direct help in the production of coffee as well as in other problems of social and 
economic nature. 
Before we move on, I would like to underline one point: Linea Proletaria was, as we have 
seen, expelled by the Catholic Church because of complaints from the communities in 
1978, thus showing the power of the latter. But Linea Proletaria came back, invited by the 
very same church and the communities that expelled them in the first place. If the church 
had not realized its own limitations within the context of the project taken on by the 
diocese before, this was the time to contemplate its resources. This is how the union 
Quiptic Ta Lecubtesel analysed the situation: 
 
Towards the end of 1979, it was obvious that the pastoral work had developed into a more direct political 
project… Through its relationship with God and the community they reached a clearer analysis of their 
situation, of their humanizing capacity and their historical being, directed towards the future, towards 
transformation… After broad reflection, they saw that the Church could not fulfil the needs of an 
organization: It is not its role to lead a political movement.321 
 
The communities themselves (and the Church) realized that they had to accept the help 
from outsiders – the Maoists preaching Revolution and armed rebellion – in order to keep 
the emancipating and political projects in Chiapas moving along the lines that were drawn 
up by the Church. 
The Union of unions was created on the basis of the commercialization of coffee, but it 
was to become much more than just an organization aiming to improve the payment for 
                                                                                                                                              
look at ejido Tabasco later on. But in many ways the reorganization was an outside project. Indigenous 
leaders were looking for ways to manoeuvre between the influence of the diocese and the leftist activists. 
According to Estrada Saavedra, the expulsion of Linea Proletaria from Chiapas was caused by indigenous 
leaders responding to criticism from the leftists by telling the church that the activists did not respect La 
palabra de Dios. What this shows is that expect for the (obvious) indigenous involvement in the processes 
discussed here, the difference between the diocese and the political activists were big, and the mutual 
mistrust ever present. The church feared that their efforts would vanish or be swallowed by organizations 
looking to take advantage of the political organization and the conscious raising created by the men of God, 
while the norteño activists feared the spiritual stronghold of the church and its lack of political radicalism. 
(Estrada Saavedra 2007, p 335) 
320 Instituto Mexicano del Café 
321 Document from Quiptic Ta Lecubtesel, in Legorreta 1998, p 130 
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agricultural products. It first participated in land conflict when state governor Sabines 
(1977-82) informed the new settlers in great parts of the Lacandon jungle that they had to 
leave their newfound lands because of a presidential decision granting land rights to the 
“real” Lacandonians.322 This intent to divide the indigenous population on the part of the 
government was to a certain extent successful, but combined with lack of public funding, 
the violence of the public servants and local leaders (as in the case of Nueva Providencia) 
and the ever-existing racism, this move would only lead to the radicalization of the 
indigenous population of Chiapas. 
The Union of unions, later to become La Aric Union de Uniones (in 1988) due to internal 
divisions, was to play an important role in Chiapas throughout the 1980s, and its history is 
an interesting one. Seeing as we have to move on, suffices to say that the Maoist idea of 
creating the Republic of the masses had its successes, that the political organization got 
stronger by the efforts of the “norteño advisors”. But it is also worth noting that internal 
division was an everyday happening, due to both differences within the group of advisors 
and intra- and inter-communal differences.323 Those who oppose the Linea Popular politics 
tend to claim that they got too preoccupied with seeking credits and commercializing 
agricultural products, thus loosing sight of the structural problems of the region. With time, 
they dropped the idea of the armed rebellion, focusing on more easily achievable goals. It 
is, perhaps, telling, all though not 100 percent fair to see that many of these advisors today 
work as public servants, thus with the very same government that they opposed some 20 
years ago. One can say that, according to the theory of mass mobilization of these groups, 
the favourable moment for the structural political change never appeared. With that being 
                                                
322 We have not at all focused on the Colonization of the Lacandon jungle in this thesis, simply because it did 
not affect, directly at least, ejido Tabasco. But this region deserves to be mentioned, seeing as it was to 
become the Zapatista stronghold and more ”emblematic” for the historic events discussed in this thesis than 
the communities of relative proximity to the town of Las Margaritas, such as ejido Tabasco. When leaving 
the fincas, not all Tojolabales and other ethnicities got ejido rights on the different fincas. Many went to 
colonize the Lacandon jungle, until the middle of the 20th century almost un-populated. These people had to 
create a whole new meaning of life as they came to the jungle, and to recreate and create social structures and 
organisation. In 1972, president Luis Echeverría granted ownership of 61 431 hectares of land to 66 families 
of Lacandonians, the only ethnic group that lived in the jungle before the exodus from the fincas. Each family 
thus got 9307 hectares, at the cost of more than 4000 ”newcomers” who had populated and cultivated the 
region. 36 communities were threatened by eviction, notwithstanding the fact that they had lived there for 
years and, in some cases, even had formal ejidal rights. The areas most affected by this presidential decree 
were later to become the absolute stronghold of the Zapatista movement. The public financial bank Nafinsa, 
through an enterprise called Cofolasa, later signed a contract for 35 000 cubic meters of wood each year with 
the Lacandonians at a not fixed rate. (Tello Diaz 2005, p 65) 
323 The organization of such unions of unions (Union de uniones / La Aric and CIOAC (the latter we will 
focus on later in this chapter) being the examples in Chiapas) was similar to the ejido unions (see figure 6.1, 
appendix 4), only adding yet another level of administration, the consejo de administracion, consisting of a 
president, a secretary and a tesorero. This consejo deals with the everyday work of the organization, sending 
information down the hierarchy and receiving topics to discuss from below. 
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said, we will meet with La Aric again as we reach the Zapatista rebellion in the next 
chapter. 
 
Ejido Tabasco walks for one year with Lucha Campesina 
In this subchapter we will look at how the Tojolabales of ejido Tabasco started a process of 
re-organization, based on many of the ideas and structures we have discussed above. This 
process in Tabasco is in many ways a universal one, applicable to the whole of Chiapas, 
off course with some local and historical differences. 
In the creation of ejido unions in and around ejido Tabasco, once again, the diocese 
representative in Comitan, La Castalia, is an important actor in the inner life of the 
community, as this quote from Caralampio Cruz Cruz shows: 
 
In 1978 or 79… We learned in La Castalia how to form ejido unions. In those days, there were more 
finqueros here. In La Castalia the idea of forming an ejido union was born, or how to work together in 
order to reach a point where we all would be equal.324 
 
This account is, as far as I can see, an accurate one, and it seems plausible that the people 
of La Castalia brought this kind of inter-communal organization to ejido Tabasco. But 
Padre Ramon Castillo acknowledges the work of the norteños – the leftist activists and 
advisors – in his account: 
 
The social organization started here… well, due to us, but in the strictly political sense. It started after the 
congress in 1974. With Politica Popular…325 They were here, even, in la Soledad, helping out. First came 
Lucha Campesina.326 
 
Lucha Campesina, the first ejido union in the vicinity of ejido Tabasco, was created in 
august 1978 – as we have seen, without the participation of the Tabasqueños. This first 
Tojolabal ejidal union was created much in the same way as the Quiptic Ta Lecubtesel, and 
consisted of some 20 communities in Las Margaritas.327 Lucha Campesina was to be the 
                                                
324 Interview with informant 2 
325 Often used as a synonym to Linea Proletaria 
326 Interview with informant 7 
327 A few notes on the sources here: Eduardo Lopez Mendez told me in interview about the number of 
original members of Lucha Campesina: ”In 1978, Lucha Campesina was organized… Some 20 or 30 
communities [joined from the beginning].” (Interview with informant 3.2). Carmen Legorreta names 15 
original members (Legorreta 1998, p 92), but this has to be inaccurate seeing as she mentions ejido Tabasco 
as one of the founding members of Lucha Campesina, when in reality the Tabasqueños only “walked one 
year with Lucha Campesina”, starting from the troubles in 1979 (see next next page) (interview with 
informant 2). There are no archives with information about this creation. The same is true for Tierra y 
Libertad and la CIOAC, both of which we will have a look at later on in this chapter. For Tierra y libertad, 
internal division and burnt down buildings have caused the archives to disappear or at least be temporarily 
lost. La CIOAC had no idea where their archives could be found, due to division and power struggles. Here I 
therefore depend on interviews and the scarce existing literature. 
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model of the Union that was created with the participation of ejido Tabasco; Tierra y 
libertad. 
It was not only the classes in La Castalia mentioned above that got the people of ejido 
Tabasco starting thinking about creating an ejido union. Because of an unfortunate 
incident, they were forced to ask newly founded Lucha Campesina for help. In 1978, the 
Tabasqueños cut down some trees on the land of the owner of Medellin without 
permission, according to themselves due to a misunderstanding.328 This was considered a 
serious crime, so the police came at the request of the landlord and arrested two 
Tabasqueños, one of them the Comisariado ejidal. 
 
In 1978, Lucha Campesina was formed in another Cañada, close to Altamirano… We came in contact with 
them because we had two compañeros incarcerated because we cut down some trees to get wood … We 
were fighting to free them. And then we heard of Lucha Campesina. We went to see the president [of 
Lucha Campesina] We asked for help, and he said: no problem, this I why we created the union… We 
managed to get the two out of prison.329 
 
This successful process led the Tabasqueños to consider joining Lucha Campesina, but 
because of the distance between Tabasco and Lomantan (a good days walk), where Lucha 
Campesina had its “headquarters”, the Tabasqueños decided after one year with Lucha 
Campesina to create an ejido union of their own.330 
 
Creating Tierra y Libertad 
According to the Tabasqueños, the Tojolabales never received help nor advice from 
outsiders when creating the ejido unions in the region: “Lucha Campesina never had a 
hispanic leader, it was all Tojolabal. We saw that unity gave strength, in facing the 
government. So we created La Union de ejidos Tierra y libertad. It was constituted in 
1979.”331 That no outsiders participated in the creation of Lucha Campesina nor in creating 
Tierra y Libertad, would have been exceptional in Chiapas in the late 1970s – as we have 
seen, outside agents were helping out in this process throughout the state. Nor does it seem 
true that the ejido unions in the area were creation of the Tojolabales themselves without 
any alien involvement: The Maoist activist working in indigenous Chiapas in the 1970s 
were looking for the one uniting factor that would facilitate organization, as we have seen. 
These factors are known as pretexts – a (real) motive and motivation shown to the outside 
                                                
328 Interview with informant 13. See also interview with informant 3.2. 
329 Interview with informant 2. Eduardo Mendez Lopez says: “They promised to fight to the last man in order 
to free the two… We got them out, without paying un peso.” (Interview with informant 13) 
330 ”Puta, it took almost two days to get to were the meetings were held.” (Interview with informant 13) 
331 Interview with informant 2 
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world, meant to attract followers – in Maoist thought. Tierra y libertad was created based 
on a pretext of transportation. Padre Ramon Castillo says: “Here the struggle was not that 
strong, because there was no one to fight… So they found a pretext: transport.”332 
And even though it is true that Lucha Campesina never had a Hispanic leader, as 
Caralampio Cruz Cruz says, there is little doubt that this organization was formed in co-
operation with outside agents – the so-called norteños.333 Be that as it may, Tierra y 
libertad was created in 1979. Written sources are scarce on this subject so we have to relay 
on the oral ones. Eduardo Lopez Mendez says about the process: 
 
La palabra de Dios says: The ones who work the milpa must organize. If you do not, you will never get the 
compañeros out of prison. This is what Carlos334 told us. And I took the word, and said: Yes, that is what 
we have to do. We had thought along the same lines… We said: Why don’t we use what we have learned 
from Lucha Campesina, and gather all the catequistas in this area [cañada de Soledad] to create an 
organization of our own? We did this to be stronger. To get our petitions for more land through. It was very 
hard, because everywhere PRI had the power, every community was PRI community. But we entered the 
different communities through La palabra de Dios. In the beginning, six communities joined, in total some 
2000 people. I was named the first authority. But we had to fight, to push.335 
 
It is obvious from the account above that the diocese of San Cristobal – in this case 
German anthropologist and La Castalia staff member Carlos Lenkersdorf – was still a 
major influence, that La palabra de Dios and the catequistas was a driving force even 
behind the deepening of political organization. 
 
In creating Tierra y libertad, the catequistas, in the whole region, played the most important part. We 
organized among ourselves, held meetings, and afterwards we conquered the ejidal Comisariados… We 
did most the work, and afterwards we convinced the autoridades. And we made it.336 
 
Eight ejidos in la Cañada de Soledad took part in the creation of Tierra y Libertad.337 The 
pretext of organizing in this region was, as we have seen, transportation.338 The dream of 
                                                
332 Interview with informant 7 
333 See interview with informant 7 above, and Legorreta 1998, p 92, but also this account by Eduardo Lopez 
Mendez: ”In 1979, they [Lucha Campesina] are well organized, and make their own assemblies, they do not 
need anybody helping them, they could find their own way without outside help because [by that time] the 
organization was already established and working.” (Interview with informant 13). Even more to the point: I 
have interviewed some of the norteños, such as Apolinar Oliva, who participated in the process of creating 
these ejido unions. There can be little doubt that outsiders – Hispanics – did participate. (Interviews with 
informants 8 and 21) 
334 Carlos Lenkersdorf, discussed in the literature section. He came to work with La Castalia through the 
connexions this latter had with the German, catholic organization Misereor. Academic work aside, 
Lenkersdorf has meant a whole lot for the people of Tabasco, having worked with them on the Milpa and 
helped organize and improve the ejido. They call him ”hermano Carlos”, and asked me about his 
whereabouts and physical condition constantly. Sadly, I had to respond that brother Carlos is sick due to old 
age. For the purpose of this thesis I have been in contact with him and his wife through e-mail, but Carlos 
Lenkersdorf was not fit to give any interviews about his life with ejido Tabasco. 
335 Interview with informant 2 
336 Op.cit. 
337 The others were Buenavista Pachan, Chiapas, Cruz del Rosario, Mexiquito, Belisario Dominquez, Rafael 
Ramirez, and Aquiles Serdan. (Estrada Saavedra 2006) 
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owning a mean of transportation, thus enabling the movement of people and goods in a 
region without communication (at the time, only one bus circulated the region of La 
Soledad, owned by one of the landlords), came true within the first year of the existence of 
Tierra y libertad. The families of each member community contributed one toston – 20 
cents – until they had the money to pay for the first communal bus in the area, according to 
the Tabasqueños.339 
Being able to buy this vehicle, seeing that the work bore fruits, was an experience for the 
founding members of Tierra y Libertad according to one of the founders: 
 
We went by foot to Mexico City, some 10 or 15 days. And then we returned with the bus, on April 20, 
1980. Ah, the joy of the people… We held a party, and people came from other regions to see the bus. It 
was the beginning… Thus, there were now two big organizations in the municipality of Las Margaritas. 
And when the two joined forces… Wow, what a joy.340 
 
Tierra y libertad was created, and despite the fact that outsiders helped form the ejido 
union, this was mainly the work of the indigenous peoples themselves, as also is the case in 
the forming of other unions in Chiapas around the same time. Some unions were to achieve 
greater success than others, though. Tierra y Libertad still exists today, but as little more 
than a shaded memory. The organization was to loose its power, at least in and around 
ejido Tabasco, in only a few years, and disappeared as an important political and economic 
factor in the mid 1980s. Padre Ramon Castillo has a theory on why this happened: 
 
Carlos [Lenkersdorf] gave them [Tierra y Libertad] money, through some organizations in Europe. So it 
never really came from the people, as in other parts of Chiapas, just from some few enthusiasts… But it 
had no future, because, unlike other places, it was never a mutual, communal struggle, just the few ones. 
And how could they maintain the bus? They spent the money on other things, including parties.341 
 
This reasoning seems an accurate one – Tierra y Libertad was largely funded by the 
German Catholic organization Misereor thanks to the efforts of Carlos Lenkersdorf, and its 
hold on Ejido Tabasco did not last long. But this did not necessarily happen because of the 
easy access to money that Padre Ramon Castillo mentions alone. The pretext of 
transportation had led to formation of the union, but the problem of in-communication was 
only one of many that the Tojolabales in the region had to face, as Caralampio Cruz Cruz 
explains: 
 
                                                                                                                                              
338 This becomes even more evident in this interview with some of the founders of Tierra y Libertad in ejido 
Tabasco: ”We said we had to fight for bus transportation from Las Margaritas-Nuevo Momon, because the 
transportation owners treated us bad in those days.” (Estrada Saavedra 2006) 
339 Interview with informant 13. As we will see, Padre Ramon Castillo has another take. 
340 Interview with informant 13 
341 Interview with informant 7. As we have seen, Lenkersdorf worked with la Castalia in the 1970s and -80s. 
 84 
We bought the bus, because we saw that this was what was most needed. As time went on, some norteños 
came to advise us, they saw the power of the organization. We started applying for an extension of the road 
that passes through here, we travelled a lot to make them build a new and better one… And then we found 
that the vehicle did not resolve our problems. In accordance with other leaders, we found that what we 
needed most was La madre tierra – lands. Because without it, we had no place to work.342 
 
The Tojolabales thus tried to fight for more lands through their new strength as members 
of a big organization, using lawyers and running from one public office to another. But the 
immediate success of the fight for better transportation did not reproduce itself in other 
areas. This had several explanations. One of the major ones is to be found far outside the 
reach of ejido unions in Chiapas: The redistribution of lands was no longer part of the 
national project, and was to be abandoned completely throughout the 1980s.343 
This new national policy, combined with the lack of real popular support and efforts 
behind the very idea of Tierra y Libertad, lead to the weakening of the union. Combine this 
with bad leadership344, and it is not hard to understand why Tierra y Libertad did not hold 
all the answers to the problems facing the ejiditarios of ejido Tabasco.345 By the mid-1980s, 
Tierra y libertad had lost most of its influence in the Tojolabal areas. This also happened to 
many other organizations in Chiapas, due to the same reasons: Lack of success in 
achieving the goals set346; the governments intents of cooptation;347 the new wave of 
Protestant groups arriving, looking for indigenous salvation in the sweet hereafter rather 
than in the earthly life348; bad leadership; and failure to agree on the goals of the big 
unions. Also, in seeing their goals frustrated and the state attitude towards their effort – 
either ignoring their demands or repressing them with violence349, the indigenous peoples 
of Chiapas went looking for new, often more radical, ways to overcome the misery. 
                                                
342 Interview with informant 2 As we have seen, Ejido Tabasco got the formal right to use the land they 
applied for in 1959 as late as in 1980. But, as we have seen and as we will se later on, the question of land 
never ceased to be the source of conflict in Chiapas. At this time, in 1980, according to the National Census 
only 150 souls were living in Tabasco. This seems improbable, compared to the 174 people registered in the 
census ten years earlier, and the 337 registered in 1990. I have not found any indication of a decrease in the 
population in the 1970s, which leads me to think that the census numbers are wrong. Anyway: The increase 
in the population in Tabasco to a total of 337 in 1990 shows the need for more lands, if only to maintain the 
quality of life of the earlier decades, seeing as a real (as opposed to the formal presidential decree in 1980, 
concerning already populated areas) annexing of lands had not taken place after 1969. 
343 Garcia de Leon 2002 
344 “The new leaders lacked the capacity, and the meetings were not called.” (Interview with informant 13) 
345 “And tierra y libertad, which started out very big, is now very small.” (Interview with informant 13) 
346 When moving beyond buying the first bus, Tierra y Libertad met the wall, as we have seen. 
347 “We started working with a man from Toreon, a Nacho. He helped us a lot, but then he changed, tried to 
get us to work with the government. Then we got rid of him.” (Interview with informant 13) 
348 “And then the religious sextas – sects – started coming, and they started telling us that organizing was the 
way of the communist. They created a division in the union, many left to join the sextas.” (Interview with 
informant 13) 
349 This coincides with the governorship of Absalon Castellanos (1983-88), brutal in its repression. The 
complete list of state repression in this period is long, as illustrated by scholars and Tojolabal activists 
Margarito Ruíz Hernández & Araceli Cal y Mayor. (Ruíz Hernández & Cal y Mayor 2003) 
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By this time, La Aric was well established in other regions of Chiapas, including parts of 
Las Margaritas. In la Cañada de Soledad, another big organization was to attract the 
Tabasqueños. 
 
La CIOAC 
La Central Independiente de Organizaciones Indigenas y Campesinas (CIOAC) – the 
Independent Central of Indigenous and Peasant Organisations – was already an established 
organization when they came to Chiapas in 1979. It was created in 1964 as an alternative to 
the official, governmental Confederacion Nacional Campesina (CNC) – the National 
Peasant Confederation.350 The organization tried to organize agricultural workers, reform 
the credit system for the agricultural sector, fight state and international monopolies and 
prevent the army from intervening in conflicts in the countryside. CIOAC came to Chiapas 
in 1979, after having been expelled a few years earlier in the same way (and in the very 
same process) as the norteños of Linea Proletaria. 
CIOAC differed from La Aric and the norteño advisors in being part of a national 
organization, in theory under direct command of the leaders in Mexico City.351 But more 
important was the ideological and political differences between La CIOAC and other 
groups in working in Chiapas at the time: CIOAC was communist, and worked within the 
political system as supporters of different leftist parties, as well as organizing labour 
unions for the peasant, indigenous population of Chiapas. Thus, their struggle was not an 
underground one (as opposed to Union del Pueblo, at least in theory a clandestine 
organization upon its arrival in Chiapas), something that led them to open confrontation 
with the government.352 
CIOAC was established in the area of Simojovel, which was to be its stronghold in the 
1980s. From their base there, they sought to expand their area of influence. They came in 
contact with Ejido Tabasco and Tierra y Libertad on a special occasion: 
 
                                                
350 See chapter 4 on the Cardenista project, where the introduction of this organisation is discussed. 
351 Even though CIOAC in Chiapas developed a rather autonomous relationship with the leadership in the 
capital, ”because they were looking to answer the regional needs. Never under the direct influence of the 
national leaders, they managed to be received by the Chiapanecos. Thus, while national CIOAC work with 
production projects, in Chiapas the organization fought for redistribution of lands”. (Montellano García 2001, 
p 160) 
352 This confrontation line caused the death of more than one member of CIOAC. The most infamous case 
was that of Andulio Galvez Velasquez, member of the state council of la CIOAC and the communist PSUM 
– Partido Socialista Unificado de Mexico. He was murdered by people ”close to Ernesto Castellanos 
Dominguez (brother of  governor Absalon Castellanos and member of ”La familia Chiapaneca).” (Ruíz 
Hernández & Cal y Mayor 2003, p 255) 
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In 1980, while we were celebrating the arrival of the bus, a delegation from La CIOAC approached and 
asked if we wanted to join them. They told us about their project, that they were present in Chiapas but not 
so much in this region, and they wanted Lucha Campesina and Tierra y libertad to join. But we said no, we 
wanted to keep on working with our organizations. But they had found the door, and kept on opening it, 
they never gave up.353 
 
This seems to be emblematic of the expansion of CIOAC in Las Margaritas. In the early 
1980s they started gaining ground here, both as an organization and with their political 
allies in Partido Socialista Unificado de Mexico – The Mexican Unified Socialist Party – 
(PSUM) (and later PT – the Workers Party). By responding to the needs of the 
communities, first and foremost the need for more and better land, they attracted many 
different groups and ejido unions to their project. Also ejido Tabasco found the strong and 
well organized CIOAC to attractive to resist: “Finally, we reached an agreement, and the 
three organizations – CIOAC, Tierra y libertad and Lucha Campesina – were tied 
together.”354 
CIOAC was, as we have seen, in open conflict with the local government. In the early 
1980s, when Tabasco and Tierra y Libertad joined the organization, they had started to 
occupy land in regions where they had a strong influence. In the communities associated 
with CIOAC, two strategies were developed:  
1. The political approach: mass meetings, demonstrations, strikes and use of the media. 
2. The more traditional approach of capacitating: self-defence (both culturally and 
material and the hiding of leaders and others wanted by the police or the pistoleros of the 
finqueros. 
In this period, governor Juan Sabines had taken on a new project of land distribution in 
Chiapas. The state government bought land and sold it, at a fair price, to communities in 
need of more land. CIOAC opposed this policy, mainly because much of the land that was 
bought by the government was already applied for by different indigenous or other rural 
communities under article 27355 of the constitution. Thus, this new policy of Sabines 
created only more tension. But this new governmental project helped CIOAC gain 
strength, as CNC – The National Peasant Confederation – in trying to get the communities 
to go along with this strategy disclosed itself as being servants of the government in the 
eyes of the indigenous population. And this was not a good time for organizations wanting 
to win over the ejidos in Chiapas to be associated with the government. State repression 
                                                
353 Interview with informant 13 
354 Interview with informant 13 
355 See chapter 4, about the Cardenista reforms 
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got ever more vile. The region was militarized in 1982. Local finqueros, helped by public 
policemen, responded to the more aggressive strategy of CIOAC by using more violence. 
 
Repression was converted into one of the systematic methods of the corporative Chiapans to control the 
independent peasant organizations. In accordance with the local caciques, the authorities tried to maintain 
the social and economic structure, more than anything in order to protect land ownership.356 
 
These attempts of protecting the landowners faced, in la Cañada de Soledad, a powerful 
enemy in CIOAC, gaining strength as the other organizations in the region lost influence. 
In the words of Eduardo Lopez Mendez: “La CIOAC is like the lizard. It swallows 
everything… Even though everything is falling apart, there is a mother and a father: La 
CIOAC. And they get stronger and stronger.”357 
 
Ejido Tabasco and CIOAC 
In August 1985, the Tabasqueños occupied the remaining lands of the finquero of the finca 
Medellin. All members of the ejido, women, children and men, left their houses and milpas 
for days, building tents and provisional houses on the lands belonging to Cesar Solis.358 
This action was a mutual struggle, decided among all the ejidos belonging to CIOAC in la 
Cañada de Soledad. The land occupation was to last for some 20 days before the police 
came, at the request of the finca owner Cesar Solis.359 This is how the Tabasqueños 
remembers the land occupation: 
 
We decided in a meeting in Comitan that we had to occupy the lands. We were there, in the camp, working 
the lands, only some 15 days, when the cabrones landowners got together and, with the help of the police 
and armed landowners managed to throw us away. And we ran away, we had nothing with which to protect 
us, it was a civil uprising, unarmed.360 
 
It seems that, because of family quarrels within the landowners in the Solis family, the 
Tabasqueños were able to hold the land for a longer period than what could be expected. 
Padre Ramon Castillo did not participate in the event, but gives the following account: 
 
The Solis brothers were fighting, so the other left Cesar Solis to himself. That way, they could not receive 
the Tabasqueños with arms, like they had done before361… The police wanted to throw them out, but when 
                                                
356 Montellano García 2001, p 191 
357 Interview with informant 13 
358 I have found one reference: ”1985, July: En Simojovel [sic], 2000 [sic. Must be wrong, 200 seems more 
plausible] policemen and 35 finqueros and pistoleros Medellin and La Soledad, occupied by peones wanting 
better payment.” (Montellano Garcia 2001, p 214) 
359 Interview with informant 13 
360 Interview with informant 2 
361 According to Padre Ramon Castillo, in the process leading to the creation of Tierra y libertad, when the 
Comisariado was imprisoned, the people of la Cañada de Soledad came together and demonstrated against 
the capture of the Comisariado. They marched on Medellin, some 3 or 4000 of them, and were received with 
the firing of arms. Seeing as I have no other source for this (nobody seems to remember, or does not want to 
talk about it), I have chosen to leave this out. Still, it deserves to be mentioned, at least in this context, where 
the Padre talks about how the Solis could not use firearms this time. (Interview with informant 7) 
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they got there, the Tabasqueños had left, only to return when the police had left. And Solis did not have 
enough money to pay the police over and over again...”362 
 
The last sentence in the quote above is an interesting one. Did the landowners have to 
pay the police to come help them against the occupiers? There are accounts of this 
happening in similar situations in other parts of Chiapas. CIOAC used land occupation on a 
regular basis in those days, thus giving the police a lot of work. It does not, then, seem 
unlikely that the landowners had to pay for protection. Finally, though, the police managed 
to chase the occupants off the land. The camps set up on the occupied lands were burned 
together with the tools and food that was left in the camp as the Tabasqueños left 
fleeing.363 In interview, Cesar Solis, landowner at the time, claims that he does not 
remember any quarrels over land with the Tabasqueños, only with neighbouring ejidos, 
bordering his property. When asked specifically about the event of summer 1985, he 
admits that there were some “minor problems”.364 That this event took place is, however, 
certain. Not only is it in accordance with the CIOAC strategy in the 1980s all over its area 
of influence in Chiapas, there is also this section from leftwing newspaper La Jornada: 
 
August 6 and 7, 1985: 200 policemen from Seguridad Publica and 35 finqueros and their pistoleros make a 
violent removal of the Tojolabales from the communities of Buena Vista Pachán, Tabasco and Chiapas, in 
Las Margaritas. Functionaries from the Secretaria de Desarolla Rural del Estado were involved. The police 
and pistoleros were transported in trucks in the property of the finqueros.365 
 
Other than this episode, it seems the Tabasqueños were not part of any major conflicts in 
the 1980s. As we have seen, Tierra y Libertad lost strength, and the CIOAC battleground 
was not really centred around the region of ejido Tabasco. And as we saw in the 
governmental report from ejido Tabasco in 1988 (se page 48): A school building existed in 
the community, but was not completed. The children never got a sufficient education there. 
The ejiditarios in Tabasco were still cut off from the outside world, and left with, at least 
according to their own accounts, too little land. The Tabasqueños applied for new lands in 
1969, but the process never reached a conclusion. By 1988 and the presidency of Salinas 
de Gortari (1988-1994), land redistribution within the ejido system was no longer a priority 
of the Mexican government, as we will see in the next chapter. 
 
                                                
362 Interview with informant 15 
363 Interview with informant 3.2 
364 Interview with informant 14 
365 Quoted in Ruiz Hernandez & Cal y Mayor 2003, p 254 
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CIOAC and regional politics 
CIOAC, and thus the Tabasqueños, supported the left leaning PRD party in the regional 
elections in Las Margaritas from its creation in the aftermath of the 1988 presidential 
elections.366 From the 1970s to the creation of PRD, CIOAC affiliated with leftwing parties 
such as PSUM. Until the 2002 elections, they never won – even though accusations of 
fraud surrounded many of the PRI election victories.367 This led to frustration. “No matter 
what we did, we could not win. The patrones and the political elites kept us out of power”, 
says Martin Mendez Lopez in ejido Tabasco.368 This frustration would, of course, make it 
easier for the Zapatistas to win over the Tabasqueños for a different kind of struggle. 
 
The republic of the Masses 
We have seen in this chapter how outsiders, the norteños, came to Chiapas from 1974 
trying to create a vanguard for the Revolution in Mexico based on Maoist ideas of 
attacking the centre from the periphery and educating the masses and waiting for the right 
moment – the moment when the correlation of forces is in your favour. The moment never 
arrived, not for these groups anyway. But these norteños did radicalize the situation in 
Chiapas, by getting the government to show its ugly face of repression and by organizing 
what Estrada calls the “republic mass community” in cooperation with the indigenous 
peoples themselves, as we have seen in the case of Tabasco.369 
But as was the case of the pastoral work in Chiapas, the political project of the leftist 
movements such as Union del Pueblo, Linea Proletaria and CIOAC, notwithstanding the 
differences between them, had some limitations. The message was sharpened and  
organizational structures created, and land was occupied. But the organizations had little to 
offer other than rhetoric and promises of a prolonged fight with political means when the 
government met their demands with a negative response or repression. It is of course 
possible that, in time, these political projects could have led to results if left to themselves 
and enabled to work on with the communities. But this we will never know. For when the 
Tabasqueños were busy occupying lands together with other CIOAC members, another 
movement had already come to Chiapas, planning an armed revolution. 
                                                
366 Those elections ended with the PRI candidate winning, but loud protests of fraud were heard. 
367 Estrada Saavedra 2007. That year (which is not within the period of study of this paper) also marked 
another important milestone: For the first time a Tojolabal became municipal president in Las Margaritas. 
368 Interview with informant 3 
369 Although it must be said that this feature was more pre-eminent in the regions were CIOAC was not as 
powerful as in La Cañada de Soledad. See figure 6.1, appendix 4, for more about how this Republic of the 
masses was structured – by the Maoist groups such as Linea Proletaria and Union del Pueblo more than the 
action and election orientated CIOAC communities. 
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Chapter 7: EZLN comes to Chiapas 
If for the Maoist groups arriving in Chiapas in the 1970s taking up arms was an option, for 
the latest newcomer – taking the name Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional (EZLN) – 
the armed uprising was the definite solution. We will in the following deal with the 
presence of this movement in Chiapas, and how this organization influenced life in ejido 
Tabasco. 
 
National context 
In the 1980s, after a debt crisis, Mexico was to become one of the golden boys of the neo-
liberal economic re-structuring imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).370 
Beginning in the aftermath of the debt crisis, Mexico took on, in the presidencies of Miguel 
de Madrid (1982 – 1988) and Salinas de Gortari (1988 – 1994), a path of neo-liberal 
politics that led to economic growth, opening the economy for foreign investments and 
privatizations.371 After a decade of such “open” economic policy, Mexico, in 1993, was 
accepted as a member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD). The following year, January 1, 1994, Mexico entered the North American Free 
Trade Area (NAFTA) agreement with USA and Canada. President Salinas de Gortari was 
often mentioned among the favourites to become the next president of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO).372 Mexico was “ready to enter the First world”.373 
The process of economic growth in the 1980s came at a price. One of the obstacles to 
overcome in adapting Mexico to a free trade and open economy was the ejido system, 
inscribed in the Revolutionary constitution in 1917 and brought to life by Lazaro Cardenas 
in the 1930s. Thus, in 1992, article 27 of the constitution of 1917 was reformed.374 The 
neo-liberal economic policy that was initialized in 1982 was a break from the revolution 
rhetoric that had been the trademark of PRI since the 1930s – even though, as we have seen 
on the topic of land redistribution (see chapter 4), rhetoric and reality did not always 
coincide in the fifty years separating post-revolutionary Mexico and the debt crisis in 1982. 
But still, theory was that land redistribution was to take place within the framework of the 
ejido system. The reform of article 27 meant an absolute change, dramatical in rural 
Chiapas, where the population was still seeking expansion of their ejidos. Now, land 
                                                
370 According to Tello Diaz 2005 
371 Garcia de Leon 2003 
372 Garcia de Leon 2005. He was the Clinton administration’s candidate for the job.  
373 Escalante Gonzalbo et.al 2005, and Garcia de Leon 2005 
374 See chapter 4 for more on article 27 
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redistribution in Mexico was going to take place through buying and selling, according to 
the reformed article 27. And the ejido system was considered an obstacle for progress and 
prosperity – small units meant small scale production, thus giving Mexico a handicap in 
international commerce.375 
The reform of article 27 did not, however, mean that president Carlos Salinas de Gortari 
had forgotten about Chiapas. He invested millions in aid and credit programmes in the state 
of Chiapas, through governmental programs Pronasol and Solidaridad. 
These programs did not manage to change the desperate situation in rural Chiapas. It 
seems that el subcomandante insurgente Marcos – the Zapatista leader – won the battle of 
narratives when he described the presidential programmes like this in 1992: 
 
You will see another magnificent construction with the noble symbol of SOLIDARIDAD printed on the 
façade. Do not look at it, I ask you to turn away, do not notice the fact that this building is… A prison (evil 
tongues claim that such are the advantages that Pronasol offer: Now the peasants will not have to go all the 
way to Cerro Hueco, the prison in the state capital [of Tuxtla Gutierrez]376 
 
A small-scale political awakening 
As we have seen, many leftist political activists went underground after the massacre of 
Tlatelolco in 1968. Government repression within the framework of the institutional 
revolution – hence the name PRI377 – was tough in the 1970s, without ever catching the 
attention of the outside world, contrary to many of the military regimes in other countries 
of Latin America.378 But this perfect dictatorship, as Peruvian writer Mario Vargas Llosa 
described the Mexican system of corporativism and repression mixed with a progressive 
face shown to the outside world, would not last forever.379 
According to scholars Patricia King and Francisco Javier Villanueva the first breach in 
the “perfect” PRI system became obvious during the catastrophic earthquake that hit 
Mexico City in 1985.380 Because of the late and incompetent reaction by the official law, 
order and first aid institutions, citizens themselves came together and organized ad hoc in 
small, autonomous neighbourhood rescue teams. When normality returned after weeks of 
trying to rescue victims of the earthquake and securing buildings, the organizational 
structures created during the disaster had shown people that organization was possible. Still 
following King and Villanueva: The organization in 1985 was to become the 
                                                
375 Garcia de Leon 2002 
376 Chiapas: el sureste en dos vientos..., in EZLN, 2003. Marcos is taking the reader for an imaginary ride 
through Chiapas, hence the references to movement in the quote. 
377 Partido Revolucionario Institucional 
378 Such as Pinochet’s Chile and general Viuda in Argentina 
379 El Pais, 1990 
380 Numbers differ. Officially, around 10 000 people died in the earthquake. Other sources claim the numbers 
reached more than 35 000. 
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organizational base of the left-centre candidacy of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, grandson of 
ejido reform father Lazaro Cardenas, in the presidential campaign in 1988.381 
Cuauhtémoc Cardenas lost the 1988 election to Carlos Salinas de Gortari by the smallest 
margin.382 Cries of fraud rose in the aftermath of the election. Salinas de Gortari and PRI 
remained in power, but had been challenged for the first time. The PRI was to loose its grip 
on Mexico throughout the 1990s. After the 1988 elections, both PAN – Partido Accion 
Nacional, Party for National Accion – and PRD – Partido de la Revolucion Democratica, 
Party of the Democratic Revolution, created on the remains of the Cardenas movement 
after the 1988 elections – became serious challengers to the PRI one-party rule.383 
 
EZLN comes to the Lacandon jungle – some remarks on the origins of EZLN 
In 1983, in mid-November, representatives of the Fuerzas de Liberacion Nacional (FLN) – 
The National Liberation Forces – reached the Lacandon jungle and made up their first 
camp. On this 17th of November 1983, two Chiapan natives of indigenous origin – Frank 
and Javier – and three urban, hispanic militants of the FLN – Comandante German, Elisa y 
Rodolfo – established the Ejercito Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) – the 
Zapatista army for National Liberation, as the southern division of the FLN.384 According 
to the original plan of the FLN, EZLN was to be just one in a national web of guerrillas 
that was to undertake an ambitious project: making the socialist revolution through the 
violent takeover of the Mexican government. 385 
In the mid-eighties, one Sebastian Rafael Guillen Vicente from the northern state of 
Tamaulipas joined the EZLN forces in Chiapas, holding the rank of captain. Guillen was to 
become the regional leader in the late 1980s, with the rank of subcomandante – under-
commander, meaning he had to take orders from comandante German – one Fernando 
Yañez, the national leader of the FLN.386 The world was to know Rafael Guillen as el 
subcomandante Marcos in 1994.387 
 
                                                
381 King & Villanueva 1998  
382 Official numbers gave 50.36% for Salinas and 31.12% for Cardenas. (Secretaria de Gobernacion 1988) 
383 Garcia de Leon 2005. This process culminated with right-centre party (PAN) winning the 2000 elections. 
That, however, is a different story, where the Zapatista uprising is one of many important forces leading to 
this historic change in Mexican politics. 
384 Tello Diaz 2005 
385 FLN were supposed to establish divisions in all of the central regions of Mexico and in the north, in the 
state of Chihuahua. (Tello Diaz 2005) 
386 And thus not, as many believe, because Marcos is subcomandante to the indigenous comandantes. 
387 Tello Diaz 2005, and de la Grange & Rico 2005 
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Some disturbing remarks along the way – EZLN and the traditional left 
Before we move on, I would like to mention a few facts that are well known, but 
remarkably little discussed among the apologists of Zapatismo (see chapter 2). 
EZLN has used a rhetoric of indigenous struggle, of seeking a place for the indigenous 
peasant population in the Mexican national project, ever since the armed uprising in 1994. 
Their message is one of democracy and plurality.388 Subcomandante Marcos is, as 
mentioned, known as the joker, the clown, the intellectual revolutionary, the armed poet, 
because of his poems, shorts stories and poetic declarations.389 Regis Debray, the French 
philosopher and Latin America specialist, even called Marcos “the greatest Latin American 
writer of our time”.390 All this may be true, and I would, if that was the focal point of this 
thesis, actually argue that EZLN did change in the encounter with the indigenous peoples 
in Chiapas. But this is not the rhetoric offered by EZLN when the movement settled in the 
Lacandon jungle. Rather, the discourse of the FLN – or, in its Chiapan uniform: EZLN – 
was one of traditional, socialist guerrilla, not unlike the ones active in Central America at 
the time. From the statutes of the FLN (written in 1980): “The FLN is a political-military 
organization who’s objective is the rural and urban worker takeover of political power in 
the Mexican republic, to install a popular republic with a socialist system.”391 
And, even more to the point: 
 
[The FLN shall strive to] integrate the struggles of the urban proletariat with the struggles of the peasants 
and indigenous peoples of the most exploited areas of our country and form the Ejercito Zapatista de 
Liberacion Nacional.392 
 
There is little doubt, then, that EZLN was created by and operated under orders of the 
national leadership of the FLN, as an integrated part of this organization. Subcomandante 
Marcos himself acknowledges this, in an interview with French scholar Yvon Le Bot in 
1997.393 This is not the focal point of this thesis, but the origins of Zapatismo do have some 
                                                
388 See, for instance, Declaracion de la Selva Lacandona, the document read aloud in the conquered town 
squares and published in newspapers immediately after the uprising in 1994: ”We are the product of 500 
years of repression” is clearly a reference to indigenous struggle. Not withstanding, and more in accordance 
with the point here: The first time the Zapatistas speak directly about being an indigenous project is in the 
Segunda Declaracion de la Selva Lacandona, published in June 1994. (both documents in EZLN 2003) 
389 See, for instance, how Marcos is portrayed by Spanish writer Montealban, briefly touched in the literature 
discussion in chapter 1. (Montealban 1999) 
390 Proceso 1995 
391 En Tello Diaz 2005 
392 Op.cit. 
393 Le Bot 1997. Even in the days following the uprising, some of the insurgents spoke openly to the press 
about fighting for the socialist revolution. They were soon quieted, and this discourse disappeared from the 
Zapatista horizon. (Tello Diaz 2005, page 234). It may seem an exaggeration to include all this information 
about the origins of the EZLN. I choose to do so because many people deny this connection between the FLN 
and EZLN, thinking, I believe, that such a bond to a traditional socialist movement ruins the image of EZLN 
as something new (see discussion on literature, chapter 1). On the other hand, I do not wish to imply that the 
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implications on the way the project should be viewed. How much does the indigenous base 
of the movements know about this pre-planned project? How much influence did the 
Tabasqueños and other Zapatistas have on the outcome of the project? This will be 
discussed throughout this chapter. 
 
Spreading the message 
As we have seen in the previous chapters: Chiapas was a state where outside actors had 
been present for decades when the Zapatistas arrived. What the newly arrived guerrilleros 
found in Chiapas was a fertile soil for radical ideas, but also competition from the existing 
projects and struggles. EZLN operated underground in the first years in the region, during 
which all the activity took place inside the Lacandon jungle. Slowly, the Zapatistas tried to 
get in touch with close by communities. This account by compañero Gerardo in the 
Zapatista anniversary book 20 y 10 gives an impression of how the first contact was made 
(Compañero Gerardo says he got in contact with the organization in 1984. That is early – 
most communities, even among the first ones, were recruited from the mid-1980s). 
Compañero Gerardo shows in this account how the communities came to enter – that some 
social leaders were the first ones to be contacted, and from them the word of the new 
organization spread to the rest of the people in the community:  
 
I was recruited by one of my brothers. He started talking to me [about EZLN] on one of his journeys [to the 
insurgents camps]. First we heard about the reasons for the fights, they told us two simple things […] 
because the ones that recruited us also had means of security and they never gave away all at once. Now, 
when you decide to do the job, then, on the journeys, you start to learn, but you have to be dedicated before 
you reach the point of learning. My community is one of the first to help the organization. We entered in 
1984. Not all of the people entered at first, but later we organized everyone, and then the insurgents could 
come to our community and feel protected. That is how we reach the point of war.394  
 
Also worth noticing is how very cautious the guerrilleros were in approaching potential 
members, how they “had their means of security”. This shows the level of dedication to the 
project: EZLN had come to the Lacandon jungle to stay for a while. Considering the young 
                                                                                                                                              
Zapatista project has not changed when confronted with the indigenous peoples of Chiapas. The problem I, as 
a student of the movement, have is that this discussion is pretty much ignored by the two tendencies in the 
literature on Zapatismo described in chapter 1, page 10. It seems that, to many scholars, EZLN has to be 
either a traditional leftist guerrilla, or that this part of the organization’s history must be kept a secret. 
Personally, I have no doubts that EZLN has changed a lot over the more the two decades the movement has 
been in Chiapas, and that the indigenous level of participation in creating what the Zapatistas stand for today 
has been an important factor. I will get back to this in chapter 8, the conclusion of this thesis.  
394 Muños Ramirez 2003. This is a book with interviews with Zapatistas, celebrating the 20th anniversary of 
the arrival in the jungle and the 10th anniversary of the armed rebellion. The book is written by Zapatista 
follower Gloria Munoz, and serves more as a document on the self perception of the Zapatistas than a source 
of balanced information. Notwithstanding, the book offers many interesting perspectives and accounts.  
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age of many of urban members of the movement who settled down in Chiapas, it is fair to 
say that they were willing to sacrifice their lives to EZLN.395  
After the first initial contacts, the Zapatistas started including the indigenous population 
in their project. Even at this early point (Geraldo speaks of 1984 still), secrecy was 
important. Only little by little, after having been tutored on means of security and, in cases, 
tested for loyalty, did the indigenous members get to see the full resources of the guerrilla 
in the making.396 
 
We saw when the organization of the Ejercito Zapatista began working in the villages. We first learned 
methods of security, because if there is no security, you cannot do anything. […] We learned more or less 
where the camps where located.397 
 
But this does not explain how the Zapatistas could spread the word from community to 
community, until being able to yield an army of some 6000 soldiers ten years later. For 
this, which we also will discuss in the case of ejido Tabasco and Zapatismo in this chapter, 
we need to know who the people the Zapatistas made their initial contacts with normally 
where. More often than not, we find that they are the catequistas, trained by the Catholic 
Church, and hence: by the diocese of San Cristobal.398 
 
With a little help from my friends? 
It seems plausible that the good relations they maintained with the Diocese of San 
Cristobal helped the Zapatistas in these early stages of Chiapan presence. According to the 
writers of the book Marcos: La genial impostura, the FLN was even originally invited to 
the region by bishop Samuel Ruiz himself. The bishop wanted someone to help the 
communities defend against the ever growing repression of the local authorities.399 Padre 
Ramon Castillo of La Castalia also speaks of the close relationship between the diocese 
and the insurgents, though not indicating any formal cooperation between the two.400 Many 
sources follow the same track, talking about how the projects of church and insurgents 
                                                
395 Tello Diaz offers a profile on many of the key members of EZLN. They are mostly students, middle class 
and in their mid-20s when they make the move to Chiapas. (Tello Diaz 2005) 
396 For this – and more specifically on how the Zapatistas train their soldiers in the mountains etc – Carlos 
Imaz has written an interesting book: Rompiendo el silencio. Biografía de un insurgente del EZLN. It is a 
fictional book, but the features and many of the people described are supposed to be accurate. (Imaz 2004) I 
lean some on his work in this section. 
397 Muños Ramirez 2003 
398 It needs to be mentioned here that although this process of contact was initiated by the Zapatistas, their 
message would be analyzed by, and to a certain degree adapted to, the indigenous communities that decided, 
as active subjects, to join the movement. I will come back to this, but mention it here to avoid being 
misunderstood as claiming that the only active subject here is EZLN. 
399 de la Grange & Rico 2005, and Tello Diaz 2005 
400 Interview with informant 7. ”They were here, you know. All of them, here, in La Castalia. And many of 
the indigenous leaders of the EZ were my students.” (Interview with informant 7) 
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coincide at least in interest.401 Also, just looking at the Zapatista stronghold in geographic 
terms is useful: It is almost identical with the different regions of influence that were 
created by the diocese of San Cristobal in 1966 (page 56). And: The Zapatista communities 
are, almost without exception, Catholic. The Protestant communities in the region were not 
receptive to the Zapatista project.402 
And then there is the role of the catequistas. The Zapatista camps and training fields were 
centred around the region of ejido Tierra y Libertad403 – where the catequistas in the region 
were won over by the Zapatistas. This enabled EZLN to, little by little, spread their 
influence and basically take over the key positions of La Aric.404 That the catequistas were 
the first to join does not, however, prove that the diocese was directly involved in the 
Zapatista project in Chiapas. As we have seen people holding this position were the natural 
leaders. One conclusion that could be drawn from this is that EZLN, just as the different 
leftist movements who came to Chiapas some ten years before the Zapatistas, found fertile 
land for their radical project in Chiapas. But it is also true that the above mentioned social 
movements – the norteños, as we have come to know them – did lay some foundations, 
together with the diocese of San Cristobal, that would enable the Zapatista message to 
spread relatively fast. As subcomandante Daniel, who was to desert in 1993, before the 
uprising, says in an interview: “Normally it was easy [to explain the Zapatista fight to the 
communities], because one has to remember that these people already were more or less 
politically capacitated.”405 
 
Gaining strength 
Established in the jungle region, EZLN started spreading the message of a new movement, 
mainly in the poorly communicated areas of the Lacandon jungle. The process of 
accumulating forces gained strength and speed from around 1988.406 
At this time, in the late 1980s, the Zapatistas had already started purchasing arms, 
preparing for war. Most of the guns were bought at the black market in the US, by the 
urban members of the movement. They were paid for by the indigenous members and their 
                                                
401 de la Grange & Rico 2005, Tello Diaz 2005, Legorreta 1998, for instance 
402 Estrada Saavedra 2006 
403 This ejido should not be confused with the ejidal union of Tierra y Libertad discussed in chapter 6. Tierra 
y Libertad means Land and Freedom, and was the cry of the original Zapatistas during the Mexican 
Revolution. Ever since, government rhetoric and social movements have used the original Zapatistas as 
symbols and references. 
404 Tello Diaz 2005 
405 de la Grange & Rico 1999 
406 Op.cit. 
 97 
small surplus after selling their products. There are no evidence that the EZLN ever dealt 
with drugs to make money to maintain the organization – it was mainly the indigenous 
members and their work that helped the movement survive.407  
Whereas the organization of FLN was virtually non-existent in other parts of the country 
except for the headquarters and urban members in Mexico City, Marcos could prove to his 
superiors – with parades and practices – that EZLN was a force to be recognized. This was 
to be showcased in the 1992 demonstrations against the 500 years celebration of the arrival 
of Columbus in San Cristobal. Here, the Zapatistas, though at this point not formerly 
recognized as such in public, tore down the statue of Spanish conqueror Matamoros in 
what was supposed to show the FLN and the other, competing organizations the real 
potential of EZLN.408At this point, EZLN had already bypassed La Aric and CIOAC in 
influence because of a rapid growth over the last four or so years, and the question was 
when war was going to be declared. In the words of Compañero Gerardo: 
 
We saw how the work developed and how, later on, our struggle was changing as the communities gained 
strength. In the beginning, almost 20 years ago, one miliciano – private – would leave one village [to join 
the organization], then two milicianos and then, later, would receive some training, and as they became 
more the work started changing. If there were five milicianos, then maybe one insurgente – higher ranking 
– would come from that same village. I mean to say that it happened step by step, not fast, maintaining the 
struggle, helping the struggle. This is how it all grew. Before 1994, we saw that we had accumulated force, 
it could be seen that it really was, that there now was un chingo – plenty of us.409 
 
By that time, the Zapatistas had, under the command of subcomandante Pedro410, already 
made contact with the people in ejido Tabasco. 
 
Zapatismo comes to ejido Tabasco 
The first contacts between EZLN and ejido Tabasco – as with the rest of the communities 
in la Cañada de Soledad – were not unlike the ones described by Compañero Gerardo: 
Someone thought to be trustworthy in the community was contacted by the Zapatistas, and 
given some information about the organization.411 Nobody but the one contacted was to 
know, not even the closest family. When absence from the community was required – in 
                                                
407 Tello Diaz 2005. Actually, there rather are compelling evidence that the Zapatistas did not make a profit 
from the Cannabis fields in Chiapas. Ex-guerillero “Enrique” even told me that he himself witnessed how one 
urban member of the FLN was sentenced to death for having bought and consumed marihuana. The 
movement was extremely preoccupied with not being attached to criminal patterns, unlike for instance FARC 
in Colombia. (Interview with informant 20) 
408 Tello Diaz 2005, and de la Grange & Rico 2005 
409 Muños Ramirez 2003 
410 One of three Subcomandantes in EZLN: Marcos; Pedro; and Daniel. The two latter answered to Marcos, 
who in turn answered only to Comandante German in Mexico City. Daniel was to desert the Zapatistas in 
1993, in part because of disagreements with Marcos (de la Grange & Rico 1999). Pedro, responsible for the 
region of Las Margaritas, was to be killed in the take-over of the municipal capital in 1994, as we will see. 
411 On this process in other communities in the region, see Estrada Saavedra 2006 b 
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case of a big reunion with EZLN, for instance – these pioneers in every community would 
have to make up an excuse – like going off to work some far away finca to make money – 
to be able to go.412  
In the case of ejido Tabasco, Eduardo Lopez Mendez and a few other catequistas were 
approached and inquired by fellow catequistas – whom they knew from diocese projects – 
from communities that already were established Zapatistas about the chances of ejido 
Tabasco joining EZLN. This happened in the late 1980s, according to my informants.413 At 
this time, ejido Tabasco was integrated in CIOAC and, at least formally, Union de ejidos 
Tierra y Libertad (see chapter 6). Politically they also maintained formal ties with the 
newly founded PRD through the CIOAC membership. Eduardo Lopez Mendez explains 
the first contacts in this way: “They started to visit us, bringing the message of a new, 
different organization. A closed one. And they had explicit goals, new ways of changing 
things, of making the government listen to us.”414 
After an initial period of discussions among the few chosen ones (who also would have 
to go to bigger meetings in the organization), the message was brought to the whole 
community.  
Before we discuss that process: It is worth mentioning that joining EZLN did not indicate 
a whole new way of thinking or living in ejido Tabasco. The community was already 
politically organized, so joining EZLN meant only sharpening the message and adapting to 
a more dedicated movement, informants say.415 This is important: It shows that EZLN 
could harvest the fruits of the political structures discussed in this thesis.416 At the same 
time, this is proof of the level of political sophistication in ejido Tabasco. 
 
                                                
412 Estrada Saavedra 2006 b. Whether these means of security were always successful is of course a different 
matter. The Tabasqueños heard of EZLN for the first time in 1985, still years before the first few were 
contacted. (Interview with informant 3) 
413 This I base on the interviews with informants 16 and 3. But my informants vary a lot on this. Some claim 
that formal contact was made with EZLN only after the armed rebellion in 1994 – which is an outright lie, 
and not even a consequent one: the same source has given me many different accounts on this. (Field 
observations in ejido Tabasco, May & June 2007). For this, the first contact with EZLN, I find support in 
Estrada Saavedra’s account of Zapatismo in neighbouring ejido Buenavista Pachan, and thus feel comfortable 
in dating this happening to around 1990. 
414 Interview with informant 15 
415 Interview with informant 15 
416 In European journalists de la Grange and Maite Rico’s interview with Salvador Morales Garibay – or 
subcomandante Daniel – this quote is of interest: “The capacitating that the bishop Samuel Ruiz [gave] the 
catequistas is invaluable [for the Zapatistas], if it had not existed there would not have such a growth nor 
capacity for action for EZLN.” (de la Grange & Rico 1999) 
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Joining the armed struggle 
Ejido Tabasco decided to join EZLN as an entire community in an assembly, where every 
man and woman in the ejido participated, in 1990.417 One of the reasons why ejido Tabasco 
joined the EZLN struggle according to the social leaders, is the similarity to the projects 
they already had undertaken. The fight and goals of EZLN are shared by CIOAC, and both 
are just two different paths leading to the same goal: Lands, respect, a prosperous future.418 
The leaders of the community felt, as did the leaders in other ejidos, that the pacific path 
had come to an end.419 Ejido Tabasco was created in the 1930s. 60 years later, after having 
walked with the Catholic Church, the norteños and the political organizations – ejidal 
unions and more explicit political organizations such as CIOAC – it was time to try 
something new. Of great importance is also the fact that CIOAC, as an organization, 
decided to join the EZLN project. “We were all tired of demonstrations, meeting, road 
blocks. We never saw any results, and we felt that this option was something new. So we 
said: Come on, let’s join them.”420 
EZLN had 11 concrete demands421 when rising up in arms in 1994, demands that were at 
that point well established in the communities. “These demands coincide with those of 
CIOCAC”, informants in ejido Tabasco say.422 
One note on what the Zapatistas promised the Tabasqueños before they decided to join: It 
is a common complaint from those criticising EZLN that they promised gold and paradise 
in order to get new members.423 This is not at all the impression I got from ejido Tabasco. 
Granted, EZLN did not speak of the revolution, nor of socialism, according to my sources. 
But all they really could – and did – promise was a new way of struggle, one that would 
take a lot of hard work and sacrifice.424 
One other aspect worth mentioning is that of, once again, the cacique. This is an ever-
present factor in rural Chiapas, and so also in this case. Accounts of how the leaders 
wanted to join EZLN and thus got their fellow ejiditarios to admit to a concept they may 
even have known very little about are not uncommon. I have no direct sources claiming 
                                                
417 See footnote 413 
418 Interview with informant 2 
419 Interview with informant 3 
420 Estrada Saavedra 2006 b 
421 ”Work, lands, roofs, food, health, educacion, independence, freedom, democracy, justice and peace”. 
(Declaracion de la Selva Lacandona, in EZLN 2003) 
422 Interviews with informants 2, 3, and 13 
423 Estrada Saavedra quotes the following from eijdo Buena Vista Pachan: ”when the Revolution triumphs”, 
said one Zapatista veteran, ”they told us that there would be land repartions, houses for everyone and 
everything the farmer needs; but (all this) only when our fight is over”. (Estrada Saavedra 2006 b) 
424 Interviews with informants 2, 3, and 16 
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that this was the case also in ejido Tabasco, but having observed the ejidal assembly and 
thus how (some of) the social leaders use their position and the advantage of having more 
information than the rest to impose their opinion, I am in no position to say it was not so in 
the encounter with Zapatismo.425 
 
Zapatismo in ejido Tabasco 
 
We helped each other mutually, because what we [the communities] did not know, they [the insurgents] 
knew. We needed to know things we did not know, and they, too, needed things from us, and that is how 
we started doing things.426 
 
This is how compañero Gerardo, who as we have seen joined EZLN in 1984, describes 
the relationship between the indigenous base of the Zapatista movement and the (almost 
exclusively hispanic) leaders. When the Tabasqueños joined collectively in the early 
1990s, the project of EZLN was established, thus meaning that ejido Tabasco would not 
have much influence over the organizational structures of EZLN.427 As in neighbouring 
ejido Buena Vista Pachan, social life in ejido Tabasco came to revolve around new 
functions such and promoters of education and health.428 These functions had to be 
established in the community due to EZLN orders. It meant that people – chosen by the 
assembly – in ejido Tabasco had to undergo some classes not unlike those of the 
catequistas in La Castalia to be able to teach reading and writing as well as some history 
about the Mexican revolution and of leftist philosophy, as well as first aid classes.429 Thus, 
they became promoters. 
The Zapatista project was (and is) one of autonomy, meaning they would be trying to 
create all necessary function as a parallel to those of the government. This would also 
mean that the children in the Zapatista communities would not receive education through 
the (in rural Chiapas very poor) public school system, but from the educational 
promoter.430 Another new institution in ejido Tabasco that came with EZLN was the 
political workshop, where, in the assembly, the situation of the indigenous population and 
of poverty in Mexico in general were discussed, as well as human rights431 and the role of 
                                                
425 Field observation in ejido Tabasco, May 2007 
426 Muños Ramírez 2003 
427 Unlike the communities that joined in the mid-1980s, who’s impact is claimed to have been big. As we 
briefly have mentioned, the Zapatista core region is the Lacandon jungle. The mutual influence between 
guerrilla leaders and indigenous thus took place in this region. (Garcia de Leon 2002) 
428 Estrada Saavedra 2006 b 
429 Interview with informant 16, and Estrada Saavedra 2005 
430 Gutiérrez Narváez 2005 
431 This was something new to ejido Tabasco. ”It was before we had human rights”, Caralampio Cruz Cruz 
said in an interview. (Interview with informant 2) 
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the women, who also got their own collectives.432 Also, the Tabasqueños started working 
the land collectively, to be able to maintain the people going off to the Zapatista camps to 
train with other EZLN members as well as maintaining the Zapatista army. 
Before we move on to describe other functions imposed by Zapatismo, I would like to 
return briefly to the fact that EZLN did not live off thievery and drugs to maintain an army 
and buy weapons. This meant that the indigenous communities would have to pay for the 
project. For instance, the EZLN leadership would sell weapons to the milicianos – the 
soldiers, often with a surplus. Seeing as the money to buy the weapons also came from the 
indigenous population, this may be considered double taxation.433 One of my informants 
says this of how he got hold of his weapon when he became a miliciano in 1993 at the age 
of 18: “I and everyone else had to buy the weapons ourselves, with or own money. I 
bought mine from someone I know that sells weapons, not far from here.”434  
Collective farming and the maintaining of the armed Zapatistas was to become a heavy 
burden in ejido Tabasco. The women complain they had to get up at five in the morning to 
make corn tortillas – the Mexican flat bread, and never could rest.435 And working 
communal land was not appreciated by everyone, for different reasons.436 
Not only farming was done collectively, the same was the case in the creation of the little 
tienda – the ejido store.437 Another new institution that came with Zapatismo was the 
different political committees, where one or more chosen ejiditarios would participate in 
regional work with other Zapatista community. 
 
Training with the Zapatistas 
EZLN were looking for young recruits who knew that they would have to wait for years – 
if at all – to reach some kind of important position in the community.438 As a Zapatista 
                                                
432 The women would, for instance, make a small communal garden to cultivate vegetables and herbs, and a 
oven in which to bake bread. They would also go learn how to use nature medicine, using locally grown 
weed against not very grave injuries. (Estrada Saavedra 2006 b, and field observations in ejido Tabasco, May 
& June 2007) 
433 At the time ejido Tabasco joined EZLN, the indigenous members, through the processes described here, 
maintained also the urban sections of the FLN / EZLN with their small surplus. There is, however, nothing 
that suggests that the EZLN leadership did anything else than use the money from the indigenous to 
strengthen the organization. (Tello Diaz 2005) 
434 Interview with informant 17 
435 Interview with informant 6 
436 Those who still today are most engaged in the Zapatista struggle in ejido Tabasco, though not necessarily 
as members, blame this on ”lazy” compañeros, while others conclude that ”We did not like collective 
farming in ejido Tabasco”. I do not wish to name names here 
437 These tiendas do not give much income, but they serve as a small source to get some emergency money in 
case of deseace. (Estrada Saavedra 2006 b) 
438 Tello Diaz 2005. Tello Diaz notes that EZLN always sought to "recruit the younger ones, those who 
would have to wait for years to win authority in their communities (…) Thus he (Marcos) constructed with 
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responsible or, even more so, sergeant, such positions of authority would be within reach 
for the young boys and girls. In many cases, such “short cuts” would lead to a division 
between younger and older generations within a community. This does not seem to be the 
case in ejido Tabasco, where the existing catequistas managed to grab on to many of the 
key Zapatista positions.439 The two functions mentioned above were among these key 
positions – the responsible and the milicianos where the top Zapatista authorities in every 
ejido, and coordinated activities such as work, politics and military – and they were the 
ones communication between the regional Zapatista leadership and the communities.  
Nobody in ejido Tabasco reached the grade of insurgente, but the community could 
present some 97 milicianos. The insurgentes are the guerrilla soldiers who live and train in 
the Zapatistas camps in the mountains and the jungle. The milicianos are civil members 
from communities that are bases de apoyo – EZLN’s support base. The milicianos live and 
work in their community, but they receive enough training to be able to protect their 
community from outside aggression.440 This training would imply having to leave the 
community once every two weeks or month to train under the command of the Zapatistas. 
The practicing milicianos would be gone for one week at the time – which of course shows 
the importance of communal farming.441 
Holding official Zapatista positions also meant having to prepare the community – to call 
assembly and prepare the discussion – for the visits by the Zapatista central command. 
According to some informants, subcomanandante Pedro, in charge for the Zapatistas in the 
region of Las Margaritas, would visit the Tabasqueños as many as ten times from the time 
ejido Tabasco entered EZLN until his death on the first day of 1994. Subcomandante Pedro 
would lead the discussions about the present situation, about how the Tabasqueños were 
receiving the information from the central command and, at least according to one source, 
would prepare the violent actions that were to take place in 1994.442 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                              
them, often assisted by the catequistas, a power structure outside of the one of the Catholic Church." (Tello 
Diaz 2005) 
439 Interviews with informants 7 and 13 
440 Interview with informant 17. The information about the functions of the insurgentes and milicianos is 
from Estrada Saavdra 2005. 
441 Interviews with informants 3.2 and 17. Whether or not the Tabasqueños participated in this training also 
before 1994, as part of the prepartions for war, is disputed, as we will see. 
442 Interview with informant 17. This is disputed, as we will see. 
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Tools or people with real influence? 
EZLN never mentioned waging war on the government nor trying to make a revolution in 
Mexico when approaching ejido Tabasco. According to the Tabasqueños, this decision was 
made in a step by step process, and the first period of Zapatista membership did not 
implicate arms training nor storage. According to the first Tabasqueños to get the message, 
the form of the organization was not yet decided when ejido Tabasco joined, let alone the 
name. As we have seen, this is not the case – EZLN was planned by urban revolutionaries 
before establishing in Chiapas. Before we move on, I would like to discuss in passing: 
What does it mean, then, that the very people who were to become the backbone of the 
movement did not know – and still today does not know – about this? At least there are 
two possible takes: 
1. The Zapatista central command has seduced its member base into believing that they 
have some kind of ownership and influence over a project that was already established – 
thus: That the Tabasqueños are useful tools in their struggle. This is of course the take of 
the critics of Zapatismo. 
2. It can also be argued, as does Subcomandante Marcos and many of the followers of the 
movement, that the level of indigenous participation really altered the Zapatista project.443 
That the uprising took place in Chiapas, and in Chiapas alone with a few exceptions, can 
thus be viewed as a consequence of the desires of the members more than that of the 
leadership. 
I will come back to this discussion in the conclusion of this thesis. 
 
The path to war 
Pope John Paul II visited Mexico in 1993. The bishop of the diocese of San Cristóbal took 
advantage of the opportunity to write the Pope a letter Samuel Ruiz called En esta hora de 
gracia – In this hour of Grace. This letter is interesting insofar as it shows us the bishop’s 
fear of what he at that time knew was being prepared in his diocese: the armed uprising. 
This is a cry for help: 
  
[…] it is not surprising that the recent decades of our diocese have been permeated by a high level of 
conflict […] What prevents us, for example, from entering into dialogue for fresh initiatives by the ejidos 
unions […] Dialogue, which is a condition for fraternal relationships.444 
 
                                                
443 Le Bot 1997 
444 Womack, Jr. 2002. His translation 
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The bishop feared the consequences of the waging of war. He also feared the loss of 
influence on the part of the church. Earlier on the Catholic Church, the social organizations 
such as La Aric and CIOAC and EZLN had been seen as complimenting each other and the 
organizations and project had coincided and co-existed in relative harmony and at times 
cooperated. Now, the Zapatistas became so strong in the early 1990s that they now could 
manage on their own. 445Former activist and anthropologist Carmen Legorreta says she had 
to go back to Chiapan the countryside in 1992 after some years in the city to try to get the 
people not to join the Zapatista plans of war. According to Legorreta, her and other norteño 
activist’s work in the region in 1992 and 1993 led to Subcomandante Marcos wanting them 
dead – casting a death sentence on them.446 
The Catholic Church also broke relations with EZLN at roughly the same time – when 
bishop Ruiz realized that the Zapatistas were forming a guerrilla. “First, he fought the 
Zapatistas over the control in the region. Then, later, he fought to avoid the coming 
tragedy.”447 The joint work of the norteños and the bishop did weaken EZLN, who lost 
some power between 1992 and 1994. According to Tello Diaz, this led Marcos to demand 
that FLN backed his war plans earlier than what the central command wanted – he was 
afraid of losing even more people. At the time of the rebellion, EZLN had under their 
command – as soldiers and bases the apoyo – some 40 percent of the population in the 
regions where the guerrilla was present. Most of the base was made up by former (and 
actual) members of La Aric, but also close to every CIOAC member in Las Margaritas had 
joined in the same way as ejido Tabasco, as well as some stronghold around Ocosingo and 
the area around San Cristobal.448  
 
Signing NAFTA 
There were rumours in Chiapas about an armed rebellion at least from 1992, rumours that 
also reached the Mexican government.449 In may 1993, the Mexican army came across a 
Zapatista training field in Corralchén on a observation trip in the Lacandon jungle. This led 
to the first armed conflict between the guerrilla and the army, but the situation never really 
got much attention. It is natural to speculate, as does for instance Carlos Tello Diaz, that 
                                                
445 The good relationship with La Aric had already soured in 1988, over the votes in the election for governor 
in Chiapas, where the Zapatistas, as was to become their custom, told their members not to vote. La Aric and 
the diocese wanted people to vote against the PRI candidate, EZLN told them not to vote. (Legorreta 1998) 
446 Interview with informant 9 
447 Tello Diaz 2005, p 217 
448 Tello Diaz 2005, and de la Grange & Rico 2005 
449 de la Grange & Rico 2005, and Tello Diaz 2005 
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the Mexican government did not want attention drawn to insecurity in the country in the 
final phases of closing the NAFTA deal with the US and Canada. But president Salinas de 
Gortari did go on a trip to the Lacandon jungle to show government involvement in the 
region. He was received on September 6, 1993 by the indigenous peoples of the ejido 
Guadalupe Tepeyac450 – one of the strongholds and later showcase communities – of the 
Zapatistas some four months before the armed uprising against his government.451 
 
The take-over of Las Margaritas – January 1. 1994 
Subcomandante Marcos held a referendum in some carefully chosen Zapatista 
communities about the waging of war. The answer he received was convincing: The 
Zapatistas wanted wanted war.452 The most important leaders in ejido Tabasco claim that 
they were never asked, just told about this decision.453 Others claim that they took part in 
deciding both when and how war should be declared.454 
Whether the Tabasqueños actually took part in the violent take-over of the municipal 
capital of Las Margaritas, is even more unclear. My informants differ a lot on this. Some 
even claim that EZLN and the Zapatista project was introduced in 1994, after the armed 
rebellion. This is not true, and is probably just an intention of evading possible 
recuperation from the government for having been part of the Zapatista project even in its 
clandestine years.455 But Tabasqueño participation in the actual fighting, and the 
preparation for this, is still unclear. Eduardo Lopez Mendez and Augusto Lopez Mendez 
are reluctant to say much about this part of the ejido history.456 “It is not easy to talk about 
                                                
450 Guadalupe Tepeyac is situated at the end of the road from Las Margaritas to the Lacandon jungle that 
passes by ejido Tabasco. Guadalupe Tepeyac is located some 200 kilometres east of ejido Tabasco. 
451 In Tello Diaz. “You find yourself far away, he said, but not forgotten. We have developed, but we are not 
done yet. We should not and will not take it easy,” said the president upon landing in his helicopter. 
452 In Tello Diaz. Tello Diaz claims Marcos chose the communities most loyal to him, a version that is 
backed by the former subcomandante Daniel who left EZLN in 1993. (de la Grange & Rico 1999) 
453 Interviews with informants 2 and 16 
454 Interviews with informants 3.2 and 17. Most of my sources say no. ”We never had a vote over the war in 
ejido Tabasco, we were just told that EZLN was going to declare war on the government.” (Interview with 
informant 16). This also seem plausible, seeing as ejido Tabasco entered only in 1990, and thus was not one 
of the really trusted communities, such as more isolated communities in the Lacandon jungle. Marcos wanted 
this referendum over the war to prove to his compañeros in the FLN that war was necessary. (Tello Diaz 
2005, Legorreta 1998, and de la Grange & Rico 1999 and 2005). It is therefore likely that Marcos chose to let 
communities where he personally had contacts vote. Ejido Tabasco was formally answering to 
subcomandante Pedro, as we have seen. On the other hand: one informant told me that ejido Tabasco did vote 
over whether to go to war or not. “In 1992, we voted in assembly. And we decided that yes, we had to do it.” 
(Interview with informant 17) 
455 How do I know this is not true? The source behind this information gave at least three different versions of 
the story of the encounter between EZLN and ejido Tabasco. All other sources, both informants inside and 
outside of ejido Tabasco, as well as sources on other communities in the region, makes it plausible to date the 
full ejidal entry in EZLN to 1990 or 1991. (Interviews with informants 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 9, and Estrada 
Saavedra 2006 b) 
456 They talk about the security situation and the dangers of government re-involvement in Chiapas. 
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this. You know, this is… dangerous material”, they say when asked about the storing of 
weapons in ejido Tabasco. Of the participation in the war actions, they say: 
 
At this point, no, we did not participate. Because of lack of preparation. But later, we had people going up 
to the mountains to prepare and practice the use of weapons. And then we participated in the big meeting in 
the headquarters.457 
 
This version coincides with what Estrada Saavedra writes about neighbouring ejido 
Buena Vista Pachan, and it is absolutely possible that they are telling the truth. 
But I also have sources claiming that Tabasqueños participated in the attacks on the first 
day of 1994. I have little to back these claims other than what seems to be the accuracy of 
the account when comparing it to other sources.458 
 
I was there, we took off for Las Margaritas as soon as it got dark. I was bringing the troops, as a driver. No 
women from ejido Tabasco participated, but I believe that some 97 men were milicianos at the time. And 
they all took part in the take-over of Las Margaritas.459 Those were the orders we received.460 
 
War 
At the same time as the Zapatistas were preparing to take Las Margaritas under the 
command of Subcomandante Pedro, other divisions got ready to take the former Chiapan 
capital of San Cristobal de Las Casas, as well as the towns of Ocosingo, Altamirano and 
Chanal. Subcomandante Marcos had the overall command.461 
The Zapatistas attacked in the first hours of the new year. They succeeded in taking all of 
the above mentioned, but met heavy resistance in Ocosingo. In San Cristobal, arguably the 
most spectacular military goal of the night, the Subcomandante himself was present 
throughout large portions of the following day, giving interviews and talking to scared and 
frustrated – and curious – tourists in the main square of the colonial city.462 It was here that 
                                                
457 Interview with informant 16. The big meeting they talk about is the organization of the Congreso Nacional 
Democratica – the National Democratic Congress, organized in Guadalupe Tepeyac in summer of 1994. 
458 Like Imas 2004, and Tello Diaz 2005. The source I quote on this, was 16 years old in 1994. He claims to 
have become a miliciano in 1993, at the age of 15. All of this seems plausible. (Interview with informant  
17). In theory, only insurgentes would have participated in the offensive military actions of EZLN. But it is 
proven that many of the soldiers were poorly equipped and ill prepared (Tello Diaz 2005, Legorreta 1998, 
videos showing wooden sticks where one would suppose that the rifle should be placed on the shoulder (In 
La Jornada & Canalseisdejulio 2003)). All of this added together makes it possible that this account is true.  
Countering that position, it would be possible to claim that the informant, as a social leader (he responsible 
for a CIOAC affiliated organization in ejido Tabasco) and thus travelling the region a lot, may have heard the 
stories of this day told, and thus is able to recreate it without having ever been present. I choose to believe 
him, though, without claiming that this is necessarily how it happened down to the least detail. 
459 That there supposedly were almost 100 men from Tabasco seems unlikely. The total Zapatista army 
marching on Las Margaritas is believed to have consisted of some 600 men (in Tello Diaz 2005). That 
number (97 milicianos) seems to be more in accordance with the total number of milicianos in ejido Tabasco.  
460 Interview with informant 17 
461 Tello Diaz has a good account of this. (Tello Diaz 2005) 
462 Already on this first day as a world-known revolutionary, Marcos started to build his image of a poetic 
revolutionary with humour. One of the most famous accounts from San Cristobal of that day has it that 
Marcos, after getting tired of telling tourists that they were not in danger and that they could go see the tourist 
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the Declaracion de la Selva Lacandona – the Declaration from the Lacandon Jungle – 
caught the world’s attention: 
 
We are the product of 500 years of struggle (…) But today we say Basta! – Enough!, we are the inheritors 
of the true creators of our nationality, we, the dispossessed, are millions and we call on our brothers to join 
our call as the only way to not die of hunger in the face of the insatiable ambition of a more than 70 years 
old dictatorship lead by a click of traitors who represent the most conservative and patria-selling groups.463 
 
The plan was to take the Mexican government and armed forces by surprise. The 
Zapatistas succeeded in this. Mexico was preparing for a new life as a first world country, 
with NAFTA going into function the very morning the Zapatistas attacked.464 In Las 
Margaritas, the municipal president and the city elites were holding a dance in local dance 
hall. The Zapatistas, masked with ski hoods, went looking for him – they wanted revenge 
for what they felt had been years of unfair repression. 
 
We were looking for the [municipal] president and his team of pistoleros. We found them in this dance 
hall, I was still in the car. We dragged the pistoleros out, and many of them were killed, just like that. Not 
the president, though. We did not want to kill him.465 
 
The take-over of Las Margaritas was a success – the local police was taken by surprise 
and the city was taken. The plan was to reach and take Comitan 18 kilometres south-west. 
But then subcomandante Pedro was killed by an unidentified individual during a stroll 
through the park, just before take off to Comitan.466 “We heard over the radio that Pedro 
was killed. So we had to go back, not to Comitan. We were ordered to go all the way to 
Guadelupe Tepeyac, to the central command.”467 
Ads Carlos Tello Diaz: “They did not even have time to burn down the municipal 
palace.468 According to the Zapatistas themselves, they lost three men in Las Margaritas, 
including subcomandante Pedro. Two milicianos were captured alive by the army – who 
regained control when the Zapatistas fled the town – a few days after the fight. The two 
men – Eduardo Gómez Hernández and Jorge Mariano Solís López – were tortured and then 
killed, according to EZLN. They were found with their tongues and ears cut off.469 Nobody 
from ejido Tabasco lost their lives in the fighting. 
                                                                                                                                              
sights in short time, said to a European group of tourists: “I am sorry for the inconvenience, but after all; this 
is a Revolution.” (Tello Diaz 2005) 
463 EZLN 2003 
464 In Garcia de Leon 2003 
465 Interview with informant 17 
466 Tello Diaz 2005 
467 Interview with informant 17 
468 In Tello Diaz 2005, p 248 
469 EZLN 2004 
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In Declaracion de la Selva Lacandona, the Zapatistas tell the world of an ambitious plan 
– more in accordance with the FLN original game plan than with the impression people, 
even scholars, have today of the movement that rebelled in 1994: “(We are going to) 
advance towards the capital of the country, beating the federal Mexican army.”470 This did 
not, as is well known, happen. 
Except for the above mentioned take-over of Chiapan cities, the military actions of 
EZLN and the FLN were not very successful. An attempt of taking the military base 
Rancho Nuevo on the highway between Comitan and San Cristobal was futile, and caused 
many Zapatista casualties. Comitan was never reached. On other fronts, the result was even 
worse. In the central parts of Mexico, some electric towers of the Comision Federal de 
Electricidad did not fall as planned on January 1, but rather one week later. In the north, 
nothing happened.471 
This does not, however, mean that the Zapatistas achieved little or nothing by rising up 
against the government. It meant that their fight was to not be a predominantly military one 
from now on. After less than two weeks of fighting, president Carlos Salinas de Gortari 
called an end to fighting in Chiapas. At this time, demonstrations in Mexico City were 
massive – and not in favour of the armed response from the government. The pressure on 
the president and the whole PRI system was heavy. Civil society had awoken, as we 
discussed briefly in the opening pages of this chapter. The man who just two weeks earlier 
had been seen as the saviour of Mexico, saw his presidential power being threatened by the 
relatively small indigenous uprising in the southernmost outskirt of the country. 
Peace talks were initiated. Official sources say that 19 soldiers, 24 policemen and some 
150 guerrilleros had died – but these numbers are disputed as too low by most. The number 
of civilian deaths are unknown.472 “We were sent home from the headquarter to our 
communities to protect them from the army”, says one informant.473 Even though war was 
to end in a few days, the milicianos would still be needed. 
 
Winning the struggle for lands 
Between 1994 and 1997, rural Chiapas saw the amount of land occupations in hitherto 
unknown quantity. During this three year period, 1714 properties were occupied – and 
recuperated, in the lingo of the Zapatistas and the indigenous population. But not all of 
                                                
470 EZLN 2003 
471 Tello Diaz 2005 
472 Op.cit. 
473 Interview with informant 17 
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these occupations were done bye Zapatistas. Daniel Villafuerte et al estimate that the 
Zapatistas occupied some 60.000 hectares, of a state total of some 148.000 in the three year 
period of 1994-1997.474  
The Tabasqueños stood for their share of occupations. As we have seen, the attempts of 
applying for more land through La reforma agraria had been futile since 1968. Thus, the 
Tabasqueños occupied the same lands they had been thrown out of during the CIOAC 
occupation (pages 87-88). This time they held on to it. Martin Mendez Lopez, himself one 
of the people participating in the occupation, gives this account: “The Zapatistas came to 
the Casa grande to look for the finquero, to throw the finquero out. But he had already left 
at that time. He never came back.”475 Anthropologist Shannan L. Mattiace visited ejido 
Tabasco two years after the Zapatista uprising, and spoke to two unnamed catequistas in 
the community about the land takeover. The two men say that 
 
Within a few days of the uprising, we saw that there was a little more respect. Even though the government 
put some pressure on us, it saw that there was another army here and they [the government] had to be 
careful. The government saw that it wasn’t convenient to run the Indians off the land we had occupied. It 
was as if the Zapatista force were protecting us. The people here began to feel very strong because another 
organization – an armed one – existed. And besides that, those who worked with a social organization, like 
the CIOAC – organizations that weren’t official [governmental] but were with the opposition – began to 
feel strong.476 
 
Mattiace claims the Tabasqueños recuperated the land on October 3, 1994. My sources 
say it happened earlier, but as there are no written sources on this, I will not argue with her. 
She also includes the interesting information that the Tabasqueños approached landowner 
Efren Bañuelos Rios, asking him to sell the land. The Bañuelos said no.477 The Bañuelo’s 
version of the story of the occupation is a little more dramatic than Martin Mendez Lopez’ 
account above: 
 
According to the Bañuelos version of the story, intruders broke down the doors at La Floresta. The 
“intruders” were former workers of theirs from the ejido Tabasco, plus others from surrounding 
communities – three hundred in all. Those who were at the farm (Efren and [his wife] Maria de Socorro 
were not present) were taken hostage at gunpoint and later released.478 
 
Through these occupations, ejido Tabasco more than doubled its territory. It would take 
more than ten years before they formally were granted the right to the newfound land – in 
                                                
474 Villafuerte et al 1999, p 131. It should be mentioned that many small land owners, even indigenous, lost 
their land. Both Zapatistas and others could use the rebellion and the land recuperation as an excuse to 
expand on behalf of neighbours and old enemies.  
475 Interview with informant 3.2 
476 Interview with ”Jose and Alberto Hernandez”, in Mattiace 2003 
477 Mattiace 2003, p 52 
478 Op.cit. 
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the case of Emiliano Zapata, the remaining Zapatista community that originated in ejido 
Tabasco, nothing has been resolved to this day.479 
The price for winning the 70 year long struggle for the land was high. Landowner Efren 
Bañuelos would not stand by and watch his land be taken from him. He claimed to have 
lost 3 million pesos when he land was occupied.480 He also claimed to have lost 482 heads 
of cattle, though 42 were later recuperated.481 Bañuelos left Chiapas, but reported to the 
police that 94 male members of ejido Tabasco had stolen his land and cattle. According to 
the Tabasqueños, two of them were taken prisoners because of this report. Because of the 
work of CIOAC, they were released after only a short time, but the apprehension orders 
were still active.482 Thus, in October 1996, almost three years after the land occupation, 
one Crecencio Lopez Ruiz was taken by the police and brought to Las Margaritas. The 
Tabasqueños, at this point used to dealing with NGOs and human right organizations, send 
a letter to the human rights organizations Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos and 
the Comisión Internacional de Derechos Humanos Fray Bartolomé de las Casas 
complaining that the police had taken Lopez Ruiz as well as having been asking around for 
other social leaders, probably in order to take them away as well. The letter is dated 
October 21, 1996: 
 
We hereby inform you of a problem that took place Sunday October 20 this year, when the police brought 
Señor Crecencio Lopez Ruiz, from ejido Tabasco, to prison following the orders given by land owner Don 
Efren Banuelos Rios […] The man in question did nothing wrong, and he may stand the danger of giving a 
wrong statement because he does not speak Spanish.483 
 
I have not been granted access by the organizations who received this letter to check their 
archives for the follow up of this situation. The Tabasqueños say he was released after a 
short time.484 What this incident tells us is interesting. It is an example of what is described 
as the low intensity war that the government waged on the Zapatistas after the president 
ceased all major military operations on January 12, 1994. There are numerous accounts of 
such incidents taking place all over the conflict zone. Even though major military actions 
were calmed, the amount of military forces in Chiapas from 1994 gives a clear indication 
                                                
479 The Zapatista take pride in not dealing with the government at any level, as we will see. Thus, getting the 
land annexion formally accepted is not in their interest. As for Medellin del Carmen and Tabasco 2000, they 
formally have the right to their lands at this point.  
480 In 1994, 3 pesos would be 1 dollar. 
481 Mattiace 2003 
482 Interview with informant 2. As mentioned, I have not been given permission by the police in Las 
Margaritas to check this for my self, but I see little reason to doubt the account. 
483 Letter from ejido Tabasco to human rights organization, dated October 21, 1996 
484 Interview with informant 2. The orders of apprehension still stand, as far as I understand. The Zapatistas 
and human rights organizations claim that the peace agreements would imply that all denouncements after the 
armed conflict should be dropped because of the general amnesty that was granted to everyone involved. 
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of this: some 60.000 soldiers was stationed in Chiapas in the mid-1990s.485 As for ejido 
Tabasco and the other communities in la Cañada de Soledad, this was felt even stronger 
than in most places. In the nearby old finca El Momon, the army installed one of its 
outfits.486 The effect of this would be dramatic.487 
 
Suspending the peace agreement 
On a live TV broadcast from the Palacio Nacional on February 9, 1995, newly elected 
president Enesto Cedillo told the nation that the leaders of EZLN were to be apprehended. 
The president named, for all the country to hear, who all the big leaders of EZLN – hiding 
behind nombres de Guerra and ski hoods – were in real life. Most dramatic was the 
sequence where Cedillo unmasked Subcomandante Marcos, and told everyone that the real 
name of this now so famous warrior was Sebastián Rafael Guillen Vicente, a university 
professor who had been missing since the mid-1980s. War was on again in Chiapas, and 
the Zapatista leaders had to run. But not for long – even this time Civil Society told the PRI 
party system that they would not accept the killing of Mexicans. In a demonstration in 
Mexico City, people wore masks and ski hoods, and the message was: Todos somos 
Marcos – We are all Marcos! The armed action was cancelled after a month. None of the 
EZLN leaders were captured.488 
For ejido Tabasco, this meant new strains on life. During this period, the army entered 
the community on two occasions, looking for identified people who they knew had 
participated in the Zapatista project. Eduardo Lopez Mendez and Augusto Lopez Mendez 
were among those who had to run when the army came: 
 
Some 200 elements from the army entered the ejido, they were looking for specific people who they 
already had identified. In [neighbouring ejido Buena Vista] Pachan, they were able to take with them some 
people, but not here.489 
 
The reason the army got nowhere in ejido Tabasco were the women. They would not let 
the army get away with two male Tabasqueños they had beaten up and were ready to take 
                                                
485 van der Haar 2005 
486 Estrada Saavedra 2006 b 
487 The official strategy of the government was that the army should "reach and maintain peace". According 
to journalist Carlos Marin the real goal was to  "destroy EZLN's will to fight". This would be done by 
isolating the insurgents from the civil population, hoping the latter would help the army. The tactical 
objective was to “destroy and/or de-organize the political-military structure of EZLN. (Proceso 1998) 
488 In La Jornada & Canalseisdejulio 2003. The low intensity war went on, with fatal consequences. One of 
the most dramatic episodes, and the most tragic, is the one known as the massacre of Acteal. On December 
22, 1997, a group of paramilitaries assassinated 45 people, women, children and men, hiding in Acteal, 
Chenalho, Chiapas. In the words of Gemma van der Haar, this happened “practically under the orders of the 
police forces”. (van der Haar 2005) 
489 Interview with informant 16 
 112
with them. The Tabasqueñas surrounded the soldiers, and kept moving in closer and closer, 
yelling at the top of their heads. Both times the army entered the ejido, this happened.490 
The man ran away, and the women ran the army away. But this laid, of course, restraints 
on the movement of the Tabasqueños. They could not risk being stopped in a road block, 
and they had to watch out for the army even when working their milpas. Even though 
peace was declared shortly, army pressure was an ever-present inconvenience in every day 
life in ejido Tabasco and the whole of Chiapas. Road blocks were found everywhere.491 
 
Internal division 
Even more serious for the welfare in ejido Tabasco than the (mainly low intensity) warfare, 
is this account by Eduardo Lopez Mendez: “When the army came here, many of the people 
in Tabasco 2000 – still living here [in the original ejido Tabasco at that point] – told the 
army who we were and where to find us. It was really ugly.”492 
Internal division had become a problem in the community. The same happened in many 
Zapatista communities. In ejido Tabasco, the division even led to armed fights, though not 
lives lost. The shooting of firearms mostly happened at night, after hours of drinking.493 
Why the divisions appeared is not an easy question to answer. I may suggest that fighting 
over who would get the best new land acquired after the uprising would be one reason. 
Another one may be found in the collective joining of the Zapatista project. As we have 
seen, the assemblies are run by the social leaders. The pressure is heavy on those who 
oppose the majority. Another reason to this division may have been the army’s presence, 
and maybe just as important: government pressure – both negative and positive. The 
government, upon seeing the military option as less fruitful, started investing more money 
in Chiapas than ever before. They tried to regulate the formally illegal land occupations by 
buying the land from the finqueros and give it to the indigenous communities that claimed 
                                                
490 ”The army came here, they kept pressuring us. They beat up two compañeros, and would have taken them 
with them. But the women got them out, they surrounded them  and screamed and threatened. This happened 
twice. In 1995.” (Interview with informant 3.2) 
491 Even in 2007, I was stopped by the police and had to show ID almost every day when travelling on the 
roads of Chiapas. 
492 Interview with informant 16 
493 Padre Ramon Castillo says of this incident that it seemed like fireworks where thrown from one part of the 
ejido to another because the bullets flew high in the air. (Interview with informant 7). Eduardo Lopez 
Mendez and Augusto Mendez Lopez say that they could not follow the same trail twice when leaving the 
community because they would risk being found and shot by their fellow Tabasqueños. (Interview with 
informant 16) 
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the right to the land.494 Of equal importance were the investments in infrastructure. 
Anthropologist Shannan L. Mattiace notes when visiting ejido Tabasco in 1995:  
 
The only government presence we saw was a primary school where classes were taught sporadically. With 
the help of the diocese of San Cristobal, the community built and staffed a rudimentary health clinic that 
serves Tabasco’s 450 inhabitants […] The village lacks a sewage system, and people bathe in a nearby 
river.495 
 
This description is not really different from the one quoted in chapter 4, from 1988. It 
could have applied to the 1960s as well, except for the clinic.496 It is telling, then, that the 
road from Las Margaritas has been paved only after the Zapatista uprising, and that ejido 
Tabasco got electricity in the late 1990s.  
And then there were the social programs. The Zapatistas are not allowed to receive 
anything from the government.497 Therefore, upon seeing a neighbouring community 
receive money from the Procampo social aid program, it takes a strong conviction not to 
cave in. “It is really tough when you cannot receive your Procampo. The people need it”, 
as Caralampio Cruz Cruz says.498 The desire to receive government aid, it seems, is partly 
what happened when the first group of Tabasqueños wanted out of EZLN. “Tabasco 2000 
could not cope with the orders. It was like a first step. Some errors were made by some 
people in the ejido. Like in 1995. They were told to comply or leave. They had to leave.”499 
This quote also says a lot about the EZLN chain of command.500 Orders were given, and 
the community would have to comply. Together with the frustration over not getting the 
little money they would have receive if ejido Tabasco were not a Zapatista community, the 
strains of communal farming and of maintaining an army (the Zapatistas never laid down 
their weapons – not till this day), this worked together to pull the Tabasqueños towards 
leaving EZLN. Also, the fact that new lands has been won and that people now treated the 
                                                
494 The reform of article 27 in the constitution in 1992 had officially ended repartion of ejido land that was 
undertaken by the Cardenista reform. To be able to resolve the issues created by the land occupations in 
1994, the government had to buy and sell the land. 
495 Mattiace 2003 
496 This clinic was a result of the time spent with the Zapatistas, not due some effort by the diocese. It was 
gone when I was in ejido Tabasco. (Fieldwork in ejido Tabasco, May/June 2006) At the time of Mattiace’s 
visit, ejido Tabasco were still part of EZLN. It does not seem, from her account, that she is aware of this. She 
introduces the two (not named, thus protecting the identity is not the case here) catequistas she interviews as 
local leaders of Tierra y Libertad, and ejido Tabasco as member of the same organization, ”a member union 
of the CIOAC-Comitan”. (Mattiace 2003) 
497 There are claims that the government paid for the Congreso Nacional Democratico in Guadalupe Tepeyac 
in the summer of 1994. I will not dispute that, but this is beside the point in this context. The communities 
cannot receive governmental aid, and if they wish to do so, they have to leave EZLN. (For the first claim, see 
Krøvel 2006. For more on the refusal of accepting governmental aid, see Estrada Saavedra 2005) 
498 Interview with informant 2 
499 Interview with informant 16 
500 For a chart of the organization structure of EZLN, see Figure 7.1 
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indigenous with a newfound respect, and that not very much else seemed to be happening 
in the political project of EZLN, made the thought of leaving the movement seem 
attractive. Most arguments for leaving I heard are of economic nature, as well as those of 
the difficulties of “living in resistance”.501 
But does that explain the internal divisions? To some degree, it does. Frustrations over 
seeing that others are not so dedicated in a project that is first and foremost a collective one 
may lead to trouble – for both parties. Being subdued to a political structure that is far 
away, but, as opposed to the governmental structures, still so very close and always 
present, may also be part of the explanation.502 And in the case of ejido Tabasco and la 
Cañada de Soledad one should not underestimate the frustrations over communal farming, 
which never was a traditional feature in this region.503 And then, of course, when one 
group leaves, the void starts getting bigger. When Tabasco 2000 was created – it is located 
between the road and the original ejido Tabasco – they joined the governmental PRI party 
for a while – the traditional enemies of both EZLN and CIOAC.504 That new structures 
were created – and thus the need for social leaders expanded – may also have something to 
do with the division. It seems to be typical of ex-zapatista communities that many 
different, competing organizations have emerged – even though all of them belong to the 
CIOAC organizational umbrella in this region of Chiapas. 
All this led to an internal division where families could be on different sides and where 
your former friends became enemies. Fighting over land between those who left EZLN and 
those who remained was common.505 The situation in Tojolabal Chiapas in the late 1990s 
is best described by Marco Estrada Saavedra. He talks of the small, internal hells in each 
community due to division.506 
 
Quick change – but not quick enough? 
EZLN altered life in the communities in a profound way. New functions were created, 
young people could reach power without going through the traditional gates, and the 
women were given rights they had never known before. And this happened fast. Ejido 
                                                
501 Interview with informant 2, and field observations in ejido Tabasco, May & June 2007. 
502 ”The Zapatista command is in the Lacandon jungle. That is really far from ejido Tabasco.“ (Interview 
with informant 17) 
503 ”We decided that communal farming is not for us.” (Interview with informant 2) 
504 Interview with informant 3.2. Tabasco 2000 is a member of CIOAC today. 
505 This also happened in ejido Tabasco, but not unntill some years into the new millenium. ”It came to be 
ugly between those from Tierra y Libertad, or Medellin del Carmen today, and the rest. So the Zapatistas 
came, armed, and said: You get nothing, it should all go to Emiliano Zapata. In the end, we resolved it. We 
got to keep 146 hectares, they got more.” (Interview with informant 3.2) 
506 Estrada Saavedra 2006 b 
 115 
Tabasco joined EZLN as base de apoyo – support base – in 1990. In a few years, the 
Tabasqueños had to adapt to internal change, to answer to an outside command, they had 
fought the government, had gotten used to foreigners wanting to talk to them. The 
Zapatista project had given the Tojolabales a new place in the regional and national 
context. And all this in less than ten years. 
But not even the pace with which change had taken place was enough: 
 
We saw that what we needed the most was land, good schools. The government was listening to us now, 
and gave us light, better roads… And EZLN receives nothing from the government. The autonomous 
schools are really bad. It just was not what we needed. They just pick one person to be teacher. It is not 
good enough.507 
 
Artemio Cruz Mendez touches on two important aspects in the quote above: That land 
was most important, and that the quantity of land needed for the whole community was 
now acquired. Now governmental aid to be able to work the land was desired. The other 
aspect is that of the bantustanification of the Zapatista project. The autonomous schools 
were bad, at least in this initial period. They are not recognized by the national 
government, which means that schooling beyond secondary school is not within the reach 
of Zapatista children.508 Not that anyone from ejido Tabasco had gone beyond that level 
before, nor was the public school much better – before the Zapatista uprising. After 1994, 
the Zapatistas had to compete with a government who proved willing to invest. And thus 
they would loose communities such as ejido Tabasco – in the periphery of the Zapatista 
heartland, and close enough to the municipal centres so that the governmental influence 
could easily reach the community. Another example of this: In 1998, ejido Tabasco got 
electricity.509 That same year, coincidently but tellingly enough, the community left the 
Zapatista project. 
 
Leaving Zapatismo – and still fighting? 
The Tabasqueños actually were thrown out of EZLN. The reasons behind this decision are 
somewhat covered in personal grudge and bitterness, but this seems to be what happened: 
One of the social leaders – a catequista and a Tierra y Libertad veteran – made an 
agreement with the political leftist party PT (the Workers party) that he would get the 
whole Cañada de Soledad to vote for the party.510 What he was promised in return, I have 
not been able to figure out. Upon hearing of this, the Zapatista central command demanded 
                                                
507 Interview with informant 5 
508 Gutiérrez Narváez 2005 
509 Interview with informant 5 
510 Most communities vote collectively in Chiapas. Thus all votes in one ejido go to the same political party. 
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an explanation – the Zapatistas do not vote in national or regional elections. Exactly what 
happened next is unclear – some claim EZLN accepted that everyone should vote for PT 
but then had a change of heart over night, others claim they refused all along, but towards 
the end of the affair, the Tabasqueños were presented with the following: Either you leave 
your political ambitions and get out of CIOAC and Tierra y Libertad, or we kick you out. 
This does not seem to have been the intention of the Tabasqueños, as this account from 
Caralampio Cruz Cruz indicates: 
 
We had to choose between them. We met at la Casa grande, to assembly. We analyzed the situation, and 
found that the EZLN fight was new to us. Tierra y Libertad was created by us. So we… We wanted to keep 
on with EZ, but we had to choose. So we had to leave.511 
 
And that was it. In the neighbouring communities, the majority of the ejiditarios had left 
EZLN prior to 1998, ejido Tabasco was among the last ones in this region to leave. The 
strains of life in resistance, governmental cooptation, competing social projects, social 
leaders trying to find a way to get personal benefits, the dogmatic Zapatista leadership 
refusing any contact with the government – the reasons may be many. But after eight years 
of Zapatismo, ejido Tabasco decided that enough is enough. They went on to – in their 
own words – continue the fight through CIOAC. 
And it may just be as easy as that. There is little doubt that the Zapatista uprising was the 
most famous, radical and maybe even infamous single event in Tojolabal Chiapas in the 
20th century. Nor does it seem illogical to believe what Tojolabal cultural activist Rosalia 
Jimenez says: 
 
Because of EZLN we have pride, dignity. Our blood had to be shed so that we could win our pride back, so 
that the nation would listen to us and the politicians would pay attention to our demands. EZLN meant 
everything to us, and I am afraid we will lose all this because people forget.512 
 
The quote indicates disappointment with those who have left the Zapatista struggle, those 
who no longer opt for the armed struggle. 
But leaving EZLN does not necessarily mean leaving the struggle behind. We have seen 
in this thesis how the Tabasqueños were struggling for lands and for a place in the Mexican 
national project – for emancipation. This process started with the Cardenista reforms in the 
1930s, reforms that were never brought to their full potential. Thus, something had to fill 
the void. Through different organizations, mutual struggle and hard work, the Tabasqueños 
has come a long way in the 70 year period covered in this thesis. Maybe the Tabasqueños 
                                                
511 Interview with informant 2 
512 Interview with informant 11 
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no longer needed EZLN to get what they had been fighting for throughout the history of 
the community. They got their land, better communication, electricity and respect. They 
became part of the national project of Mexico. EZLN made the wheels move a lot faster 
than the other projects described in this thesis – but they were trying to move the same 
wheels as the others. The degree of success can be discussed, but that is not the topic of 
this thesis. I have tried to show how the Zapatista movement was a continuation of a long 
process of struggle for land and emancipation. With ejido Tabasco (for the most part) 
leaving EZLN, the struggle may take on yet another form. As Caralampio Cruz Cruz, 
social leader and an important actor for change in ejido Tabasco since the 1970s, puts it: 
 
Here we are today. And we have gotten here thanks to the fight of CIOAC and PRD, and the fight of 
EZLN. Together. And thanks to Union Lucha Campesina, where many ideas were born. Now nobody can 
fool or cheat us. Cause now we know. And thanks to La Castalia, the classes there. Where we opened our 
eyes.513 
 
                                                
513 Interview with informant 2 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
My thesis, described in chapter 1, was that EZLN must be understood within a context of 
indigenous struggle for land and emancipation in Mexico. I have claimed that the Zapatista 
uprising is only one of many events in a historical process of this struggle. 
 
The chronology  
To prove this thesis, I have shown how indigenous life in Chiapas was altered by the 
Cardenista reforms in the 1930s. I claim that this alteration is the first outside actor that 
changed life in ejido Tabasco. These reforms, discussed in chapter 4, gave the right of 
property to the indigenous, and attached the former villains of the fincas to the national 
project of Mexico. This meant a qualitative change from the way of life described in 
chapter 3 – that of the finca. When “thrown into” the modern world, the indigenous 
peoples of Chiapas looked for ways to emancipate themselves in the new order. In this 
struggle, the indigenous found that their needs coincided with those of different 
representatives of the outside world, of modern, Hispanic Mexico. Knut Kjeldstadli argues 
that, in this transition from the traditional to the modern – or the known to the unknown – 
social, collective movements may play important parts. When tradition can no longer 
explain the very being, it enters into crisis, and social movements and political 
organisations may fill the void.514 This tendency was strengthened in indigenous Chiapas 
when the Cardenista reforms came to a halt in the following decades. The void came to be 
filled by the Catholic Church and liberation theory as well as of the deepening of the 
political structures and significance of the ejido, as we have seen in chapter 4 and 5. 
The encounter between church – the sencond outside actor to generate change in ejido 
Tabasco – and the indigenous was fruitful for both parties. The needs of the ejidal 
communities fitted with the project taken on by the diocese of San Cristobal. As a 
newfound belief in their skills and abilities to find and define space within the Chiapan and 
national context was awoken, the indigenous peoples deepened their social and political 
project through the cooperation with the norteño activists that came to Chiapas in the 
1970s. These activists are the third outsiders to make an impact in indigenous Chiapas and 
eijdo Tabasco. This process, discussed in chapter 6, was a result – and the continuation – of 
the encounter between church and community described in the previous chapter. We have 
seen how this indigenous struggle was of a material nature – such as fighting for more land 
                                                
514 Kjeldstadli 1995 
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and better communications – as well as of a cultural one. The indigenous peoples and the 
outsiders – in this case both church and norteño activists – found some common ground for 
their projects.515  
The fourth and last project in the historical process discussed in this thesis is EZLN. This 
movement found in Chiapas radicalized indigenous peoples, who after years of fighting 
were ready for ever more drastic measures. As in the other processes described in this 
thesis, this encounter between outsiders and the native peoples coincided with the needs of 
both subjects. And, also in the other processes described, the latest project was a 
continuation by the former ones – with the subjects from these still present and active.  
This perspective of continuity means that the organizational structure of EZLN was not 
something radically different or new to the Chiapan communities. This tells us that looking 
for answers about the Zapatista movement in the movement itself, without taking into 
consideration the historical circumstances, is problematic. EZLN saw the light of day as 
one circumstance in a longer series of historical happenings. In the words of Eduardo 
Lopez Mendez in ejido Tabasco: “When word of this reached the people, who were now 
used to organization, they liked it very much. They saw it was part of our struggle.”516 
 
Social movements cast light on Chiapas  
But this only explains my thesis halfway. Another important aspect is that of EZLN as a 
social movement. When I discuss the origin of EZLN in FLN, I do not mean to imply that 
EZLN can be studied solely as a social movement in its own right within the historical 
frame I have chosen. This discussion is rather included as a comment on the discussion on 
literature.517 I will comment on that later on in this conclusion. I rather want to stress the 
historical roots of the movement. The Hispanic leadership of EZLN would not have been 
able to take armed action without the indigenous base. And this base, joining EZLN as 
active subjects, had been struggling for their rights and desires for more than 50 years 
before the armed uprising in 1994. Looking at EZLN as a social movement in a historical 
perspective offers one clear advantage, based on the following chain of argument: Things 
had not gotten that much – if at all – worse in Chiapas in the 1980s and -90s that this alone 
                                                
515 Albeit fighting over who would be in charge of the developments. We saw an example of this when the 
Catholic Church expelled the norteños in the late 1970s, and in how the indigenous peoples were constantly 
looking for new ways to gain ground, both literarily and more abstractly speaking. 
516 Interview with informant 16 
517 Nor am I including that section because I believe that the facts mentioned above the origins of EZLN are 
new. They serve a purpose in explaining why this thesis has become as it is, a result of constant discussion 
about the existing literature. 
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can explain the emergence of a radical, armed organization.518 By looking at the social 
organization in Chiapas in a longer perspective, the creation of such an organization 
because easier to understand. My claim was: The process that resulted in EZLN started 
with the Cardenista reforms. This becomes plausible when introducing Sidney Tarrow’s 
theory of the origin of social movements in situations of what we may call “contained 
freedom”. Tarrow says that the creation of social movements is more likely to happen in a 
situation between full oppression and outside control, and full opening and access to the 
political system.519 The Cardenista reforms ended villainage for the indigenous peoples in 
Chiapas. But the reforms were never really seen through, and were actually abandoned in 
the following decades. This left the indigenous peoples with an opening, a space within 
which they could exist. But they were never really included in the national project, and 
racism and structures still kept them down. Thus, the Chiapan situation fits Tarrow’s 
theory.520 This is also in accordance with Eric Wolf’s claim that peasant rebellion takes 
place when the peasants no longer rely on the traditional institutions and alternative 
institutions offer no alternative.521 
Such an analysis has implications for the framing of the movement we have seen develop 
and adapt throughout this thesis. Is the Zapatista movement then a peasant movement? I 
would argue that seeing the indigenous peoples as the agents of change in the historical 
perspective of this thesis leads to such a conclusion. We have seen how peasant grievances, 
according to Eric Wolf, often need to be given shape and expression in organization before 
entering the political stage.522 We also have seen how Wolf claims that the transition to 
capitalism – modernization, as through the Cardenista reforms – is the most radical phase 
in peasant evolution in the 20th century.523 All this fits the historical perspective used here, 
and strengthens my original thesis. Thus, we have seen the inner logics of a peasant 
movement evolve into the radical stage of rebellion in this thesis.  
This does not mean that other models of emergence of social movements do not apply. 
Seeing EZLN as the (thus far) last phase in this long term historical struggle for land and 
emancipation does not exclude trying to explain, still historically and in the context of 
                                                
518 At the time of the uprising in 1994, more than 50% of the land in Chiapas was on ejidal or communal 
hands, some 25% consisted of private property. (Villafuerte et al 1999, p 123). Granted: State repression 
under the reign of Absalon Castellanos was vile. But I do not see how this alone could explain an armed 
rebellion. 
519 Tarrow 1998 
520 Op.cit. 
521 Wolf 1969, p xix 
522 Op.cit., p xvii 
523 Op.cit., pp 278-285 
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social movements, how an armed uprising came to happen at the time it occurred. We have 
seen, in chapter 2, how the degree of opening in the political system; the stability in the 
power balance of the ruling elites; and the means available to the government and its 
possibilities to use these may be of importance for analysing the structure of possibilities 
for the emergence of social movements.524 The structures of official Mexico were falling 
apart in the 1980s: There was the debt crisis of 1982; the social awakening in the aftermath 
of the 1985 earthquake in Mexico City; the protests against the 1988 election when official 
party almost lost power over the national government. This breach in the elites – where all 
of a sudden different parties were fighting over governmental power – was strengthen by 
the radicalization of parts of the Catholic Church. Liberation theology was not new in the 
1980s, as we have seen, but with weaker institutions all around, this division became even 
more evident.525 
And then there was the struggle over hegemony, as defined by Antonio Gramsci and 
discussed in chapter 2 of this thesis. The last remains of the politics of the Mexican 
revolution were abandoned with the change of article 27 of the constitution and thus of the 
redistribution of land through the ejidos. This happened at a time (in 1992) when it seemed 
the PRI party had overcome much of the resistance, and optimism was the order of the day 
(see chapter 7). The PRI party still used the image of Emiliano Zapata to legitimize their 
power as the institutionalized revolution at that time. The president’s son was name 
Emiliano; the government airplane was called Emiliano Zapata; and official speeches were 
given in front of a mural painting of the revolutionary hero. EZLN took the name back on 
behalf of the popular struggle against the power. 526 When this project was legitimized by 
the Mexican people – who in support for peace in Chiapas yelled Zapata vive, la lucha 
sigue in the streets of Mexico City - this won the Zapatistas an important fight over 
symbols. The came to be seen as true heirs of the revolutionary heroes of the early 20th 
century.527 
                                                
524 Tarrow, McAdam & Tilly 2001 
525 See how this analysis, in the letter from bishop Samuel Ruiz to the Pope upon the latter’s 1993 visit to 
Mexico quoted in chapter 7, is more in accordance with the Zapatista world view than that of the national 
government: ”The crisis of the industrialized countries and the decrease in the price of oil in the first half […] 
of the ´80s, together with the burden of the external debt, became intolerable for the economic system […] 
the government undertook the first structural adjustment measures in a neoliberal framework, with high cost 
for the more vulnerable classes […] we are now experiencing what we could call “the second modernization 
of rural Chiapas” […] This is also happening in the context of the chronic drop of coffee prices […] at the 
same time that the intensity and extension of the agrarian conflicts began to increase […] The spearhead of 
this modernizing agrarian movement is the reform of Article 27.”  (Quoted in Womack, Jr, 2002. His 
translation) 
526 Rajchenberg & Heau-Lambert 1998 
527 See footnote 158, on the movie Los últimos Zapatistas - Héroes olvidados 
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Also, if claiming that EZLN is the strengthening of the processes discussed in this thesis 
– the realization of the potential for a real social movement in 20th century Chiapas, we see 
how EZLN fulfils the criteria for a social movement discussed on page XX of chapter 2: 
The permanent character; the mass character; the strict internal organizational structures 
and clearly defined goals; the collective identity and the distancing from broader society at 
the same time as they want to change society.528 
But does not seeing EZLN as the conclusive phase in this long indigenous struggle lead 
to a conclusion that subcomandante Marcos and the apologists of the Zapatista movement 
are right when they said that EZLN is really a Chiapan based, indigenous movement?529 
This is, as I have showed in chapter 7, not an obvious conclusion in the encounter between 
EZLN and the indigenous. These were two different projects – one was the indigenous 
struggle for land and emancipation, the other was the EZLN socialist revolution. But on the 
other side: There are two active subjects in the interaction between EZLN and the 
indigenous communities. Who influenced the other most, is an open question. But in the 
long term perspective, this little discussion of the origins of EZLN may not be of the 
greatest important. The interesting process here is that of a long lasting, slow and steady 
formation (seen from within the indigenous communities) and capacitating (seen from the 
outsider’s point of view) of social structures and social movements. 
All in all I feel have used theories of social movements to cast some light on EZLN and 
the historical context in Chiapas. This may not be absolute proof that such theories apply 
outside the western world, as was discussed in chapter 2. But nor does it weaken such a 
thesis, at least. 
 
Ejido Tabasco – an ideal type community? 
Another important aspect that must be addressed in this conclusion is whether ejido 
Tabasco really is a relevant community in order to describe the Zapatista movement. That 
is not an easy question to answer. The historical process discussed in this thesis is much the 
same all over the state of Chiapas, and the historical actors are the same. But, as mentioned 
in chapter 4: Where ejido Tabasco was able to exist on the land of their ancestors, others 
                                                
528 See Kjeldstadli 2002, page 37 
529 Once again: The main reason for my including the origins of EZLN is that of the discussion of the 
literature, of the way many pro-Zapatista scholars choose to look away from these (for some reason) 
uncomfortable facts. But another reason is also worth underlining: There are some troublesome aspects in the 
origins of EZLN, and in the way this, for a long time, was kept a secret. There can be little doubt that if the 
indigenous communities influenced EZLN, the same was true the other way around. This has some 
implications concerning viewing EZLN as an open, democratic movement. 
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had to leave the land of the fincas to settle new ejidos in the Lacandon jungle. The process 
of creating the ejido structures are not unlike, but settling in a brand new context meant 
that, for those who went to live in the jungle, this process was even more of a break with 
the past than the situation was in ejido Tabasco. In these newly settled ejidos, there were 
even some that consisted of different indigenous ethnicities. And, maybe even more 
important: These settlers were to become the backbone of the Zapatista movement. Also 
the relative proximity of ejido Tabasco to the local centres of Comitan and Las Margaritas, 
as opposed to those further into the jungle, is of importance in separating the communities. 
These factors have some implications for the study of ejido Tabasco as an ideal type 
community of the processes discussed in this thesis: 
1. The level of inter-communal interaction may have been weaker in the region studied 
here than in the jungle. 
2. The break-up from the finca may be too peaceful to actually give an accurate 
description of the overall situation. 
3. The first encounter with the norteño activists (who also settled in the Lacandon jungle 
upon arriving) and even more so with EZLN would have been different. And the level of 
influence on the Zapatista project may have been more important. 
4. Even the level of participation, at least in the Zapatista project, may be deeper in the 
jungle region. The fact that ejido Tabasco abandoned the project in 1998, while many 
jungle ejidos still are Zapatistas, is proof of that. This may also indicate that the 
marginalization is of greater importance in the Lacandon jungle. An example: In ejido 
Tabasco, the Zapatista schooling system never was popular.530 But in other ejidos, in the 
jungle in particular, the Zapatistas keep creating their own institutions.531 Another point 
here would be that the jungle communities are out of reach of the governmental influence, 
both when it comes to rewards and punishment (see chapter 7, on governmental aid 
programs used to “bribe” communities to leave the Zapatista movement). 
On the other hand, there are other Chiapan communities who barely, if at all, had 
anything to do with EZLN. And then there are the Protestant ones, that (to a great extent) 
refused to participate in the Zapatista struggle at all.  
                                                
530 Interview with informant 5 
531 Ejido Tabasco joined the Zapatista project, but less enthusiastically than in other parts. Without trying to 
prove Mancur Olson right, ejido Tabasco joined EZLN more as free passengers. (Olson 1977). The 
Tabasqueños saw some opportunities, but contrary to the economic man approach, maybe not the whole 
picture. Without implying that ejido Tabasco was lured into joining, it may be possible to wonder whether or 
not the consequences were considered before joining (collective farming and the army presence etc). 
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In the context of Zapatismo, then, ejido Tabasco may be a little less than the ideal type 
community. That being said: with the four points mentioned above in mind, it is possible to 
understand parts of Zapatismo through ejido Tabasco, and even more so in the historical 
approach I have chosen. As for Chiapas as a whole, I would claim ejido Tabasco is not far 
from being a rather typical representative of the processes described in this thesis. 
 
And the literature? 
I claimed in the discussion about literature in chapter 1 that two main positions can be 
identified among the scholars writing about Zapatismo: 
One holds that he indigenous population had been victims of repression for so long that it 
was just a matter for EZLN of organizing the necessary revolution that led to the uprising. 
The other position claims that revolutionaries from the city cynically used the local 
population as a tool to reach their goal of a socialist revolution. I have included some 
discussion about the two positions in chapter 7, but without wanting to let it take totally 
control of my approach. The reasoning here is that one should not make the agents of 
change, or the subjects, victims of the point of view of outside agents, who in this case 
would be the scholars writing on Zapatismo. 
Where would I place myself within the two positions after having worked with this topic 
of study for some years? I would claim, as I did in chapter 1, that they are both wrong. To 
understand Zapatismo, I claim, one has to study the historical context, as I have tried to do 
here. I follow many other scholars in doing so – I do not mean to imply that this master 
thesis is groundbreaking in its approach. As for the political tendencies also discussed in 
chapter 1, I would place my self somewhere in between the opponents and the apologists 
of the Zapatista movement. Personally, I still shave a great deal of the original sympathy 
for EZLN and its projects described in the introduction of this thesis. But my positive view 
of Zapatismo had be restored through research and fieldwork after the frustrations in the 
encounter with the body of literature. 
 
Would I have done it over again? 
Except for the focus on the Cardenista reform in chapter five, the chronology of this thesis 
is a rather traditional one in the academic study of Chiapas. If not for the spatial 
limitatations of a master thesis, I would have included the influence of the Guatemalan 
civil  war in the 1980s war in my account. This conflict did affect the Mexican neighbour, 
and more so the southernmost border state of Chiapas than any other region:  
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1. The refugees from Guatemala had a lot of contact with the Mexican indigenous 
peoples, and held talks about their common situation as marginalized in the national 
project etc.  
2. The Guatemalan army even attacked refugees on the Mexican side of the border, 
accusing them of being guerrillas. This helped tighten the bonds between the refugees and 
the Mexicans, and it showed the degree of state violence inflicted on indigenous peoples by 
the ladino elites.532  
3. The end of warfare in Guatemala and the eventual end of the cold war would ease the 
pressure on the Chiapan border with Guatemala as the southern border of the US led anti-
communist block. This made it easier for a clandestine guerrilla movement to prepare for 
war on the Mexican government in the vast areas of the Lacandon jungle. 
I would have liked to look more at this Guatemalan influence on the development in 
Chiapas. This is, as far as I can see, a field that deserves to be studied by scholars in the 
future. 
With this long historical project and the space limits of a master thesis, I had to drop the 
discussion of indigenous autonomy and the San Andres agreements about indigenous 
culture between the government and EZLN in 1996, as well as a lot of other issues not 
mentioned in this thesis.533 For my own sake, I would have liked to include the Zapatista 
arrival in Mexico City in February 2001 after a month’s travel through Mexico. The 
political meeting in the main square of Mexico City and the fact that one of the female 
leaders of an indigenous movement from the periphery of Chiapas reached the point of 
speaking to the Mexican parliament is, to me, Zapatismo’s finest moment. On the other 
hand, these processes have been discussed and analysed by many others. And seeing that 
EZLN is a social movement that still is active, I need to stop somewhere. I chose to draw 
the line in 1998, when (most of) ejido Tabasco left Zapatismo. 
I do not feel this weakens my thesis. I have set out to test that EZLN is the final – as of 
yet – stage in an indigenous struggle for land and emancipation. 
This is as far as I got. 
                                                
532 Interview with informant 10 
533 The San Andres agreements is a name used to describe the treaty of indigenous cultural right signed by 
governmental negotiators and EZLN in 1996, planned as the first of four table meetings. The process was 
stopped with this first agreement, that has never been ratified by the government and has been made a 
centrepiece claim by the Zapatistas. 
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Map 2.1: Chiapas with major cities and municipio of Las Margaritas535 
 
  
                                                
535 Adapted by Jessica Allande 
 C 
Map 2.2: Las Margaritas with important communities and the Lacandon jungle536 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
536 Adapted by Jessica Allande. The red line is the Las Margaritas – San Quintin highway. 
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Figure 3.1: Picture of finca Medellin and view of ejido Tabasco537 
 
 
                                                
537 The first picture shows the old finca Medellin, the middle one shows Tabasco 2000 in the background. 
The bottom picture shows the men of Medellin del Carmen during a collective interview in May 2007. All 
pictures are taken by Jessica Allande. 
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Figure 6.1: Organization structure of ejido unions538 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
538 Taken from Estrada Saavedra 2007, p 285. Adapted by Jessica Allande 
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Figure 7.1: Organization structure of EZLN539 
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